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There is a child trafficking problem in football which exists beneath public awareness. The 
problem involves African minors being transported to foreign countries by unscrupulous 
intermediaries who either abandon them to fend for themselves or control their mobility for 
the explicit purpose of exploitation. Child trafficking in football occurs within a football 
environment that benefits from the increased commodification of children, but football does 
not provide the requisite protections to prevent the African minors from being trafficked and 
exploited within the sport. Though football trafficking is a subset of the wider child 
trafficking issue, particular consideration must be given to the specificity of sport and the 
unique incentives which football provides to both the perpetrators and potential victims of 
the crime. 
This research aims to understand the key factors which leads to football trafficking, to 
evaluate the efficacy of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy responses, and to propose 
recommendations which improve the performance of FIFA’s regulations and offer better 
safeguards to the African minors. The study uses an interdisciplinary research method, by 
combining the legal doctrinal and socio-legal approaches to better analyse the core drivers 
of football trafficking, and to offer solutions which are tailored to the circumstances of the 
at-risk child players. 
Moreover, by examining the problem through the theoretical lens of regulatory theory, the 
analysis uncovers that there are several social, systemic, and structural factors in and around 
football’s regulatory environment which have undermined the performance of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies. The study concludes that FIFA’s regulatory shortfalls can be remedied 
by adopting procedures aligned with effective regulation, applying a child-centred approach 
to further anti-trafficking policies, and introducing practices which can tackle some of the 
fundamental vulnerabilities of the African minors. When combined, these measures could 
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Chapter 1 - INTRODUCTION 
The issue of the human trafficking of African minors within football is belatedly gaining 
recognition in both academic and non-academic circles. Talented children are recruited by 
football agents as a means of making profit by selling them to bigger European football clubs. 
This problem has existed for a sufficient period of time that it can no longer be referred to 
as “a new form of labour exploitation”,1 as was noted by the Special Rapporteur on the Sale 
of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, during her visit to Belgium in 1998.2 
In the years gone by, the legal responses to the growing instances of the crime have remained 
slow and largely ineffective, thus continuing to place African minors at risk of exploitation. 
Though this thesis focuses on the increased risks to African minors specifically, it is 
acknowledged that football trafficking exists beyond Africa and has occurred in parts of 
South America and Asia over the years. It is argued that these occurrences are indicative of 
football being a global sport that is by far the most watched and followed sport in the world.3 
Thus, in turning attention back to the African minors, it is significant that football also has a 
good (recent) history of showcasing players from Africa. 4  For example, in the English 
Premier League, the most watched league in the world,5 the award for the highest goal scorer 
in the 2018/19 football season was shared by 3 players, Mohamed Salah (Egypt), Pierre-
Emerick Aubameyang (Gabon), and Sadio Mané (Senegal). 6  With the common factor 
between these players being their African heritage/nationalities. 
The images of the players holding up their respective golden boot awards was broadcast 
around the world, and this undoubtedly motivated aspiring African footballers to dream 
about equally succeeding at top European football clubs. Considering football is sold to the 
                                                 
1  Scarpa, Silvia. "Child trafficking: International instruments to protect the most vulnerable victims." Family Court 
Review 44, no. 3 (2006): 429-447. p/432 
2 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Rights of the Child: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Ms. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos—Addendum—
Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur to Belgium and the Netherlands on the issue of Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 13, at 4–5, §§ 14– 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/73/Add.1 (1999). 
3  Sawe, Benjamin, “The Most Popular Sports in the World” (WorldAtlas, April 2018) 
<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-are-the-most-popular-sports-in-the-world.html> accessed 11/06/2020 
4  Okpara, Christian, “Why African players are dominating European leagues” (The Guardian, May 2019) 
<https://guardian.ng/sport/why-african-players-are-dominating-european-leagues/> accessed 11/06/2020 
5  Premier League, “Entertaining Audiences” <https://www.premierleague.com/this-is-pl/the-
fans/686489?articleId=686489#:~:text=The%20Premier%20League%20is%20the,90%20minutes%20of%20unpredictabl
e%20action.> accessed 11/06/2020 
6  Goal, “Premier League top scorers 2018-19: Salah, Mane & Aubameyang share Golden Boot” (Goal, May 2019) 
<https://www.goal.com/en/news/premier-league-top-scorers-2018-19-salah-mane-
aubameyang/1uwar9gb81cdt1f1hxsvjtdngv> accessed 11/06/2020 
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public as a sport for every and anyone,7 there are consequently limited mental barriers 
regarding the possibilities of becoming a professional player abroad. However, unfortunately 
for the aspiring players, the practical barriers to entering professional football at the top level 
are high, and the images representing the success of the few African players outshines the 
failures of the vast majority who have had similar dreams.8 The overriding situation indicates 
that only one in thousands of aspiring players will realise anything resembling their sporting 
aspirations in Europe.9 Yet, notwithstanding the apparent myriad of obstacles in the way of 
their success, the aspirations of the African players largely remain undeterred. The players 
persist in the pursuit of a footballing career abroad because they see football as a means of 
escaping some of the intrinsic socio-economic and developmental issues they face in their 
home countries. 
The eagerness to escape can be aligned with the migratory disposition of the African minors, 
and their decision is often supported by their parents, and the sporting and football 
environment which benefits from the commodification of child participants. On the one hand, 
in sport, the livelihoods of many adults (parents, coaches, and trainers) depend on children 
and the performances of the children in sports competitions.10 These pressures could bring 
about instances of child labour and exploitation, as several forms of maltreatment are known 
to take place when children are over-trained and abused in the name of improving their 
sporting performance.11 Whereas, on the other hand, and in football specifically, the abuse 
of child players generally leads to the sale of such players to foreign clubs, as the players are 
viewed as potential sources of revenue.12 This creates an incentive for persons looking to 
benefit from the profits involved in selling a young player abroad. Thus, unscrupulous 
intermediaries are able to leverage the eagerness of the child players who want to escape, by 
promising them a professional contract at a major European club, before requesting a 
facilitative fee for the trip to be made possible.13 Though the players’ families consider the 
                                                 
7 FIFA, ‘Our Strategy’ (Explore FIFA, 13 October 2016) <https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/explore-fifa.html> 
accessed on 03/10/2019. And see UEFA, “#EqualGame – Football is open to everyone” (December 2018) 
<https://www.uefa.com/insideuefa/social-responsibility/news/newsid=2587064.html> accessed on 09/01/2020 
8 Ungruhe, Christian. "Mobilities at play: the local embedding of transnational connections in West African football 
migration." The International Journal of the History of Sport 33, no. 15 (2016): 1767-1785. p/1776 
9 McGee, Darragh. "Displacing childhood: Labour exploitation and child trafficking in sport." In Labour Migration, Human 
Trafficking and Multinational Corporations: The Commodification of Illicit Flows, (Routledge, 2012) pp. 71-90. p/73 
10 Weber, Romana. "Protection of children in competitive sport: Some critical questions for London 2012." International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport 44, no. 1 (2009): 55-69. p/64 
11 Ibid. p/61 
12 Darby, Paul. "Moving players, traversing perspectives: Global value chains, production networks and Ghanaian football 
labour migration." Geoforum 50 (2013): 43-53. p/49 
13 Pete Pattison, ‘Football’s broken dreams: The African teenagers sold a Premier League lie’ The Guardian (London, 16 
May 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/may/16/football-broken-dreams-african-teenagers-
sold-premier-league-lie-nepal> accessed on 19 November 2018 
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fee to be a small price to pay to be a successful professional footballer in Europe,14 the 
transaction often triggers a series of events culminating in the minor being trafficked and 
either abandoned or exploited in the foreign country.15  
The International Labour Office (ILO) reported that of the 40 million victims of modern 
slavery in 2016, 1 in 4 were children.16 Of this number, there are reportedly 15,000 African 
football minors who are trafficked and exploited every year by unscrupulous persons using 
false pretences and deceptive practices.17 In some cases, the African minors are taken to a 
European country for trials but are subsequently abandoned when they are unable to secure 
a professional football contract.18 In other situations, upon arriving in Europe, the players 
are made to train and play football for long hours without being paid for their work.19 These 
instances illustrate that the vulnerabilities of the African boys and their eagerness to escape 
puts them at a significant risk of trafficking and exploitation, irrespective of the laws and 
regulations introduced to prevent such practices from taking place. This thesis focuses on 
the conditions faced by the young males because the current football landscape does not 
have a similarly burgeoning market for young foreign female talent. However, with growing 
calls for gender equality and bridging the pay gap in female football,20 young girls may soon 
be subjected to the same adverse treatment as the young boys.21  
Much of the recent commentary on trafficking refers to trafficked persons as “survivors”, as 
this gives the power back to the individual.22 Yet, in this thesis, the trafficked boys are 
referred to as victims of football trafficking because their power and autonomy is arguably 
never returned to them. To explain, the trafficked African minors are found in precarious 
                                                 
14  Esson, James. “10-step guide to football trafficking” (Loughborough News Blog, 2015) 
<http://blog.lboro.ac.uk/news/politics/10-step-guide-to-football-trafficking/5/> accessed on 1st June 2016 
15 Poli, Raffaele, “The migrations of African football players to Europe: human trafficking and neo-colonialism in question” 
(2010) Football for Development, Vienna, Austria. 
<http://www.footballfordevelopment.net/uploads/tx_drblob/storage/Poli_migration-of-African-football-players_01.pdf>. 
16 International Labour Organization, “Global estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage” Geneva 
2017. p/5 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf> 
accessed on 28/07/2020 
17  Rowe, Mark, “Dossier: The human game – tackling football’s ‘slave trade’” (Geographical, July 2018) 
<https://geographical.co.uk/people/development/item/2817-football-trafficking> accessed on 16/07/2020 
18 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice (2018).p/62 
19  Edwards, Piers. 'Underage African footballers 'trafficked' to Laos' (BBC Africa sport, 21 July 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-33595804> accessed on 01/11/2017 




accessed on 04/06/2020 
21  Brackenridge, C. H. "Children's rights in football: Welfare and work." (2010) 
<https://idrottsforum.org/articles/brackenridge/brackenridge110608.html> accessed on 02/03/2020 
22 Gozdziak, Elzbieta, and N. Micah. Victims No Longer: Research on Child Survivors of Trafficking for Sexual and Labor 




situations such as homelessness, slavery, child prostitution, and they are sometimes forced 
to engage in criminal activities to repay their “debt”23 for passage into the foreign country.24 
However, upon detection, the African minors are treated as irregular migrants or criminals, 
rather than as the victims of this human rights violation. This results in them being stripped 
of any power or status applicable to their circumstances as victims, often resulting in them 
being returned home to face the same conditions that prompted their being trafficked in the 
first instance. 25  Hence, the African boys cannot be termed as “survivors” of human 
trafficking, as they are barely even treated as “victims”. 
The occurrence of football trafficking persists despite FIFA’s regulations imposing 
significant restrictions on the international transfer of minors.26 Mala fide intermediaries, 
football academies, and football clubs, all continue to find loopholes within FIFA’s rules to 
traffic, transfer, and exploit young African boys to the more lucrative leagues in Europe.27 
The football trafficking situation is furthered by the lowly stature of West African football 
within the global game, where there is a limited range of revenue streams for the teams, so 
children are increasingly seen as vital assets that can be groomed and sold for profit. As 
Esson succinctly explained, “the structural logic of a football industry that promotes 
movement as a prerequisite to financial success merges with the migratory disposition in 
West Africa, and it is in this context that exploitative and irregular migratory practices are 
able to occur.”28 
The growing prominence of irregular migration and the football trafficking phenomenon 
suggests that there may be a gap between what the relevant laws are “on paper”, and how 
the laws are being interpreted and applied in practice. To examine this disparity, the thesis 
adopts a socio-legal approach which involves understanding a specific social situation by 
considering the relationship between the situation and the laws which directly apply to it.29 
Thus, the thesis will explore football trafficking by putting into perspective the relationship 
                                                 
23 Zimmerman, C. and M. B. Schenker, “Human trafficking for forced labour and occupational health” (2014) Occup 
Environ Med 71(12) 807. p. 807 
24 Esson, James, “Better Off at Home? Rethinking Responses to Trafficked West African Footballers in Europe”, (2015) 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 512. p/519 
25 Lisborg, Anders, Sine Plambech, "Going Back• Moving On: A synthesis report of the trends and experiences of returned 
trafficking victims in Thailand and the Philippines” ILO, Bangkok, 2009. Cited in Paasche, Erlend, May-Len Skilbrei, and 
Sine Plambech. "Vulnerable Here or There? Examining the vulnerability of victims of human trafficking before and after 
return." Anti-trafficking review (2018): 34-51. p/35 
26 FIFA, ‘Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players’ (2020) Article 19 & 19bis 
27  FIFPro, “FIFPRO AND FIFA IMPROVE PROTECTION OF MINORS” (28 January 2015) 
<https://www.fifpro.org/news/fifpro-and-fifa-improve-protection-of-minors/en/> accessed on 11 May 2017 
28  Esson, James. "Playing the victim? Human trafficking, African youth, and geographies of structural 
inequality." Population, Space and Place (2020): e2309. p/6 




between the relevant anti-trafficking laws (at FIFA and international law levels) and the 
social situation to which the laws are ordinarily supposed to apply (i.e., the prevention of 
child trafficking). A socio-legal approach will enable the thesis to highlight the role the 
relevant laws have played in the creation, maintenance, and/or changes, to the social 
circumstances of the at-risk minors.30 
The following analysis of anti-trafficking laws is aimed at demonstrating that football 
trafficking is a poorly understood phenomenon. Despite it being a subset of the broader child 
trafficking issue, football trafficking, in particular, has been under-examined. This lack of 
an in-depth understanding has significantly limited the efficacy of FIFA’s regulatory 
responses to its occurrence. As it is commonly noted that effective regulations cannot be 
formed when the regulator does not understand the full extent of the problem being regulated 
against. The thesis argues that FIFA’s current anti-trafficking regulations have been 
modelled on incomplete information, and this has been to the detriment of the African (and 
other foreign) minors involved with the sport. Thus, obtaining an understanding of the full 
extent of the football trafficking problem is pertinent for FIFA to be able to develop effective 
anti-trafficking policies in the long-term. 
1.1 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
There are several gaps in the policies and research on football trafficking which this thesis 
looks to bridge. 
At an international law level, there are instruments which should limit the occurrence of 
trafficking, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC),31 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,32 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, 
which aims to eradicate forced labour and human trafficking.33 Despite the strength and 
global applicability of these instruments, there are two core limitations to their usefulness 
within the context of football trafficking. First, these regulations do not explicitly deal with 
the specificity of sport, instead, they view the occurrence of trafficking through the prism of 
human rights, immigration, or criminality. The anti-trafficking regulations therefore do not 
account for the unique incentives and rewards (pull factors) which football offers to the 
aspiring African minors. These incentives consequently amplify the vulnerabilities and 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
The Protocols Thereto” of 25 December 2003 
32 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, 
vol.1577. (1999) The Preamble. 
33  United Nations, “The Sustainable Development Agenda: 17 Goals to Transform Our World” 
<https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/> accessed 20/11/2019 
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inherent factors pushing the African minors into the hands of unscrupulous persons. Second, 
the applicability of international law in this sporting context is hindered by the insularity of 
FIFA and football’s regulatory environment. FIFA, the global regulator of the sport, is a 
unique self-regulatory organisation which does not openly welcome external interference in 
football matters. FIFA has its own internal legal mechanisms and determines how all matters 
related to the sport are to be resolved, thus limiting the use of wider regulatory instruments 
for tackling this football related problem. 
There have been several gaps in FIFA’s regulatory responses to football trafficking. 
Instruments such as its current ban on the international transfer of minors (ITMs), shows a 
lack of understanding of football trafficking and the root causes leading to its occurrence. 
For example, FIFA’s ban does not account for the peculiarity of the push and pull factors 
faced by the aspiring African players. FIFA’s regulations and the practices fostered within 
football has incentivised the intense recruitment of foreign child players, and has created 
loopholes which unscrupulous persons and teams have been able to use to traffic and exploit 
players, both within and beneath FIFA’s radar. FIFA believed that the ban on ITMs would 
protect minors from the adverse human rights risks related to trafficking, but in practice, the 
ban has pushed minors into positions of heightened vulnerability in their quest to go abroad 
and attain professional playing contracts. Considering the significant supply of willing 
African football talent looking to leave, FIFA’s regulatory responses has neither created a 
model to quell their football related migratory disposition, nor has FIFA introduced policies 
to significantly deter the foreign clubs from demanding the “cheap” labour which the African 
players are eager to provide. FIFA created a global football transfer market which makes it 
possible for players to be signed on a transnational basis, but FIFA’s policies have been 
unable to offer the requisite protections for some football minors. This lack of protection 
continues to occur whilst the sport benefits from the commodification of child players, and 
the constant development of “cheap” football labour into profitable assets. 
At an academic level, sociologists Esson34 and Darby35 have explored football trafficking in 
depth. And from a legal standpoint, Drywood considered the role the EU could play in 
correcting this human rights issue in sport.36 Yilmaz and others proposed that FIFA’s anti-
                                                 
34 Esson, James. "Better off at home? Rethinking responses to trafficked West African footballers in Europe." Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies 41, no. 3 (2015): 512-530. 
35 Darby, Paul, Gerard Akindes, and Matthew Kirwin. "Football academies and the migration of African football labor to 
Europe." Journal of Sport and Social Issues 31, no. 2 (2007): 143-161. 
36 Drywood, Eleanor. "‘When we buy a young boy…’: Migrant Footballers, Children’s Rights and the Case for EU 
Intervention." Stalford, Helen and Iusmen, Ingi (eds.) (2015): 191-220. 
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trafficking policies have not been formed in the best interests of the child. 37  Najarian 
provided a range of regulatory recommendations which FIFA could adopt to offer better 
protections to the at-risk minors.38 Of the academic discourse on football trafficking, this 
thesis fills a gap by combining the use of the socio-legal research method, and the theoretical 
lens of “regulatory theory”, to conduct a thorough analysis of the problem and propose 
tailored solutions. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The gaps in the literature led to the following research questions: 
1. What are the key factors leading to the trafficking and exploitation of African 
minors? 
2. Are current regulatory responses to the problem adequate? 
3. How could an alternate regulatory framework succeed in limiting football 
trafficking? 
1.3 RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
With the research questions in mind, the thesis aims to achieve the following core objectives: 
1. To understand the football trafficking problem and the factors that have contributed 
to its prominence from the perspective of FIFA, the football teams, and the African 
minors. 
2. To locate FIFA’s position within football’s regulatory space, and to highlight the 
organisation’s legal authority over all matters related to the sport. 
3. To evaluate the legal and regulatory context of FIFA’s anti-trafficking laws, and to 
uncover the systemic, structural, and social factors affecting the performance of its 
policies in practice. 
4. To understand when regulatory failure occurs, and what remedies are available for 
correcting such failures. 
5. To propose essential amendments to FIFA that will enable the organisation to 
produce more effective anti-trafficking policies that can prevent football trafficking 
and safeguard the African minors from exploitation. 
                                                 
37  Yilmaz, Serhat, James Esson, Paul Darby, Eleanor Drywood, and Carolynne Mason. "Children’s rights and the 
regulations on the transfer of young players in football." International Review for the Sociology of Sport 55, no. 1 (2020): 
115-124. 
38 Najarian, Alex C. "The Lost Boys: FIFA's Insufficient Efforts to Stop Trafficking of Youth Footballers." Sports Law. 
J. 22 (2015): 151. 
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6. To recommend a nuanced alternate regulatory model, able to curb football trafficking 
by limiting some of the core vulnerabilities of the African minors. 
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
A model framework for this type of social and regulatory research was developed by Crotty39 
and refined by Losoncz.40 The framework proposes that researchers address three questions 
which would guide the analysis and aid the development of a coherent and consistent 
research design. These are: 
1. What is my theoretical perspective? That is, in my view, what theoretical 
rationale would capture effectively the interplay between actors, events and 
mechanisms? 
2. What is my overarching research strategy or methodology? 
3. What methods or tools will I use for my data collection?41 
1.4.1 Theoretical Perspective 
This thesis adopts the use of regulatory theory as the chosen theoretical perspective. Through 
this lens, the evaluation of FIFA and the football trafficking problem will be able to go 
beyond traditional legal tools and mechanisms.42 In addition, the study will benefit from the 
interdisciplinary and flexible nature of the chosen theory, as the ensuing analysis will 
account for the specific context of sport. This capacity of the theory stems from the fact that 
much of what is commonly referred to as “sports law” coincides with regulation and 
regulatory theory. Therefore, regulatory theory is significant for the analysis of the specific 
factors contributing to football trafficking. The theory will aid the exploration of FIFA’s 
anti-trafficking policies and the examination of FIFA’s position in football’s regulatory 
space. Then, the theory will be used in a diagnostic capacity to evaluate the performance of 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies. Finally, the theory is adopted as a remedial tool to apply 
social, political, and economic pressures on FIFA to remedy the performance and failure of 
its anti-trafficking regulations.43 
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The methodology for this project is primarily legal doctrinal, with a significant socio-legal 
dimension that enables the further analysis of the relevant anti-trafficking policies in context. 
Within the law discipline, the legal doctrinal methodology is the most accepted due to the 
distinctive element it brings to legal research. 44  The methodology consists of deriving 
arguments from authoritative sources and presenting the law as a coherent set of principles 
and rules.45 Conversely, the socio-legal methodology allows the research to provide new 
perspectives on the law, in a manner that complements the doctrinal research and contributes 
to law’s critical awareness of itself.46 The socio-legal dimension allows for the incorporation 
of key analysis from other academic disciplines into legal research, in order to offer 
innovative solutions for tackling a problem. 47  For example, by using the socio-legal 
approach, the research will be able to examine the social factors underlying the effectiveness 
of FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations. 48  Such an examination will consider the “social 
origins, social conditions of existence, and social consequences” 49 of FIFA’s policies, to 
determine how its rules are being implemented in the real world. 
This type of legal research that combines the legal doctrinal and the socio-legal research 
methodologies often benefits from the insight drawn from consulting varied but relevant 
intellectual sources. 50  The combined methodologies allows this analysis to be more 
balanced, 51  and able to transcend the limitations of the individual approaches. 52  The 
overriding positive of the combination is that this research will be able to propose quality 
solutions and regulatory recommendations which are informed by the factors that undermine 
the performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies. 
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49 Siems, Mathias M, and Daithí Mac Síthigh. “Mapping legal research.” (2012) The Cambridge Law Journal 71, no. 3: 
651-676. p/655 
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1.5 RESEARCH METHOD AND STRATEGY 
1.5.1 Research Question 1 – Literature Review 
To answer the first research question and determine the key factors leading to the trafficking 
and exploitation of African minors, this thesis will illustrate a comprehensive literature 
review of the academic discourse pertaining to the trafficking of persons, the continued 
emigration of talented personnel from Africa, and the regulatory environment surrounding 
football. However, it should be noted that the data (both qualitative and quantitative) on 
trafficking is generally sketchy, so many of the sources relied upon when discussing this 
phenomenon are perhaps more anecdotal than academically robust. To compensate for this, 
the thesis will draw from a wide range of sources, disciplines, and documents,53 as relevant 
to the occurrence of football trafficking. The research method involves using sources such 
as case law, FIFA regulations, UN reports, journal articles (both law and non-law), sports 
law textbooks, relevant websites, and media reports. This research method coincides with 
the expectation that doctrinal researchers are to conduct an in-depth literature review,54 in 
order to have a structured reasoning of the available literature.55 
The following chapters will provide an answer to the first research question: 
2. The Trafficking of Persons: understanding human trafficking and discussing 
relevant anti-trafficking laws at an international law level; and analysing football 
trafficking, explaining how it occurs, and identifying the factors that have contributed 
to the growth of the problem in the sport.  
3. The Migration of the African Labour Force: considering the impact of labour 
migration on Africa and the migratory disposition of the African football minors. 
4. Regulation, Regulatory Space and FIFA’s Anti-Trafficking Policies: exploring 
the importance of regulation in understanding FIFA’s regulatory structure and 
strategies; analysing FIFA’s role as the global regulator of football; and discussing 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulatory responses. 
1.5.2 Research Question 2 – Analysis of Regulatory Responses 
To answer the second research question and determine the adequacy of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies, regulatory theory is used as a diagnostic tool in combination with the 
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socio-legal approach. Regulatory theory will help to provide a critical insight into the 
conditions and consequences of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies, 56  by highlighting the 
structural, systemic, and social factors which have affected its policy performance thus far.57 
To conduct this diagnosis a list of amenable benchmarks, which are based on the “general 
currency” areas of regulation, are going to be used.58 The benchmarks offer a means of 
assessing how regulation should work,59 such as by ascertaining: the policy objectives; the 
aspect of regulation; the assessed party; and the decentred regulatory regime. With the socio-
legal approach, the evaluation of FIFA’s policies will address issues that neither a legal 
doctrinal,60 nor a strict social science methodology, would be able to address individually.61 
Through this research method, the thesis will determine the true impact of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking rules,62 and will highlight the gaps between the operation of the policies in theory, 
and that which occurs in practice.63 
The analysis will draw on existing empirical football trafficking sources of data.64 For 
example, Esson, a leading academic in the field, has undergone substantial empirical 
fieldwork with African football minors in Ghana (conducting 211 informal interviews)65 and 
France (interviewing Guinean, Ivorian, and Cameroonian minors who had been involved in 
irregular football migration),66 to identify the full extent of the football trafficking problem 
first-hand. Esson’s findings will inform the examination of the social factors negatively 
impacting the performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies. Additionally, the thesis will 
expand on other systemic and structural factors to illustrate how these contribute to the 
ineffective performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies. 
The analysis will be conducted through the following chapters: 
5. Evaluating the performance of FIFA’s policies in attaining its policy objectives. 
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6. Evaluating FIFA’s regulations - Aspects and Assessed Party: examining the 
social and systemic factors which impinge upon the effectiveness of ‘aspects’ of 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies. Also, discussing FIFA as the ‘assessed party’ to 
determine the structural factors preventing optimal regulatory performance. 
7. Evaluating FIFA as a decentred body/non-state regulator, to understand the 
common regulatory problems such bodies face, and to explain how an organisation’s 
set up can influence the performance of its policies.  
8. FIFA’s regulatory failure? – exploring the circumstances around failing 
regulations and drawing inferences with the performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policies. 
1.5.3 Research Question 3 – Proposed Solutions 
To address the third research question and justify how the proposed alternate regulatory 
framework could succeed in limiting football trafficking, regulatory theory is deployed in a 
remedial capacity. The discussions will expand on the findings from the evaluation of 
FIFA’s laws, to propose remedies for countering regulatory failure, and to propose adequate 
regulatory recommendations to FIFA. Hutchinson argued that “good quality doctrinal 
research goes well beyond description, analysis, and critique, and invariably suggests ways 
the law could be amended, or […] improved”.67 Hence, the regulatory recommendations and 
alternate model being proposed will be informed by the analysis into the internal and external 
factors which have affected FIFA’s policy performance. Thereby allowing FIFA to produce 
more effective anti-trafficking policies in the future. 
The following chapters will discuss the third research question of this thesis: 
9. Remedying FIFA’s Regulatory Failure and the performance of its anti-trafficking 
policies. Analysing how organisational reform and improved legitimacy and 
accountability practices could result in better protection for the at-risk minors. 
10. Creating Effective anti-trafficking regulations: Discussing the core facets of 
effective regulation and modelling this to the regulatory environment of football and 
FIFA, illustrating how the proposed practices could fit the specific circumstances 
around football trafficking. In addition, the UNCRC is considered as an important 
yardstick to proffer a child-centred regulatory approach to better anti-trafficking 
policies, whilst a legal route into professional football is also discussed. 
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11. Alternate Regulatory Model for tackling football trafficking. Analysing how the 
development of African football, through the adoption of Sport for Development and 
Peace programmes, could lead to the eradication of some of the intrinsic factors that 
contribute to the occurrence of football trafficking amidst the African minors. 
1.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This research provides a two-fold contribution to the literature on football trafficking: the 
theoretical perspective being used to analyse the problem, and the alternate regulatory model 
being proposed.  
The use of regulatory theory as both a diagnostic and remedial tool has not previously 
occurred within football trafficking research. With the area ordinarily being under-
researched and having a limited range of law related academic discourse, this project offers 
a significant contribution to the knowledge and understanding of football trafficking from 
this legal and regulatory perspective. This perspective views the problem as occurring 
beyond the confined prisms of human rights, immigration, or criminality. The diagnostic 
application of regulatory theory paves the way for a thorough evaluation of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking laws in a different manner to the pre-existing literature in the field. Moreover, the 
examination and assessment of FIFA’s relevant policies provides an in-depth insight into the 
internal and external factors which have contributed to the underperformance of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies over the years. This level of examination into FIFA’s regulations will 
inform future research and policy actions pertaining to football trafficking. Leading to more 
tailored and effective regulatory responses to the problem. 
The adoption of regulatory theory as a remedial tool allows this research to contribute to the 
football trafficking field in three ways: 1) through the proposed remedies to correct FIFA’s 
organisational and structural failures, as a means of improving the performance of its anti-
trafficking policies; 2) by offering a comprehensive range of regulatory recommendations to 
FIFA that will result in it improving its regulatory practices, and enable it to create more 
effective anti-trafficking policies; and 3) by using the socio-legal approach as an underlying 
basis to offer regulatory recommendations to FIFA, which are reflective of the social factors 
that undermine its policy performance (i.e., the alternate regulatory model being proposed). 
The alternate regulatory model represents a contribution to knowledge when considered and 
applied as a specific means of curbing football trafficking. It provides a nuanced solution to 
the problem that uses the resources, globality, and popularity of football, to counter the 
vulnerabilities of the at-risk African minors. By using football to tackle the root causes of 
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the problem, it is argued, that the minors would be less likely to enter the precarious football 





Chapter 2 - THE TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS 
Prior to discussing football trafficking, it is essential to understand human trafficking on a 
general basis and to examine some of the relevant international law instruments related to 
trafficking. This is to contextualise football trafficking and explore the peculiarities of its 
occurrence as a subset of the wider literature on human trafficking. After which, the steps 
involved in football trafficking can be considered, before analysing the factors that 
contributed to the initiation of the trafficking problem within the sport. 
2.1 DEFINING HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
Human trafficking occurs when an individual, by himself or through an intermediary, assists 
the illegal entry of another person into a foreign territory. The trafficker subjects the “alien” 
to fraudulent practices, violence, threats, or other forms of constraint to take advantage of 
the individual’s illegal administrative status.68 In various instances, the trafficker also looks 
to profit from the sale of the trafficked individual’s labour or sexual services in the 
destination country.69 The prevalence of trafficking is known to be driven by economic gain, 
and human trafficking, in particular, is considered to be an especially lucrative trade. This is 
because unlike the one-time profits of drug and arms trafficking, a single human trafficking 
"investment" generally yields consistent future profits for the traffickers.70 In addition to 
these profits, human trafficking has notoriously low risks of detection, apprehension, 
prosecution, and penalties for traffickers. In some cases, this is due to insufficient laws 
against trafficking in persons in a given region.71 Whilst in other instances, the impunity of 
the traffickers can be ascribed to the decidedly "soft" approach adopted by state authorities 
when dealing with human traffickers at the prosecution stage.72 Hence, human trafficking 
has been described as the “perfect crime”73 because of an apparent absence of criminal 
liability. 
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For several years, there was no internationally accepted definition of trafficking.74 However, 
the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons 
(Trafficking Protocol) provided a globally accepted definition for the problem. According 
to “The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016”,75 
the Trafficking Protocol is one of the most prominent international instruments introduced 
to abolish human trafficking.76 Hyland explained that the Trafficking Protocol is the first 
international instrument to comprehensively define trafficking, and that “the Protocol 
reflects the first international consensus on the definition of trafficking, which is the first 
step toward a concerted international effort to combat trafficking”.77 
Thus, Article 3 paragraph (a) of the Trafficking Protocol defines trafficking in persons as 
the: 
Recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of 
threat or the use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.78  
It has been contended that the definition is intentionally broad so it can be applied flexibly 
to multiple contexts of exploitation.79 This empowers the Protocol’s definition to address 
other yet-to-be-conceived forms of trafficking and guarantees the instrument’s longevity.80 
The trafficking definition has a threefold structure:  
1. An ACT, consisting of: Recruitment; transportation; transfer; harbouring or receipt 
of persons. 
2. By MEANS of: Threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, 
deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, giving or receiving payments 
or benefits to achieve consent of a person having control over another. Article 3(b) 
                                                 
74 Gallagher, Anne, and Paul Holmes. "Developing an effective criminal justice response to human trafficking: Lessons 
from the front line." International criminal justice review 18, no. 3 (2008): 318-343. p/319 
75 European Commission's "The EU Strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012-2016" p. 4 
76 UN General Assembly, 'Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, 
supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime' (2000) 55 GA res 25. 
77 Hyland, Kelly E., 'The Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children' (2001) 8(2) Human Rights Brief 12. p. 31 
78 UN General Assembly, 'Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, 
supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime' (2000) 55 GA res 25 
79  Saner, Raymond, Lichia Yiu, and Laurel Rush. "The measuring and monitoring of human trafficking." Public 
Administration and Policy (2018). p/95 
80  Fredette, Kalen. "Revisiting the UN protocol on human trafficking: Striking balances for more effective 
legislation." Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 17 (2009): 101. p/114 
29 
 
of the Trafficking Protocol states that consent on the part of the victim is irrelevant 
if one of the means is used.81 
3. For the PURPOSE of: Exploitation (including, forced labour or services, slavery or 
practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs, the exploitation of 
the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation).82 
All three elements must be present for the Trafficking Protocol to become operational. 
Therefore, for trafficking to have occurred, there would need to be an ‘act’ through a ‘means’ 
and with a ‘purpose of exploitation’,83 such as when the victims of trafficking are recruited 
through the means of deception for exploitative labour. The only exception to this rule is in 
the case of minors (under 18 persons), wherein the ‘means’ requirement is waived,84 as 
codified in Articles 3(c) of the Trafficking Protocol. 85  This exception was added to 
acknowledge the fact that a child is “unable to consent to certain types of activities”.86 
Consequently, a minor is a victim of trafficking once they have suffered the above ‘act’ and 
‘purpose’ elements of the Trafficking Protocol. For the child, coercion, deceit, abuse of 
power or any other “means” of trafficking does not need to be proven, as is often the case 
when dealing with adult victims.87 Thus, this thesis focuses on the trafficking of minors due 
to their specific vulnerabilities, and the “ruthless exploitation” trafficked children generally 
face, according to UNICEF.88 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ON ANTI-TRAFFICKING 
International law is an essential tool in the fight against human trafficking, especially 
considering the number of regulatory instruments introduced to combat this epidemic.89 The 
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United Nations (UN), along with other governmental bodies and states recognised the 
importance of protecting children from precarious circumstances related to human rights and 
trafficking, and have consequently produced several declarations and resolutions to aid this 
objective. Similar to the international regulatory and legal environment, FIFA also 
commissioned an independent report by John Ruggie, Professor in Human Rights and 
International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School, and former top United Nations official on 
business and human rights.90 Ruggie was tasked with developing recommendations on how 
FIFA can embed respect for human rights across its global operations,91 and his report 
consequently led to FIFA’s commitment to respect all internationally recognised human 
rights through its first Human Rights Policy in 2017.92 FIFA’s Human Rights Policy is 
considered further in chapter 7.93 
Nonetheless, this section focuses on three international instruments from the UN that will be 
most relevant to the analysis of football trafficking. The section discusses the provisions and 
their relevance by way of an introduction, whereas further analysis on the adaptability of the 
instruments within the specific context of football trafficking is discussed later in chapter 
5.94 
2.2.1 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) 
The UNTOC is a multilateral treaty that was adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
on 15 November 2000, it came into effect on 25 December 2003,95 and has been ratified by 
147 countries.96 States that ratify this instrument commit themselves to taking a series of 
measures against transnational organised crime.97  The treaty represents the first serious 
attempt by the international community to invoke the weapon of international law in the 
battle against transnational organised crime.98 The treaty is commonly referred to as the 
Palermo Protocols, and it is supplemented by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
                                                 
90 Gavel, Doug, “Independent Report Recommends how FIFA Needs to Manage the Far-Reaching Human Rights Risks of 
its Global Enterprise” (2016) Harvard Kennedy School <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/announcements/independent-report-
recommends-how-fifa-needs-manage-far-reaching-human-rights-risks> accessed on 18/08/2021 
91  Ruggie, John, “For the game. For the world. FIFA and human rights” (2016) Harvard Kennedy School 
<https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Ruggie_humanrightsFIFA_reportApril2016.pdf> accessed on 31/08/19. 
92 FIFA, “FIFA’s Human Rights Policy” (May 2017 edition) 
93 7.4.2: Lack of recognition of wider human rights 
94 5.3: Comparing Performance 
95 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
The Protocols Thereto” of 25 December 2003 
96 United Nations Treaty Collection, “12. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” New York, 
15 November 2000 <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12&chapter=18&lang=en> accessed 30/07/2020 
97  UNODC, “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto” 
<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html> accessed on 19/11/2020 
98 Gallagher, Anne. "Human rights and the new UN protocols on trafficking and migrant smuggling: A preliminary 
analysis." Hum. Rts. Q. 23 (2001): 975. p/976 
31 
 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (Trafficking Protocol); 99  the 
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling Protocol);100 
and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms (Firearms 
Protocol).101 Of the three protocols, the Trafficking and Smuggling protocols are the most 
important to this discussion on human trafficking. 
Trafficking Protocol 
The Trafficking Protocol is a multifaceted instrument which is considered to be the most 
comprehensive and explicitly articulated international legal framework on human 
trafficking.102  The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is responsible for 
implementing the protocol, and offers the practical help to nation states regarding drafting 
their laws, creating comprehensive national anti-trafficking strategies, and assisting with 
implementation.103 
There are two overriding accomplishments of the Trafficking Protocol. The first is in 
developing a global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in 
persons.104 The second is by replacing a strict, traditional law enforcement approach to anti-
trafficking, with a three-pronged (3-P) approach that takes into account trafficking 
prevention, punishment of traffickers, and protection of victims.105 As Fredette explained, 
the 3-P approach enjoys considerable overlap, because successful prosecution which results 
in incarceration will not only operate as a specific deterrent and, hence, prevent future 
offenses, but it will simultaneously protect the victims.106 
Prosecution 
The Protocol sets out mandatory criminal law enforcement provisions for state parties, 
directed at successfully apprehending and prosecuting traffickers. Article 5 of the protocol 
requires nation states to adopt necessary measures to criminalise trafficking, attempted 
trafficking, and other intentional participation in a trafficking scheme, in order to protect and 
deter the further trafficking of women and children.107 
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The Protocol contains provisions which are purportedly "victim-focused"108 and directed at 
preventing trafficking offenses. Article 9 of the Trafficking Protocol calls on state parties to 
develop comprehensive programs policies and measures to combat and prevent trafficking 
and protect victims from re-victimisation. The provision requires states to “take or strengthen 
measures … to alleviate the factors that make…women and children [especially] vulnerable 
to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment, and lack of equal opportunities.” 109 
Though the identified aspects are well-known push factors that influence the occurrence of 
trafficking, the provision only requests that member states “endeavour to undertake 
measures such as research, information and mass media campaigns and social and economic 
initiatives to prevent and combat trafficking in persons”. 110  This requirement does not 
provide a concrete framework for tackling the listed push factors, nor does it provide 
instructions on how the measures are going to be implemented in practice. As acknowledged 
in the Travaux Préparatoires of the Trafficking Protocol, “the high costs of these benefits 
and the fact that they apply equally to all State parties in which victims are found, regardless 
of the level of socio-economic development or availability of resources, precluded these 
from being made obligatory.”111 Thus, without making the Article 9 requirement obligatory 
and collaborating with state parties to devise a concrete way to level the resource, structural, 
and general socio-economic gap between the source and destination countries, the propensity 
of the Trafficking Protocol to actually prevent the occurrences of human trafficking is likely 
to be limited.  
Protection 
For anti-trafficking legislation to be thorough and effective, it is commonly held that there 
must be strong provisions for the protection of trafficked persons. To this end, Article 6(1) 
of the Trafficking Protocol requires that state parties protect the privacy and identity of 
victims by making legal proceedings confidential. Article 6(2) requires that States provide 
victims with relevant information and legal assistance during any criminal proceedings 
against offenders. Article 6(3) provides that state parties consider implementing measures to 
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provide for the physical, psychological, and social recovery of victims of trafficking in 
persons. Article 6(4) requires that state parties consider the age, gender, and special needs 
of victims of trafficking in persons. Article 6(5) adds further that each Party "shall endeavour 
to provide for" the physical safety of victims of trafficking while they are within its territory. 
Article 6(6) mandates legislation affording victims compensation, which provides additional 
incentives for victims to cooperate with the prosecution.112 Article 7 calls on member states 
to consider measures for allowing trafficked victims to remain in the state into which they 
were trafficked.113 Article 8 deals with the repatriation of the trafficking victim, and notes 
that this should be done with regard for the safety of the person.114 
Despite the inclusion of these protection provisions, the Protocol has received criticism for 
being overly oriented towards the protection and assistance of victims primarily due to their 
utility as witnesses for trials.115 This is further validated by the fact that some of the measures 
are mandatory for the member states, whilst others are only optional.116 Coincidentally, 
Articles which de-emphasise the victim’s role as a witness, like Article 6(3),(4) and Article 
7, carry markedly diminished State obligations.117 Article 6(3) requires that States only 
"consider" the aforementioned measures, rather than directly compelling them to provide 
such victim assistance.118 
Article 7 requires that states “consider” adopting measures to permit stay for trafficked 
persons. Without making this a mandatory requirement,119 States can refuse a person from 
staying, especially when the individual’s “victim” status is still in dispute. In this instance, 
the child runs the risk of being removed from the destination country as part of a State’s 
claim to protecting the victim.120 However, the decision to return a trafficked child to their 
home country is often made without consideration of the complex circumstances that led to 
their being trafficked in the first instance. For example, trafficking victims who are returned 
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potentially face the same “pressures upon return that had prompted their departure.”121 They 
are deported to a “home” and family circumstances filled with anxiety and 
disappointment.122 In the case of victims of football trafficking, the players are left to face 
their families or wider communities who likely financed the ultimately unsuccessful 
clandestine trip abroad.123 Some parents of the trafficking victims have even asked their 
children not to come back to Africa and to stay abroad, even under precarious circumstances, 
just so they could achieve their footballing aspirations.124 Outside football, returned victims 
have faced additional problems, such as being mocked for coming back with no money, 
receiving demands for the repayment of debts, and being shamed for the type of work 
engaged in whilst abroad.125 Hence, sending child victims of trafficking back home may not 
be in the child’s best interest, and may contravene Article 9(b) of the Trafficking Protocol, 
which compels States to protect the child victims from re-victimisation. 
Smuggling Protocol 
The Smuggling Protocol adopted by the UN General Assembly resolution 55/25 entered into 
force on 28 January 2004. The Protocol deals with the growing problem of organised 
criminal groups who smuggle migrants, often at substantial risk to the migrants and at great 
profit for the smugglers. The major achievement of the Protocol was that, for the first time 
in a global international instrument, a definition of smuggling of migrants was developed 
and agreed upon.126 The Protocol aims to prevent smuggled migrants from facing the worst 
forms of exploitation which often characterises the smuggling process,127 by protecting the 
rights of smuggled migrants.128  
Unlike trafficking, smuggling does not entail coercion or deception, indicating that 
smuggling is often a voluntary act on the part of those smuggled.129 Smugglers are said to 
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be present and participate actively during the recruitment and transportation processes.130 
The services of smugglers end when those smuggled have reached their destination, whereas 
trafficking would result in the persons being exploited upon arrival in the destination 
country.131 In some situations where smuggled migrants are forced into dependency through 
mental and/or physical violence, or where they are exploited, this could be seen as trafficking 
rather than smuggling.132 This is because when exploitation occurs, the smuggled migrant is 
arguably no longer willingly taking part in the activities that are imposed upon them. 
2.2.2 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
The UNCRC was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1989, and it came 
into force on 2 September 1990. The UNCRC is the most highly ratified instrument in 
international law (196 parties), with the USA isolated as the principal dissenter.133 The 
UNCRC was the first comprehensive, internationally binding treaty to give full recognition 
to the individual rights of children.134 The instrument was the driving and decisive force in 
mobilising the international community in favour of respecting and protecting the rights of 
children.135 It has 54 articles that cover all aspects of a child’s life and sets out the civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights that all children everywhere are entitled to.136 
Through the UNCRC, child rights would penetrate all sectors of society, such as, from the 
schools to the military, from the family to the sport context, and applying in public as well 
as private domains, “with no exception.” 137 The UNCRC is the main reference regarding 
the situation of trafficked children, considering its provisions deal with the illicit transfer of 
children, their exploitation, and trafficking.138 It is expected that signatories to the treaty 
adapt their laws, policies, programmes, and institutions, to the minimum standards and 
requirements enshrined within the UNCRC.139 
                                                 
130 Ellis, Tom and James Akpala, 'Making sense of the relationship between trafficking in persons, human smuggling, and 
organised crime: the case of Nigeria' (2011) 84(1) The Police Journal 13. p/3 
131 Stoyanova, Vladislava. "Complementary protection for victims of human trafficking under the European Convention 
on Human Rights." Goettingen J. Int'l L. 3 (2011): 777. p/781-2 
132  King, Lindsey, “International Law and Human Trafficking” (Human Rights and Human Welfare) 
<http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/trafficking/InternationalLaw.pdf> accessed on 29 August 2016, p. 89 
133 Killkelly, Ursula, and Laura Lundy. "Children's rights in action: using the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as 
an auditing tool." Child & Fam. lq 18 (2006): 331. p/331 
134 Kinkelly, Ursula. "Protecting children's rights under the ECHR: the role of positive obligations." N. Ir. Legal Q. 61 
(2010): 245. p/246 
135 Doek, Jaap E. "The CRC 20 years: An overview of some of the major achievements and remaining challenges." Child 
abuse & neglect 33, no. 11 (2009): 771-782. p/772 
136  UNICEF, “How We Protect Children's Rights with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child” 
<https://www.unicef.org.uk/what-we-do/un-convention-child-rights/> accessed on 22/11/2020 
137 David, Paulo. "Respecting the rights of the child in sports: Not an option." In International Handbook on Child Rights 
and School Psychology, pp. 377-388. Springer, Cham, 2020. p/378 
138 Scarpa, Silvia. "Child trafficking: International instruments to protect the most vulnerable victims." Family Court 
Review 44, no. 3 (2006): 429-447. p/439 
139 David, Paulo. "Respecting the rights of the child in sports: Not an option." In International Handbook on Child Rights 
and School Psychology, pp. 377-388. Springer, Cham, 2020. p/378 
36 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child monitors the Convention’s 
implementation.140 The committee consists of 10 experts (Art. 43 UNCRC), and state parties 
are expected to regularly submit reports on the measures they have taken to enforce the 
UNCRC’s provisions. The Committee in turn produces a set of concluding observations on 
the extent to which a State is complying with its obligations.141 
The UNCRC defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen years”, and 
recognises that children require special consideration based on their increased susceptibility 
to exploitation.142 The UNCRC contains specific provisions concerning the well-being of 
minors, including their rights to:  
 Being protected from abduction, sale or moved illegally to a different place in or 
outside their country for the purpose of exploitation. 143  This provision is 
augmented by the optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child prostitution 
and Child Pornography (2000), which prohibits trafficking in children for any 
purpose, including for exploitation and forced labour.144 
 Protection from all forms of mistreatment, physically, or mentally;145 
 Special care for the child when deprived of family environment;146 
 Protection from economic exploitation and from performing work that will 
interfere with the child’s education;147  
 A standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral, 
and social development;148  
 Rehabilitation, as a victim of trafficking;149 
 Protection from all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of a 
child's welfare.150 
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The "Best Interests of the Child" principle 
Outside the provisions that protect children from trafficking, an additional area of specific 
interest within this study is Article 3(1) UNCRC, which provides that “in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child 
shall be a primary consideration”.151 The best interest principle recognises the vulnerability 
of children and the need to offer them special protections by adopting a paternalistic 
approach.152 However, the choice of terminology used by the drafters suggests that the 
child's best interests are not to be considered as the single overriding factor,153 but rather, are 
to be translated as “a” primary consideration instead of “the” primary or paramount factor 
in matters relating to a child.154 In considering the best interests of the child, Article 3 
UNCRC is often read in conjunction with the autonomy principle in Article 12 UNCRC. 
Article 12 establishes the right of every child to freely express his or her views in all matters 
affecting them, and the subsequent right for those views to be given due weight according 
to the child's age and maturity.155 The autonomy principle is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 10.156 
Zermatten explained that there are three elements to the best interest principle. First, it is a 
rule of procedure, as whenever a decision is to be taken that will affect a specific child or a 
group of children, the decision-making process must consider the possible impacts of the 
decision (positive or negative) on the child/children concerned.157 Second, the best interests 
of the child is the foundation for a substantive right,158 as State parties have an obligation to 
put in place the necessary mechanisms needed to apply the principle “in relation to all actions 
concerning children”, rather than only in legal and administrative proceedings or other 
narrowly defined contexts. 159  Third, the best interests of the child is a fundamental, 
                                                 
151 Article 3 of the UNCRC  
152 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice (2018). p/64 
153 Alston, Philip. "The best interests principle: towards a reconciliation of culture and human rights." International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 8, no. 1 (1994): 1-25. p/12 
154 Parker, Stephen. "The best interests of the child-principles and problems." International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 8, no. 1 (1994): 26-41. p/28 
155 Article 12(1) of the UNCRC 
156 10.3.2: The voice of the child 
157 Zermatten, Jean. "The best interests of the child principle: literal analysis and function." The International Journal of 
Children's Rights 18, no. 4 (2010): 483-499. p/485 
158 Ibid. 
159 Alston, Philip. "The best interests principle: towards a reconciliation of culture and human rights." International Journal 
of Law, Policy and the Family 8, no. 1 (1994): 1-25. p/4 
38 
 
interpretive legal principle, based on the recognition that an adult is only in a position to take 
decisions on behalf of a child because of the child's lack of experience and judgment.160 
The UNCRC committee continues to issue recommendations to State parties, requesting that 
they fully operationalise the best interests of the child in all the policies, projects, and 
programmes which have an impact on the daily life of children.161 The best interest provision 
has at times been criticised for being a “vague principle”,162 because no one really knows 
what is in the best interest of a child, or a group of children.163 Though, as Doek argued, the 
thorough implementation of the UNCRC to its full potential will undoubtedly be in the 
child’s best interest.164 
2.2.3 UN Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs)  
At the UN Summit in September 2015, world leaders accepted to adopt the 17 SDGs, and 
on 1 January 2016 the SDGs came into force. The SDGs apply to all countries and is an 
attempt to mobilise efforts to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities, and tackle climate 
change, whilst ensuring that no one is left behind.165 The SDGs’ are considered to be a 
uniquely powerful international mechanism, 166 not only because of its exhortation to leave 
no one behind, but also due to the universality of the instrument. This universality and 
emphasis on human rights has led to praise for the SDGs because the goals are presented in 
a manner that makes it applicable to both developing and developed countries.167 In line with 
the SDGs human rights emphasis, the goal of eradicating human trafficking is listed under 
Goal 5, Gender Equality; Goal 8, Decent Work and Economic Growth; and Goal 16, Peace, 
Justice and Strong Institutions. Regarding the specific task of stopping child trafficking, 
goals 8.7 and 16.2 provide that nation states: 
8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end 
modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and 
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elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use 
of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms 
16.2 End abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence against 
and torture of children.168 
In addition to putting the end of child trafficking on the agenda, the SDGs also target the 
facilitation of safe mobility in Goal 8.8, which addresses the need to protect labour rights 
and promote safe and secure working environments for all migrant workers.169  
2.3 WHAT IS FOOTBALL TRAFFICKING? 
Unlike the accepted definition of human trafficking provided by the Trafficking Protocol, 
there is no universal definition for football trafficking. However, when the circumstances 
faced by several African football minors are considered alongside the criteria for the 
occurrence of trafficking as set by the Protocol, it is apparent that football trafficking is 
merely a subset of the much larger human trafficking issue. In football, unscrupulous persons 
adopt the “means” of coercion and deceptive practices to commit the “act” of trafficking and 
transporting minors from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe for exploitative “purposes” and 
financial gain.170 FIFA, the world governing body of football, admitted that: 
Every country is affected by human trafficking, whether as a country of 
origin, transit or destination for victims… The world of sport, including 
football, has not been spared from this problem. Every year, thousands of 
young people, particularly from Africa, Asia and South America, are at risk 
of being sold a false dream of a career in Europe by those who may aim to 
exploit them for profit and economic gain.171 
The people at the heart of the crime are often the fraudulent football agents/intermediaries 
looking for a means to make profit through football. The high competition amongst the 
thousands of licensed and unlicensed agents operating around the world has forced several 
of them to adopt deceitful means to locate and contract promising young players.172 The 
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agents use illegal and unethical methods to acquire the rights to African minors,173 often 
focusing on the Sub-Saharan region (i.e., Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Senegal) because 
the area exports the greatest number of footballers.174  The agents mislead the player’s 
parents to make them the child’s representative,175 putting the agent in a position where they 
can promise the child high paying salaries at top clubs in Europe in order to transport them 
abroad. Upon arrival in the destination country, the players find themselves earning below 
the minimum wage requirements (if they are paid at all), whilst having their professional 
mobility monitored and controlled.176 Poli reported that some of the African players are 
made to accept contractual terms which their EU counterparts would otherwise reject.177 
To this end, there are two parts to football trafficking, human trafficking occurring in 
football, and human trafficking occurring through football.  
2.3.1 Human trafficking in football 
This occurs when an intermediary takes advantage of their position with a football minor. 
Whereby, after the intermediary has received money to procure a contract or trial with a 
foreign club, the intermediary provides a contract of an exploitative nature, which is to the 
detriment of the young player.178 Poli identified that human trafficking in football takes place 
in various circumstances, these include: when there are inconclusive trials abroad and the 
player is subsequently withdrawn and abandoned; when the player is kept in a football 
related illegal situation and labour exploitation occurs (for instance, when the player is not 
paid for his work); and other occasions, such as when there is exclusive control over a 
player’s professional mobility, which may be due to the exploitative contract terms that 
unknowingly binds them to an intermediary.179  
It can be argued that such instances of human trafficking in football are allowed to exist and 
thrive when the minor is coerced into signing an employment (or legal representation) 
contract that he or his parents do not thoroughly understand. As Castle and others reported, 
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African minors have been known to sign contracts in foreign languages, resulting in them 
“diverting a large proportion of their earnings to an agent” without being aware of the terms 
and consequences of the agreement.180 These contracts allow the unscrupulous agents to take 
advantage of young players for a considerable number of years, as the players are kept in 
situations of debt bondage. Zimmerman and Schenker explained that debt bondage occurs 
when a victim of trafficking is told that they are in debt to the lending agents or traffickers, 
and that they must pay for undeclared expenses.181 Such expenses could include demanding 
money back for travel costs, or money for the documents procured during the course of 
undertaking the clandestine trip. The costs are demanded as a means of pushing the victims 
to work beyond fatigue to repay the supposed debt. In a football context, this translates to 
scenarios whereby children are expected to play and train – under instruction from their 
trafficker – for a substantial period of time, without appropriate care or regard given to the 
child.182 These circumstances are detrimental to the child’s physical and mental well-being, 
and most of all, are not in the child’s best interest.183  
Admittedly, there is a significant overlap between trafficking in football and other forms of 
labour exploitation. Within football, the unscrupulous intermediaries and economically 
powerful multinational sports franchises combine to obtain ownership of and control over 
the life of the young players.184 Whereas with labour exploitation, boys are trafficked by 
local syndicates that use false papers to transport them, as they threaten the boys with 
disclosure to the immigration authorities if the boys try to escape. 185  The victims of 
trafficking in football, modern slavery, and labour exploitation, mostly find themselves in 
circumstances that are comparable to one another. 
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2.3.2 Human trafficking through football 
Human trafficking through football transpires in an indirect but nevertheless more prevalent 
manner, as the evidence from the vast majority of human trafficking instances reveal.186 
Human trafficking through football occurs when the promises made by an intermediary of 
the existence of an interested foreign football team is a charade, and on arrival in the 
destination country, the intermediary abandons the player, having appropriated his fees from 
the player and his family prior to the journey.187 The unscrupulous persons involved here are 
essentially smugglers who give false promises to young players and their families. To 
convince them to pay large sums of money for expatriation, only to then leave these minors 
to their own devices on arrival in the foreign country.188  
The trafficking through football literature can be divided into two components. 
Retain to Exploit 
In the first component, the traffickers or smugglers do not abandon the minors on arrival in 
the destination country, as they are at times part of a wider criminal network who seek to 
exploit the victim beyond the initial migration, and in order to make continued profits in a 
non-football sector in the destination country. 189  This component cannot be classed as 
trafficking in football because the minor is trafficked for a different sector, but the child has 
been trafficked through football, with exploitation occurring in a non-football related field. 
There are various examples of sectors which witness this example of retained labour 
exploitation when a young player arrives in a foreign country, these could include the 
agricultural, construction, manufacturing, hospitality, care, prostitution, and domestic work 
sectors. 
When luring the football players into the precarious trafficking through football 
circumstances, “football” is often the key tool that persuades the boys and causes them to 
pursue the opportunity which may lead to their exploitation. In the general trafficking 
literature, the luring techniques are often similar. Football is replaced with other promises 
that hint at prosperity and a better life abroad for the persons being trafficked. Hence, the 
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false promises of a playing contract at a professional European football club are substituted 
with other key employment or educational opportunities to sway the young persons.190 These 
promised employment opportunities could range from working in restaurants and domestic 
work, accountancy roles, and even education or training opportunities.191 In addition, there 
are also promises made to the family to persuade them to give their child to the trafficker, 
such as claims that their child will send money back home and that he will return with 
valuable experience and savings.192 The false promises to the individual about foreign work 
opportunities, and to families about subsequent remittance, aligns these scenarios with the 
circumstances being replicated in a footballing context. However, football provides a 
peculiar case because of the parties involved and the uniquely high monetary incentives on 
offer. 
Abandonment 
In the second component, the player is abandoned in the foreign country, which creates a 
further array of problems. Some players are given the opportunity to attend trials in the 
foreign country whilst others are abandoned upon arrival. Players who are given trial 
opportunities but do not secure playing contracts, and players who secure short term 
contracts but their contracts are not renewed by the club, also run the risk of being abandoned 
upon arrival. This often occurs after the intermediary has taken the “finder’s fee” paid to him 
by the player’s family, along with the player’s documentation and any money left for the 
welfare of the player. 193  FIFA illustrated this example when they explained that “the 
trafficking of young players to clubs, mainly in Europe, by unscrupulous persons led to some 
minors, whose talent may not have met the expectations of the respective clubs, being 
virtually abandoned on the streets in foreign countries.” 194  Abandonment in football 
trafficking is consistent with general trafficking and smuggling literature, as a large majority 
of the young players are left in precarious positions, devoid of educational qualifications, 
and abandoned in a foreign country with little or no means of supporting themselves.195  
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The European Commission’s (EC) White Paper on Sport attempted to address this issue that 
sport was facing in a comprehensive manner. 196  Article 4.5 of the White Paper 
acknowledged that “the most serious problem concerns children who are […] abandoned in 
a foreign country [as the circumstances could] foster their further exploitation”.197 Further 
exploitation, in this instance, could be when the trafficked player is taken abroad and 
subjected to homelessness, slavery, child prostitution, or has no option but to engage in 
enforced criminal activity to survive. 198 In reaching its findings, the EC cited reports of the 
existence of international networks which were managed by unscrupulous intermediaries 
who conducted the business of transferring young players from Africa to Europe.199 The EC 
White Paper noted that “although in most cases this phenomenon [of players being 
abandoned] does not fall into the legal definition of trafficking in human beings, it is 
unacceptable.” 200 
With the definition of human trafficking in the Trafficking Protocol, the less common and 
more direct human trafficking in football is in line with the legal definition of human 
trafficking. Whereas the indirect and more prevalent human trafficking through football, 
may not always amount to human trafficking according to the regulation.201 This is because, 
though the “act” occurs as the player is transported, the subsequent abandonment will not 
ordinarily amount to being an exploitative “purpose” for the trafficked person. However, 
there may be other precarious and exploitative circumstances that the player could be 
subjected to as a consequence of their being abandoned in the destination country. 
2.4 THE FOOTBALL TRAFFICKING PROCESS 
Esson used his expertise gained from conducting empirical research in this subject area to 
provide a ten-step guide on the process of football trafficking. 202 He interviewed several 
players from Sub-Saharan Africa who had first-hand experience of football trafficking or 
irregular football migration, to determine the commonly reported processes.203 
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An intermediary, claiming to be a football agent or talent scout, identifies a player in a 
match or trial and offers him the opportunity to be signed by a foreign club. Recruitment 
could take place in person or via the internet. 204  
The intermediary/agent could be legitimate in some instances, and other instances they are 
not.205 Their aim is to lure boys from their homes, they produce fake letters which detail 
lucrative contracts worth thousands of pounds each week.206 Similar to the promises made 
on the existence of a high paying job abroad, the intermediary offers the young player trials 
and contracts at emerging Asian and lower tier European clubs, 207  and at times at top 
European and Premier League sides.208 The children are targeted in and around African clubs 
or academies, on the streets, during informal football tournaments, and via social networking 
sites.209  
Step 2: 
The intermediary asks the player for money in exchange for securing this opportunity: this 
is akin to a ‘finder’s fee’. Additional funds are also requested to cover living costs and 
spending money in the destination country. 210 
The unscrupulous intermediary stresses to the child and their family that payment must be 
made to secure the trial or playing contract, and to pay for visas prior to the trip.211 The 
intention of the intermediary here is to extract as much money from the family as possible.212 
Step 3: 
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The player’s immediate and extended family often sell family possessions, remove siblings 
from schooling or take out a loan to meet the costs. This is typically in the region of €/£/$ 3-
5,000. 213 
McGee corroborated Esson’s assertion, as he suggested that the unscrupulous intermediaries 
demand up to $5,000 from the player’s parents in order to transport their child abroad.214 To 
raise these funds, the family is forced into desperate measures to pay the intermediary and 
secure passage to Europe, and potentially a more prosperous life for their child via 
professional football.215 
Step 4: 
The player arrives in a destination country often on a short-term tourist visa. Players 
sometimes arrive via legal channels, or in other instances, through conventional modes of 
transportation but with false travel documents.216 
Some young players enter the destination country via legal routes and means with short-term 
valid visas suited for travel, whilst others are transported under more precarious 
circumstances, for example, in small boats that are unfit for long distance travel.217 A number 
of players are also trafficked abroad using fake passports.218 These passports are at times 
made by forgers who charge the equivalent of 500 Euros in some cases, 219 and in other 
instances, the passports are officially produced and released by an embassy. It is also not 
uncommon for embassy workers to be in collusion with the traffickers to aid the transfer of 
players abroad. In July 2017, some young African players with entry visas and other 
documents that were falsified arrived in the Tuscan city of Prato to play for Italian third 
division side, AC Prato. They were presented as promising players and were brought with 
the intention to transfer them to a top-ranking football club later, so they would be profitable 
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to their traffickers.220 The players were minors from the Ivory Coast, and the traffickers 
reportedly identified corrupt border guards 221  and bribed embassy employees to issue 
passports that raised the player’s age.222 Investigators subsequently found false documents 
at both the Italian Embassy in Abidjan, and at the Immigration Office of the Prato Police 
Department.223 
Step 5: 
On arrival in the destination country, the intermediary takes the player’s documents and any 
spending money for ‘safe keeping’.224 
The act of taking the players documents is popular amongst traffickers, as it is done to gain 
control over the players physical and professional mobility.225 It prevents the trafficked 
persons from being able to seek help for fear of removal or imprisonment in the destination 
country. It allows the traffickers to watch over the trafficked children226 and place them in 
debt bondage as a means of keeping them captive.227 
Step 6: 
While in a destination country, the player may or may not attend a trial with a club. In some 
cases, the agent abandons the player on arrival in a destination country.228 
In cases of abandonment, the trafficker/smuggler is often the primary beneficiary of the 
player being taken abroad for exploitation,229 as the trafficker would have made their profits 
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through the arrangement of transportation for the player.230 Thus, after receiving their funds, 
the trafficker/smuggler could decide to abscond with the rest of the money paid to them by 
the player’s family to procure the playing contract.231 
Step 7: 
If the player is not abandoned on arrival, they might be taken to multiple trials until a 
contract is offered and the agent is satisfied with the terms.232 
Some traffickers and criminal groups take control of the boys on arrival rather than abandon 
them,233 retaining the boy for exploitation. This occurs when the trafficking ring consists of 
intermediaries who aim to run the whole operation to maximise their gains and profits in the 
destination country. The International Labour Office explains that this could take the form 
of the trafficker trying to make money from: recruitment (by selling false papers and getting 
the family to pay for services provided); travel (by adding a margin to travel tickets, charging 
a fee for bribing authorities); and then at the point of exploitation in the destination country 
(by paying the individual low or no salaries, operating a sub-standard workplace, and 
charging for accommodation provided, and also putting the child in debt bondage).234 
Regarding low salaries and sub-standard living and working conditions, some football clubs 
have at times forced young players to play under these circumstances as a means of reducing 
costs.235 
Step 8: 
If the trials are successful, the player signs a contract with the club. Problematically, the 
contract is typically exploitative with unfavourable terms for the player. 236 
The players at times sign exploitative contracts which guarantee the intermediary a 
considerable percentage of the child's subsequent career earnings, provided he continues to 
                                                 
230 IPEC, Combating trafficking in children for labour exploitation: A resource kit for policy-makers and 
practitioners (International Labour Office; ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva 
2008). Book 1: Understanding What Child Trafficking Is, pg. 25-6 
231 Andrews, Matthew, and Peter Harrington. "Off pitch: football's financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them." (2016) CID Working Paper No. 311. p/181 
232 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice 4, no. 1 (2018): 60-72. 62-63 
233 Andrews, Matthew, and Peter Harrington. "Off pitch: football's financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them." (2016) CID Working Paper No. 311. p/181 
234 IPEC, Combating trafficking in children for labour exploitation: A resource kit for policy-makers and 
practitioners (International Labour Office; ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva 
2008). Book 1: Understanding What Child Trafficking Is, pg. 25-6 
235 Andrews, Matthew, and Peter Harrington. "Off pitch: football's financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them." (2016) CID Working Paper No. 311. p/181 
236 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice 4, no. 1 (2018): 60-72. 62-63 
49 
 
play football professionally and successfully. 237  The fact that the player performs 
successfully gives the exploitative contract a “positive” veneer for all the parties involved in 
the transaction. The transfer will be considered as beneficial to the intermediaries or 
unscrupulous persons who organised the deal; the club’s investors will get improved returns 
based on the better performance of their club; the club’s manager will be given plaudits for 
discovering and playing a talented player; the club’s owner(s) will be satisfied with their 
investment; 238  and most of all, the trafficked player will be happy to have secured a 
professional playing contract, irrespective of any exploitative aspects. The successful 
transaction could also benefit the owner of the African team or academy where the boy was 
originally found. The club would reap the rewards of the profitable transfer business,239 and 
could make further trickle-down returns if the player is later sold on to a bigger club for a 
substantial transfer fee.  
David contended that the instances of trafficking and child exploitation in sport are not new, 
as football clubs (and sports teams in general) are known to turn a blind eye to the origin of 
a player once the player is deemed to be successful. He explained that in these circumstances, 
“the law of silence prevails. [This law provides that] no one will denounce the fact that a 
child athlete was trafficked illegally if he or she becomes a sports star.”240 The law of silence, 
as occurs in football, provides an incentive for unscrupulous persons to continue trafficking 
and exploiting child players for profit. 
Step 9: 
If the player is unsuccessful at his trials, or his contract is not renewed and another club is 
not found, the intermediary abandons him. In most cases the intermediary will also take his 
‘finder’s fee’, the player’s documentation, and any remaining money with him.241  
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When a player is abandoned as a result of the absence of a playing contract, he is left without 
money, legal papers or identification, and is given no means to return home if he pleases.242  
This opens the door to possible instances of exploitation in the destination country. 
Step 10: 
Once the player realises the precarious nature of his situation, he is often reluctant to return 
to his country of origin and may decide to remain in the destination country illegally without 
any means of subsistence.243 
Some players would rather stay in the destination country than return home due to shame 
and feelings of failure. Thus, some of the players end up working on the streets to survive,244 
and others fall victim to re-exploitation because of their precarious and vulnerable status.245 
Ultimately, pursuant to the Trafficking Protocol, steps one to five of the football trafficking 
process would constitute an “act”, which is the recruitment and transportation of the young 
players, through the “means” of fraud, coercion, or other abuses of power or vulnerability. 
Whereas steps five to nine of the process are in line with the “exploitative purpose” of the 
traffickers, such as to sell the players for financial gain or make them sign exploitative 
playing contracts in the foreign country. 
2.5 THE INITIATION OF FOOTBALL TRAFFICKING 
There are several circumstances in football that have contributed to an increase in the 
instances of football trafficking. 
2.5.1 The Bosman ruling 
The problem started, in part, due to the decision made by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in UEFA v. Bosman,246 and the ensuing amendments to football regulations that were 
set up to govern the transfer of players between clubs. In the case, the Belgian football player, 
Jean-Marc Bosman, played for the Belgian club side R.F.C Liege. When his contract 
expired, he was offered a new contract on less beneficial terms and he subsequently refused 
                                                 
242 Lembo, Christina. "FIFA transfer regulations and UEFA player eligibility rules: major changes in European football 
and the negative effect on minors." Emory Int'l L. Rev. 25 (2011): 539. p/569 
243 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice 4, no. 1 (2018): 60-72. 62-63 
244 Lembo, Christina. "FIFA transfer regulations and UEFA player eligibility rules: major changes in European football 
and the negative effect on minors." Emory Int'l L. Rev. 25 (2011): 539. p/569 
245 Warburton, Dan, “Fake agents tricking thousands of football-loving kids into child trafficking hell” (Mirror Online, 
2018) <https://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/kids-young-13-dreams-football-12995874> accessed on 29/7/2018  
246 Union Royale Belge Des Sociétés De Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal Club Liégeois SA v Jean-
Marc Bosman and others and Union Des Associations Européennes De Football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman (C-415/93) 
[1995] ECR I-4921 
51 
 
to sign and renew his contract with R.F.C Liege. A French side U.S.L Dunkerque later came 
in to offer Bosman a one-year playing contract.247  
The transfer negotiations between the Belgian and French clubs broke down and Bosman 
challenged the legality of his refused transfer, as it left him unable to practice his trade at 
either club.248 He argued that his rights guaranteed by Article 45 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),249 were being breached by the football transfer 
system which hindered him from the freedom of movement to practice his trade in another 
EU member state.250 The case was brought before the Belgian courts and later referred to the 
ECJ, where the ECJ resolved that the restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed by 
previous FIFA transfer rules were unjustified.251 FIFA subsequently amended its regulations 
and abolished the payment of transfer fees for EU nationals playing within the EU and 
moving to another EU team on expiration of their employment contracts.252 
2.5.2 Aftermath of the Bosman ruling 
The consequences of the Bosman judgment for the sport were far-reaching.253  The following 
are some of the key aspects as related to the initiation of football trafficking: 
Loss in income 
Following Bosman, various football stakeholders raised objections to the new rules and the 
detrimental effects it would have on smaller clubs, largely because of the loss of income 
from transfer fees for out-of-contract players. Their claim was that money leaving the clubs 
was going into the players’ pockets by way of increased salaries and signing on fees, as the 
bigger clubs increasingly offered better-paying contracts to the best players by diverting and 
giving them the money that was supposed to be their transfer fee.254 This loss in revenue 
became a clear disadvantage for the smaller clubs which were majorly dependent on the 
income from transfer fees to survive. With the lost revenue going into players’ pockets, the 
post-Bosman period generated an inflationary wage spiral, where many smaller clubs risked 
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going into bankruptcy if they attempted to compete at a high standard.255 In addition, the 
revenues at clubs were being used to satisfy short term goals like paying the increased 
salaries, rather than long term improvements to grassroots football that would have helped 
to develop other talented players.256 
Once it was confirmed that the ECJ’s ruling in Bosman was not going to be overturned,257 
some football clubs were left with no choice but to find other means of recovering their lost 
revenue.  
Increased transfer fees 
The smaller football clubs typically viewed the transfer market as the best means to recoup 
their loss of income and their investments made on players. They did this by locating and 
purchasing players at discounted rates to subsequently sell the players at the highest possible 
profit margins to other – mostly bigger – clubs, before the player’s contract expired. 258  
However, the Bosman ruling led to a significant increase in the transfer fees for players who 
were still under contract,259 which made it harder for clubs to acquire talented players in 
Europe.260 This meant that the smaller clubs could no longer afford the transfer fees placed 
on players in less prominent teams and leagues across Europe, as long as the players were 
still under contract. Maguire explained that as a consequence of Bosman, there had been an 
inflation in the value of promising young players in the bigger EU leagues, as the ruling led 
to young players being offered attractive and lengthy contracts by clubs fearful of losing 
them on free transfers.261 This fear of losing players also contributed to the smaller clubs’ 
loss in income, as they were then bound to pay players’ significant wages irrespective of 
their diminished revenue streams. 
The bigger clubs, with their significant resources, were unaffected by the higher transfer fees 
for players who were under contract. In fact, several of the bigger clubs benefitted (and 
continue to benefit from) the Bosman ruling, as they are able to promise the best players of 
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smaller clubs improved salaries if the player does not renew their contract with their team. 
By running down their contract, the bigger club can get the player at a significantly reduced 
price.262 David explained that after Bosman “clubs in countries such as Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, [saw] their young football 
talents ‘stolen’ by wealthier teams from England, Italy, and Spain who offer[ed] better-paid 
contracts.” 263 With these circumstances, the smaller clubs sought for a cheaper means to 
obtain players outside the EU at an affordable rate, to develop the players themselves, and 
sell the players off to a bigger club for heightened profits later. 
The “cheaper” (non-EU) markets 
Magee and Sudgen argued that the Bosman ruling acted as a lubricant which eased and 
accelerated the movement of players across European and worldwide frontiers.264 A study 
by the European Commission (EC) corroborated this claim, as the EC noted that there had 
been an increase in the use of non-EU markets by some EU clubs to acquire players for 
less.265 The EC confirmed that several EU clubs were looking to foreign countries (mainly 
the South American and African markets),266 so they could “acquire talented players at 
significantly lower prices than in Europe.”267  
The fact that the young players in African football are valued at such a lowered sum has been 
attributed to the financial weaknesses in the footballing sector on the continent.268 These 
financial weaknesses allow the smaller and mid-ranged EU clubs to have the “pick of the 
bunch” of Africa’s talent. As they can freely choose the most talented players to purchase, 
export, and resell at a higher price and profit margin to a bigger and richer club later on in 
Europe.269 The financial weaknesses affecting the African football landscape are also a core 
reason why the players are willing to take any opportunity to play professionally in 
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Europe.270 Poli referred to this eagerness as the “economic criteria in the country of origin”, 
and explained that this ensues when there are players who wish to play abroad whatever the 
cost.271 The financial weakness of African football is similarly used to undervalue the most 
talented African players, thereby making African football and its players the “cheaper” 
option. Poli explained that the departures of the best African players abroad affects the 
transfer sums that foreign clubs are prepared to invest when signing other players from the 
region.272 For example, though the recruitment of footballers from South America can cost 
more than 20 million Euros, transfers carried out for players from sub-Saharan Africa rarely 
cost more than 1 million Euros, for even the most promising players.273 Whereas, after 
signing such players from Africa, some EU teams have been able to sell the African 
footballers for sums as much as 81.3 million Euros later on.274 
Celen and others argued that in the aftermath of Bosman, several EU clubs had two choices 
afforded to them.275 First, the EU clubs could obtain new talent from foreign clubs with 
lesser economic resources than them, and later sell the players for substantial profits. Second, 
the clubs could implement a more advanced youth and grassroots programme in their region 
which would aim to develop talented players to join their first team in the future.276 With the 
second option, the clubs would be taking a labour-intensive approach by investing in their 
academy in the hope of producing talented players, which would save millions in transfer 
fees.277 However, as Maguire explained, because the rewards for success and the cost of 
failure are so great in the sport, the managers of these smaller clubs cannot often afford the 
promise of longer-term youth development.278 Therefore, several teams within Europe chose 
the first option rather than the second. The first option was considered to be quicker, 
provided a wider access to a range of players, had an increased profit potential,279 and was 
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also cheaper, considering the players came from outside the EU.280 By using the cheaper 
option, the EU clubs are able to build their squads in a cost-efficient manner,281 whilst 
developing players and maximising their “sell-on” value.282  
The aforementioned EC study also acknowledged that though several of the transfers that 
take place between EU clubs and their African counterparts are legal and official transfers, 
there are a number of players who fall victim to economic exploitation as a result of the EU 
clubs’ search for “cheap” talent.283 The risks to the minors increases when the search by the 
EU clubs is coupled with the players’ willingness to go abroad as a result of the financial 
weaknesses of African football.284 Thus, the investments and purchases made by EU clubs 
has contributed to the formation of the illegal market in which unscrupulous intermediaries 
acquire and traffic African minors to Europe for profit.285 
Lack of protection for foreign players  
In football, when an EU club purchases and transfers an EU minor to a new team there are 
additional regulatory burdens for which the buying club must comply, relating to the safety 
and well-being of the player. However, these regulatory burdens are not equally imposed on 
clubs who purchase other foreign/non-EU minors in the sport. Article 19(2)(b) of FIFA’s 
Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), commonly referred to as “The 
EU Exception”, offers specific protections to EU minors. The provision imposes obligations 
in respect of football education, academic provision (as a plan-B for the player if he is 
unsuccessful in football) and living standards.286 The FIFA regulations do not reflect any 
such fail-safe measures and protections from sub-standard living and working conditions for 
the non-EU minors, who are equally playing their football away from home. 287  This 
imbalance has created an opportunity for EU teams and unscrupulous intermediaries to 
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transfer and treat the African minors differently, with no long-term consideration regarding 
their well-being and safety from exploitation. 
Home grown players rule 
As a result of the Bosman ruling, small to medium sized clubs began recruiting more from 
the cheaper markets in Africa and South America, as the bigger clubs continued to purchase 
the best players from the smaller sides. The influx of players came because the Bosman 
ruling eliminated the old quota rule which restricted the number of foreign players within 
the leagues.288  Therefore, without the quota, the number of foreigners amongst the EU 
leagues subsequently rose,289 and this coincided with the larger sums of money caused by 
the commercialisation of football. This commercialisation increased revenues for the clubs, 
allowing the richer clubs to stockpile the best players from all over Europe in their squads.290 
The bigger clubs were able to do this by entering into direct exchange agreements with clubs 
from other national associations within Europe, calculatedly choosing clubs in countries 
which had more flexible nationality and work permit rules.291 Such agreements not only 
granted the bigger clubs access to a larger pool of non-EU talent which existed in  the other 
leagues, but it importantly provided an avenue for the bigger clubs to sign foreign players 
and place them in an EU side so that they could achieve EU status quicker. 292  These 
agreements have been termed as “feeder” or “nursery” club links,293 where the elite clubs 
establish connections with teams in developing countries directly, or use a mid-level club in 
Europe as an intermediate shelter for their players. 
An example of this took place when English Premier League side, Manchester United, 
entered into an agreement with Belgian club, Royal Antwerp. To establish the relationship, 
Manchester United loaned several of their players to get experience at Royal Antwerp. In 
exchange, Manchester United were able to exploit Belgium’s relaxed employment laws and 
immigration rules, by signing and sending players from outside the EU to Antwerp so that 
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the players could work and attain a European work permit.294  Examples of direct feeder 
links have also occurred with Ajax of Amsterdam which “entered into a franchise agreement 
in South Africa”,295 and Danish side FC Midtjylland entered into an agreement with FC 
Ebedei, a Nigerian club, that provided the Danish club with exclusive access to the most 
talented players from the Nigerian side’s first team and youth academy.296 Other examples 
include Arsenal with Hellenic Cape Town, Paris St. Germain with Esperance of Tunis, and 
Monaco with ASEC Abidjan of the Ivory Coast.297 
With these occurrences, several factors were said to play a contributory role in the formation 
of the home-grown rule, such as: the influx of foreign players representing European teams; 
the decrease in investment in youth training academies in Europe; the lower competitive 
balance in club competitions because the bigger clubs were able to stockpile the best 
players;298 the reduced playing chances for ‘locally’ trained players; and the circumstances 
that allowed “many European clubs to 'poach' young players from the age of 16 from across 
the European Union.”299 Thus, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), which 
is one of FIFA’s confederations and is the governing body of European football, created the 
“home-grown” player eligibility rules in 2005.300 UEFA explained that the home-grown rule 
aims to encourage the local training of young players and increase the openness and fairness 
of European competitions. 301 The rule aims to counter the trend for hoarding players, and 
tries to re-establish a 'local' identity at EU clubs.302 The rule provides that each club under 
UEFA, on from the 2008/09 football season, must name a minimum of eight home-grown 
players in their 25-man squads.303 UEFA defines a home-grown player as a player who, 
regardless of their nationality, has been trained by their club or by another club in the same 
national association for at least three years, between the ages of 15 and 21. Up to half of the 
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home-grown players named by a club must be from the club itself, whilst the other half could 
be from the club or from another club within the same national association.304 
The home-grown players rule was purported to be beneficial for several reasons. First, 
though there is a requirement to have the eight home-grown players, clubs were not obliged 
to play these players. 305  Second, the rule was to decrease the financial disparity and 
competitive imbalance between the EU football teams.306 Third, the rule was to discourage 
clubs from spending money on outside talent, but rather encouraging them to invest in home-
grown talent. 307 Fourth, by investing in home-grown talent and training more young players 
so that they graduate the youth system and count towards the club’s home-grown quota, the 
rule would also increase the profile and market value of home-grown players in Europe.308 
With this increased value, clubs would be given an incentive to increase their interest, 
investments, and direct more resources towards internal talent development programmes 
rather than buying foreign talent.309  
Notwithstanding these benefits, there have been a number of concerns raised about the 
home-grown rule. Such as, the possibility of the rule being adopted in a discriminatory 
manner or in a way which would be contrary to an individual’s right to freedom of 
movement.310 However, in May 2008, the European Commission stated that the home-
grown rule was legal and compatible with the Treaty provisions on free movement of 
persons, as long as it does not lead to any direct discrimination based on nationality.311 By 
extension, some clubs are situated in countries which do not have a history of producing 
high quality youth players. Thus, relying on the ability of the club’s scouts to find talented 
players based in the club’s country and national association is a gamble centred around a 
limited pool of players.312 Several clubs began pursuing and recruiting younger and younger 
promising foreign players to gain a competitive advantage, and to meet the home-grown 
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requirements.313 The clubs targeted signing players while they are still young enough to meet 
the registration requirement of the home-grown rule, so the player would spend three seasons 
playing in the EU country while they are between the ages of 15 and 21.314 
Whilst the rule was introduced with a view to offering greater opportunities to young local 
players, the data suggests that in the years since the rule was introduced, the opportunities 
for the young local players in the major European leagues have not been protected.315 In 
actuality, the rule has regularly been interpreted as a race by clubs to prioritise and secure 
the services of very young players so that they can be converted to home-grown players by 
the time they become 18.316 This feeds into the supply networks and trafficking issues which 
affect the sport, as Bullough and others explained that circumventing the home-grown rule 
is “quite straightforward” from both a selection and recruitment perspective for the football 
clubs.317 With this ease of circumvention, the bigger clubs and their larger resources are able 
to hinder the development of other smaller to medium sized clubs, as they can continuously 
purchase the younger players identified by the other clubs for themselves. 318  This is 
particularly the case when the academy of the bigger club is not producing the standard of 
players they require. The bigger clubs then poach and hoard young players from going to 
other clubs, as they have the resources and capacity to keep the players they recruit until the 
players qualify as home-grown talents. And in so doing, undermining the essence of the 
home-grown rule. 
In England, studies have shown that there is a limited supply of indigenous players due to 
the Bosman ruling and the globalisation of football.319 Therefore, with the elite indigenous 
players in short supply, the market value of the talented English players has increased 
significantly. This means that several English clubs have been keen on acquiring the most 
promising young foreign players, so that the players can qualify as home-grown, and later 
be sold as “locally trained” players with an increased market value. Additionally, with the 
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increased financial burdens on the small to medium sized clubs, the football environment 
has created an avenue for unscrupulous intermediaries to introduce youth players from 
overseas as a cheap and viable alternative to the more expensive indigenous players.320 
Outside the Bosman ruling, there have been other factors within football which have 
contributed to the prominence of the problem. 
2.5.3 Commodification of Children 
With several clubs intensifying their global search for young football talent, FIFA lowered 
the age limit for which an international transfer certificate (ITC) would need to be granted 
to 10-12 years,321 to cope with the developments in the industry.322 The ITC signifies that a 
player is free to join a new club,323 and without the ITC, a player’s transfer is likely to be 
null and void.324 With this change, football clubs are able to sign players who are less than 
ten years of age without attaining an ITC from FIFA to confirm the transfer. This age 
reduction has had an adverse effect in the football transfer market, as the search for the next 
footballing star has put an even younger demographic of football minors at an increased risk 
of trafficking and exploitation. Football clubs and their scouts now focus on this younger 
demographic as part of their speculative commercial strategy.325 For example, Spanish club 
Real Madrid signed nine-year-old Takuhiro Nakai, from Japan;326 and FC Barcelona signed 
nine-year-old Sandro Reyes, from the Philippines.327 These transactions were calculated to 
extract the most commercial value and potential profits from the players, and to 
simultaneously circumvent FIFA’s ITC requirement.328 
The continued commodification of child footballers has brought forward a notion of the child 
as a worker, a unit of labour, and as a commodity to be traded in multinational markets.329 
Some have argued that child athletes have been reduced to property and are no longer viewed 
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as individuals, much less, as children.330 Subsequently, the increased commodification has 
contributed to children being used for exploitative practices by unscrupulous persons.331 For 
instance, because clubs are conducting a wide search for young talented players, 
unscrupulous persons recruit and traffic child players in the hope that some of the players 
will become successful. Or in the hope that they can sell the players to the recruiting clubs 
for some profit. Thus, the unscrupulous persons are often aware that the financial and 
economic value of a football minor is only likely to be achieved when he is transferred or 
sold to another club, 332  and this creates an incentive to continue engaging in football 
trafficking. 
2.5.4 Training Compensation 
FIFA attempted to discourage the increased trading of foreign minors by deterring richer 
clubs from signing the talented young players based in Africa and South America.333 FIFA 
tried to do this by stipulating that clubs involved in the training and education of players 
between the ages of 12 and 23 would receive financial compensation from the buying club.334 
The training compensation gives the labour and investment spent training a youth player 
monetary value,335 thereby forming an important source of revenue for the smaller clubs.336 
The compensation acts as a reward for the training and football education given to the player, 
whilst simultaneously underlining to the clubs that young footballers are valuable assets 
within the global football marketplace,337 and could be a key resource.338 
At its core, the training compensation was set up by FIFA for there to be a “trickle-down” 
effect to the money paid for players. This trickle-down effect would occur when the fees 
paid for a player trickles from the upper echelons and richer clubs in football towards the 
lower levels, such as when a big club purchases a player that was trained at a smaller club.339 
The crucial point, however, is that this trickle-down effect – and the associated economic 
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value of the player – can only be realised when he is transferred to a bigger club. Thus, the 
training compensation has had two important consequences on the lives of the football 
minors, and the recruitment habits of football clubs. First, the compensation payments give 
clubs an incentive to acquire many players at as young an age as possible to minimise their 
future economic liability.340 In recruiting and training the players, the clubs would not need 
to pay training compensation to another club if the player is successful and subsequently 
sold. Also, if the player is sold, the clubs would be able to maximise their profits as the 
training compensation would be calculated into the transfer fee they receive for the player. 
Second, because of FIFA's classification system for football academies, the training 
compensation is often minimal for clubs and academies based in Africa, and the transfer fees 
are generally negotiated to try to maximise returns in lieu of this.341 Therefore, with the 
smaller foreign clubs being denied the opportunity to increase their possible revenues, this 
has resulted in an intense financial speculation and an increase in the trading of young 
African players, in order to amass returns.342 Which has in turn led to many young African 
players being recruited and developed to be sold to richer EU clubs, as a means of realising 
some of their financial value.343  
2.5.5 Increase in Football Academies 
After the Bosman ruling, FIFA introduced regulations to govern the international transfer of 
players. However, football saw a concurrent increase in the global recruitment of talented 
young foreign players, both as a means of complying and bypassing several FIFA laws. 
Some EU clubs consequently sought for innovative ways to source these players,344 and one 
of such methods was through forming football academies in celebrated football regions and 
nations outside Europe, i.e., in Africa and South America.345 The academies provided an 
avenue for the teams to identify the most talented young players, groom them, and thereafter 
export them to the parent EU club, to another club in the EU for work permit purposes, or to 
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sell the player to another club for financial gain. 346  With the home-grown rule, the 
commodification of children, and the training compensation initiatives adopted by EU 
football clubs, these factors all contributed to the idea that young foreign children are sources 
of monetary value and significance. Therefore, having an academy in a source country to 
locate these young foreign players, train them, and export them, was deemed a worthwhile 
investment for several clubs.347 Amidst the search for the talented players, four categories of 
football academies were regularly formed: African academies; Afro-European academies; 
Privately owned academies; and Unofficial academies. 
African academies 
The African academies are typically set up by local club sides or run by the national football 
federations. For example, most Ghanaian clubs have a youth academy or have a relationship 
with an existing academy, whether it is an official or unofficial one.348 The benefit of African 
academies is that they are required to be registered with the local government or local FA, 
in an attempt to ensure that all transactions conducted with players and minors within the 
region are on record and legal.349 Conversely, these academies may be seen as a money 
making scheme,350 as various clubs and academy owners in Africa recruit talented players 
for the purpose of selling them to foreign clubs for profit. 
Many young boys from underprivileged backgrounds view football academies as sites 
enabling them to become agents of their own development.351 As there is a perception that 
in joining the academy, the boys will have better opportunities to migrate and to be in control 
of their own destinies. Thus, because the academies nurture the dreams of making it in 
Europe for the young players in their regions, the academies attract many young boys and 
capitalise on their aspirations.352 The fact that the academies are typically set up in thriving 
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towns with aspiring players,353 provides them with the opportunities to effectively buy boys 
from their families.354 The academies either groom the players to partake in the local football 
league with their affiliated team, or if deemed as being of the requisite quality to go abroad, 
young players are sold to foreign clubs.355 The African academies notoriously do not provide 
educational training to the boys or prepare them for a possible life outside of football if they 
are unsuccessful,356 and this is notwithstanding the low success rates of players making it as 
professionals. Ultimately, the African academies are run by owners with their intentions of 
generating profit from the transfer of academy graduates,357  rather than on helping the 
vulnerable and disadvantaged boys in their regions. 
Afro-European academies 
Afro-European academies are commonly set up by European clubs looking to establish their 
presence in an African country through a football academy, or when an EU club decides to 
invest in an existing club or academy in Africa as a means of securing a position of first 
refusal for the African side’s most talented players (e.g., a feeder link or agreement).358 The 
Afro-European academies are set up by clubs, agents, and other members of the football 
community in target countries known for producing young footballing talent.359 In some 
instances, a part of the government in an African country may set up an academy in 
collaboration with a European team, to foster better engagement with the people in the 
community, and to introduce the practices of the European youth coaches and academies to 
the African side.360 Examples of Afro-European academies include, Dutch team Feyenoord 
who created a residential academy in the Cape Coast of Ghana, and also Austrian club Red 
Bull Salzburg who opened another facility in Ghana back in 2008.361 In 2016, FC Barcelona 
established their first academy in Africa in the most populous state and country on the 
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continent, Lagos, Nigeria.362 And in 2019, Real Madrid launched their academy in Nigeria 
in collaboration with the Rivers state government.363 
On the one hand, these Afro-European academies could be said to have several benefits, not 
only in terms of the production and export of talented footballers, but as institutions that 
contribute to the development of football locally, which could also have an impact on other 
development agendas. 364  The academies train and teach African players about key 
footballing attributes which highlight their technical abilities, whilst simultaneously 
providing schooling geared towards preparing the players for the overseas market. 365 With 
the advanced training provided, there could be long-term advancements to the African 
country and its people, such as: developments in African football and the local African 
economies; improvements in performances from African teams in their leagues and national 
sides during international competitions; and, with more technical players produced by the 
academies, there would be increased opportunities for talented African players to go and 
play professionally abroad and earn higher wages, which they could then remit back home 
to the benefit of their family and local communities.366 With the education that is given to 
the players through the academies, they would be provided with key skills and knowledge 
that will give them essential character traits that aid their careers in Europe, or give them 
alternative options if they are unsuccessful playing football.367 To illustrate, in Barcelona’s 
Lagos academy, the players are taught in accordance with a curriculum that is modelled after 
the Nigerian and British educational systems.368 The players are also exposed to language 
training, including English, Spanish, and French, as well as a plethora of other subjects. 
On the other hand, despite all the benefits in terms of technical training and educational 
provisions for the African players, the academies themselves admit that their primary aim is 
the production of professional footballers, as opposed to academically sound individuals.369 
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Therefore, the involved European clubs collaborating with African academies continue to 
profit from the great number of aspiring and cheap talent available in Africa. 370  Their 
strategic positioning in the populated regions in the target countries371 means that they are 
able to recruit several players at once.372 Though the players who enrol in these academies 
traditionally escape the typical children’s rights violations that are common in other types of 
academies on the continent, it is argued that the fact the successful graduates still go on to 
represent EU teams fuels the incentive to traffic young boys into these academies. 
Some have argued that the European clubs are using the Afro-European academies to profit 
from the young African players without any obligation for them to reinvest in the 
communities in which the talented players have been discovered and developed. 373 As 
demand for highly skilled but cheap football labour in Europe accelerated post-Bosman, the 
presence of the football academies in Africa has increased as part of the export-oriented 
football industry.374 The continued transfer of players has in turn led to the depletion of the 
pool of talented African players on the continent, which underlines the fact that the main 
interest of the EU teams is the exportation and exploitation of the young African players.375 
The Afro-European academies have subsequently been likened to “farms” in which players 
are groomed for export,376 and as “nurseries that allow [EU clubs] to reserve African talent 
until the player can be legally transferred to Europe”, thereby strengthening European 
football at the expense of the African game, 377  and leaving African leagues “bereft of 
talent”.378 
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Privately owned academies 
The privately owned academies are formed by individuals or foreign governments with the 
intention of grooming African players for profit or other gains. With these academies, there 
are two differing models of operation.  
The first is the Right to Dream (RtD) academy situated in Ghana. The academy is a non-
profit enterprise founded in 1999 by the former scout of Manchester United, Tom Vernon.379 
Vernon explained that the aim of the academy is to provide children from low income 
earning families with the opportunity to change their lives, their community and their 
country through football.380  RtD provides its entrants with accommodation, school and 
training facilities, and football pitches, so they are fit to go abroad.381 RtD places an equal 
emphasis on education as it does on football training,382 which is an approach modelled from 
the American athlete scholarship system.383 The advantages of this model is that if a player 
does not progress along the path of being a professional athlete, his options of success do 
not become limited, as there could be scholarships to international schools to continue 
advancing his prospects.384 To this effect, RtD has raised more than $40m in scholarships,385 
as there are more boys in their academy who receive and use the scholarships than there are 
boys who end up playing football professionally.386 It has been reported that 34 of RtD’s 
graduates have gone on to become professional footballers, whereas 51 of their graduates 
have gone on to study at colleges and universities in the US and UK.387 The RtD model 
focuses on player development, and when players are sold, it limits the effect of a muscle 
drain by providing avenues for reinvestment in Africa. RtD makes its graduates sign a 
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“Declaration to Give Back to Africa”,388 so that successful players reinvest their profits in 
their respective communities and provide a means for other young players to equally benefit 
from the opportunities they were given. For example, David Accam, a RtD graduate who 
plays in America’s Major League Soccer, came back to fund a community pitch in Ghana.389 
In 2015, Vernon bought Danish side FC Nordsjælland and became the chairman of the club. 
Vernon bought the club as a ready-made destination for RtD’s graduates via the formation 
of this new “supply chain”, 390 as he considered it to be a way to give more African players 
opportunities to play and experience life abroad. Prior to the purchase of the Danish club, 
Vernon explained that RtD’s graduates were being sold for $150,000 to $200,000 to Swedish 
clubs, and then 18 months later, the players were sold on for a further $3m or $4m to other 
EU clubs. Vernon believed that the manner in which the transfers were occurring meant that 
RtD’s graduates were being undervalued because they were based in Africa, which is also 
what Poli previously corroborated.391 Therefore, the purchase of the Danish club was to 
reshape the supply chain, and to enable Vernon conduct the initial transfers to Europe by 
himself. In doing so, RtD can demand and receive more representative transfer fees for their 
players, and the money can then be reinvested into their academy to improve facilities and 
cater to other boys in the community.392 
The second privately owned academy to be discussed is the Aspire Academy by the Qatari 
government. The Aspire academy cherry-picked the most talented African footballers, 
having conducted trials in which a sum of approximately 750,000 children across Africa 
participated.393 Qatar claimed that the motive behind the establishment of such an academy 
was for humanitarian reasons, and to provide adequate competition for the Qatari boys in 
preparation for the 2022 World Cup.394 
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Aspire is considered to be the greatest talent-scouting operation in football history,395 due to 
the financial outlay to develop talent for their academy.396 However, there were reports that 
the academy, despite providing highly lucrative football scholarships for the players, 
targeted young players in a bid to exploit and naturalise them after some years.397 Qatar in 
itself has a history of naturalising foreign athletes to raise their level of competitiveness 
internationally, and many who have brought it sporting success have had little or no previous 
ties to the country.398 In 2017, Qatar’s football squad was made up of players from ten 
different countries – including two from Senegal and one from Ghana.399 The players were 
naturalised and allowed to play because of FIFA’s Statutes which state in Article 7(d) that a 
player will be eligible to play for a representative team if he has "lived continuously for at 
least five years after reaching the age of 18 on the territory of the relevant association."400 
The Aspire academy subsequently played a significant role in Qatar’s success at the 2019 
Asian Cup, as 13 of the country’s 23-man squad graduated from the academy.401 Though it 
was reported that only four of the players were not born in Qatar.402 
The differences between the privately owned academies highlights the opposing ways in 
which African football minors are treated. One approach prioritises the Africans in a 
community, their well-being, and prepares the players for a professional footballing career, 
or a back-up career opportunity. This approach also limits the effect of a muscle drain of 
African football talent, seeks a means to reinvest into African football and its communities, 
and limits avenues for unscrupulous persons to identify and take advantage of the aspiring 
African players. Whereas the second approach was aimed at exporting and possibly 
exploiting African players to naturalise them. This latter approach leaves Africa and African 
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football worse off, by draining the continent of talented players, and potentially putting 
players who are not retained by the academy in precarious circumstances in the destination 
country. 
Unofficial academies 
The demand for inexpensive young players has resulted in an increase in unofficial and 
unregistered training academies in Africa, and an array of unlicensed agents who set up these 
academies to exploit and sell African football minors.403 The unofficial academies provide a 
substandard structure of football training to their players, 404  and are generally run by 
unqualified coaches or fraudulent scouts with no credentials.405 The academies are seen by 
the roadside in Africa with no proper equipment or training facilities,406 as they are formed 
with the sole purpose of making financial gain.407 The growth in the number of unofficial 
academies in Africa can be attributed to the commodification of children in football, and the 
realisation by the local entrepreneurs that running an academy could be a plausible business 
opportunity to make significant profits.408 These local entrepreneurs know that in order to 
make their profits and realise the value of the player, any recruited player must be sold to a 
foreign team.409  
With the limited number of official and accredited academies in Africa attracting many 
players from across the continent, the opportunity for the unofficial academies to capitalise 
on the players who do not make it into the accredited academies has risen significantly. For 
context, there were reportedly about 18,000 hopefuls who attended trials for 15 places at the 
Right to Dream Academy in Ghana.410 These circumstances led to the situation described as 
“exploitation within exploitation”,411  as players were asked to pay money to procure a 
Ghanaian passport to increase the likelihood of their acceptance into the accredited 
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academies. The fortunate players go into the official academies, whilst the unfortunate ones 
become subject to proposals from unofficial academies who offer them opportunities to take 
part in unregulated local football competitions. 412  The players who join the unofficial 
academies would be unprotected by any club or federation whilst they take part in these 
activities. The players would fall outside all legal and administrative regulations that are 
aimed at safeguarding them from entry into what is effectively an 'underground' football 
economy.413 Furthermore, by virtue of participating in these unregulated competitions, the 
players become increasingly exposed to the risks of trafficking by unscrupulous persons 
looking to sell them or manipulate them into signing exploitative contracts.  
A secondary problem with the unofficial academies is that they do not prepare the young 
players for a life outside football, or the possibility of the player not securing a professional 
playing contract. The unscrupulous coaches and owners reportedly remove boys from school 
to enrol in these academies,414 thereby emphasising that their exclusive focus is on football 
training.415 Of the academies discussed, the unofficial academies are considered to be the 
most exploitative and extreme for the African players. As the players are only seen as 
commodities for financial gain and are not provided with any alternative prospects. 
Conclusion 
The issue of football trafficking cannot be understated, and there are several factors that have 
contributed to its continued occurrence. The trafficking problem occurs both in football and 
through football, but whilst trafficking in football is within the provisions of the Trafficking 
Protocol, trafficking through football may not always have an exploitative purpose for the 
player in the destination country. The football trafficking process showed that there are 
several core commonalities between the other forms of trafficking and football trafficking. 
The initiation of the football trafficking problem was also considered, as there was an 
analysis of the wide-ranging impact of the Bosman ruling for the EU teams, examining how 
their search for the next football star in the cheaper non-EU markets has fostered the illicit 
trade in African minors. Policies like the home-grown rule meant that EU clubs were also 
keen on recruiting an even younger demographic of foreign players, in order to develop them 
and allow them to later qualify as “local” players. This coincided with the increased 
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commodification of children in the sport, as more parties realised that minors could be an 
important source of revenue. 
Lastly, the increase in the number of football academies in Africa ties in with the feeder links 
formed to “cherry pick” the country (and continent’s) most promising players. Though some 
of the academies have a developmental benefit for the players, their families, and the 
communities they are situated in, the overarching essence of the academies remain to export 
the most talented players, thereby causing a drain of Africa’s football talent. Moreover, 
certain academies do not give alternatives for players who are unable to attain professional 
contracts, which could leave some aspiring players in potentially precarious circumstances. 
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Chapter 3 - THE MIGRATION OF THE AFRICAN LABOUR FORCE 
Migrant labour has been a key feature of the sports industry for several years, but as time 
has passed, the frequency in which it has taken place has increased, and so have the 
complexities involved in understanding the probable effects. An example of such 
complexities comes to the fore in the case of migrant African footballers and how aspects of 
their migration could be viewed as child and/or human trafficking.416 Football migration is 
classified into regular or irregular migration. Regular football migration takes place when 
the migration complies with FIFA regulations on the transfer of players,417 and this can occur 
on three levels. Players could move between clubs in the same nation; players could move 
between clubs from different nations but in the same continent; and, players could move 
between clubs from different continents. 418  The underlying factor of regular football 
migration is that it is conducted between officially registered clubs and associations.419 By 
contrast, irregular football migration involves players being transferred to clubs in foreign 
countries outside FIFA’s regulatory provisions, and contrary to the legal authority of the 
receiving country and government.420 Hence, irregular migration involves the moving of 
players between continents in a manner that includes smuggling or football trafficking.421 
3.1 HISTORY OF FOOTBALL LABOUR MIGRATION 
Migration between continents can often be associated with historical ties.422 For instance, a 
typical Senegalese or Ivorian player may seek to migrate and play professionally in France 
due to colonial, cultural, linguistic, social, and personal connections.423 The residual impact 
of colonial links between the African country and the former European imperialist state is 
often a key factor, owing to the shared history and other similarities between the countries.424 
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Therefore, as Taylor noted, to understand the migration of footballers in the ‘age of 
globalization’ we must be conscious of the historical elements involved.425 The history and 
colonial links between an aspiring African footballer and an EU team often evidences a 
broader sequence of labour flows, which can be analysed through the events that transpired 
during the colonial era, the post-colonial era, and the age of neo-colonialism. 
3.1.1 Colonial era (early-mid 20th century) 
In the colonial era, economic and trade links were established between Western European 
nations and the outer regions of the world which they had colonised. 426  The European 
countries deemed their African colonies as being rich in natural resources, raw materials, 
and cheap labour.427 Since football was an established part of the Westernisation process 
during this era,428 the talented African footballers were considered to be under the umbrella  
of “cheap labour”. The European countries used football as a means of controlling their 
colonies,429 whilst their associated clubs exported African players as an economically logical 
decision able to yield substantial returns in the long term. This led to instances whereby 
European countries with significant imperial impact in Africa became the foremost 
beneficiaries of player migration,430 as African footballers were exported in large numbers. 
From the 1930s, French professional clubs mined their colonies for football talent.431 At the 
induction of the French professional league in 1932, several of the players who took part in 
the league originated from France’s North African colonies.432 Players commonly came 
from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, with the latter producing Ali Benouma and Kouider 
Daho who were among the first employees in the new French league. 433 The exploitation of 
African talent was more evident six years later in 1938, when 147 African players were 
recorded as playing in the French first and second divisions. This tally continued to rise after 
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the Second World War, as between 1945 and 1962, a further 117 players of North African 
descent took part in France’s professional leagues.434 The players were 76 Algerians, 34 
Moroccans, and 7 Tunisian footballers.435 Additionally, the French national team benefitted 
from the exported African players, as some players became naturalised and played for their 
“adopted” countries, such as Larbi Ben Barek who was a player of Moroccan descent but 
represented the France national team 17 times.436 
The exportation and exploitation of African football labour also occurred in Portugal in the 
1950s,437 as the prevalent football teams in Portugal established scouting networks in their 
African colonies (Angola and Mozambique) to export the most talented players to the 
Portuguese league.438 Indeed, one of Portugal’s greatest ever football players and the most 
prominent African-born player to represent a European side, Eusebio da Silva Ferreira, was 
a product of such an arrangement between an African colony and the European empire. 
Eusebio, who was originally from Mozambique,439 signed for the Portuguese league side 
Benfica in 1961, he was subsequently naturalised, and he went on to form a core part of the 
Portuguese national team for more than a decade, between 1961 and 1973.440 Eusebio gained 
international recognition as a symbol of Portuguese football and society, playing over sixty 
times for his nation during that period and becoming European Footballer of the Year in 
1965, and winning the Golden Boot at the 1966 World Cup.441  
Like the French and Portuguese, the British were also involved in the exportation of African 
football talent, as there were a few Egyptian and South African players taking part in English 
professional football during the 1910s.442 Between 1949-59, academics have argued that 
Britain’s ruling class used football as a means of proffering the image of its superior political 
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and economic system,443 whilst asserting its imperial hegemony and racist discrimination.444 
The British settlers discouraged the local dance and physical activities prevalent amidst their 
colonies, as they chose to enforce European-approved leisure pursuits, such as sports, 
including volleyball, netball, track and field, and football.445 Njororai explained that the 
simplicity of football enhanced the popularity of the sport on the continent, as the Africans 
were willing and enthusiastic to participate, because their natural athleticism fit perfectly 
with this new sport.446 
3.1.2 Post-Colonial era (late 20th – early 21st century) 
The collapse of the colonial rule in Africa did little in the way of halting the exportation of 
African talent to European clubs, as the post-colonial connections were still strong.447 It has 
been suggested that the end of the colonial era resulted in a steady and more sustained flow 
of African football talent to the likes of France, Belgium, and Portugal, between the 1960s 
and 1970s. 448  African players were increasingly recognised as the most cost-effective 
acquisitions for European clubs,449 as they were viewed as sources of labour for the “core” 
professional leagues of Europe. 450  The migration of football talent to Europe occurred 
concurrently with the migration of Africa’s skilled tertiary-educated labour force during that 
period.451 At the time, the migration of the skilled Africans increased in scale and patterns,452 
and this was due to the promises of higher wages made to the people. The migrations also 
served as a means for the Africans to escape the political unrest that existed in parts of the 
continent in the aftermath of the colonial era.453 
Elite sports migrants were a considerable part of the highly skilled human capital who were 
migrating from Africa.454 The motivations for their emigration were often similar to the 
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reasons proffered by other skilled African migrant workers, but with an evident emphasis on 
receiving more sporting opportunities, participating in sporting events, and receiving better 
pay for their work.455 These reasons for sports labour migration are still relevant today, and 
it is evidenced by the globalised nature of the sporting industry.456 
In football, the success of the continental European leagues of Italy, France, and Spain, 
accelerated the professionalisation of football, and prompted more instances of international 
labour migration.457 During the 1980s and 1990s, African talent began to cross European 
borders in larger numbers, as there was an estimated 350 Africans taking part in professional 
football across Europe at the time.458 By the 2000s, this figure had increased by over 100 per 
cent. 459  In 2000, 69% of the Africans in Portuguese football were from the former 
Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau, and 59% of 
the 162 African players in France came from their former French territories.460 Some have 
argued that the more sustained transfer of talented African players in the post-colonial era 
took place after the FIFA under-17 World Youth Championships in 1991, which was won 
by Ghana.461 After the competition, more EU clubs were made aware of the potential offered 
by talented African players.462 
During the post-colonial era, there was an increased representation of African players and 
players of African descent amongst European teams, and this was especially the case with 
teams from countries which had a significant imperial impact on the African continent. For 
example, the French national side at the 1998 FIFA World Cup won the competition with a 
team that was dubbed the “rainbow team”, due to several of its star players originating from 
the former colonies of France.463 The players had backgrounds ranging from North Africa, 
West Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific islands, Armenia and the Basque country.464 Further 
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to this, since France’s triumph in 1998, it has become even more regular for the French 
national team to contain players of African descent,465 as this was again the case in 2018 
when France won their second FIFA World Cup.466   
Some European clubs used their financial superiority to capitalise on their advantage and 
dictate transfer conditions with clubs in their former colonies in the post-colonial era.467 
These transfers between the European and African clubs contributed to the brain/muscle 
drain of skilled African players.468 The muscle drain refers to the movement of talented 
players from clubs in poorer countries to clubs in the richer countries,469 as the poorer 
countries and football clubs are continuously de-skilled. The muscle drain is comparable to 
the brain drain of skilled health workers in the early 2000s, which left many former British 
colonies like Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, without sufficient medical personnel. 470 
Nevertheless, the muscle drain of footballers is characterised by the ability of the European 
clubs to flex their financial power in a manner which contributes towards the 
underdevelopment of African football,471 and the continued dependence of African football 
on European clubs and finances.472 A further characteristic of the muscle drain is that it 
occurs via the underpinning element of neo-colonial imperialism.473 
3.1.3 Neo-Colonialism (21st century) 
Neo-colonialism transpires when the economic and political policies of a great power (in 
this context, the European countries, football clubs and leagues474) indirectly maintain or 
extend their influence over other areas or people (the African countries and the associated 
clubs)475  without necessarily reducing the status of the subordinate nation to that of a 
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colony.476 In neo-colonialism, the dominant country and economy is able to penetrate the 
poorer country and its economy by taking advantage of the latter’s vulnerability.477  
In a footballing context, neo-colonialism occurs through the constant exportation and 
exploitation of African footballers by the dominant European clubs, as they use their 
previous colonial links to undertake the muscle drain of the African football labour force.478 
Several European clubs evidently subscribe to the increased commodification of children, 
and in so doing view Africa’s football talent as “raw materials” 479 and “cash crops” to be 
harvested on the European market.480 With the relatively cheap cost of acquiring the talented 
African players, some European clubs use their superior financial capabilities to lure the 
talented players in the poor regions of Africa to the richer and more dominant European 
countries and leagues.481 Consequently, Africans remain prominent in the core European 
soccer leagues of England, France, Italy, and Spain.482 Several European clubs have fuelled 
migratory flows and geographical patterns with African countries through formal links with 
their former colonial possessions.483 These links were established with the specific intention 
of outlasting the colonial rule, and they were aimed at promoting the colonial hegemony of 
the European countries to the African people long after the abolition of colonialism.484 
To illustrate, Portugal used football as part of their wider imperialist narrative to facilitate 
their colonial power over the African countries, by importing European values to local 
populations who had little history of sport.485 One such practice involved naming African 
clubs after Portuguese teams, thereby creating a basis in which the members of the African 
country developed more of an affinity towards the more successful European side rather than 
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their own teams in their home country and leagues.486 In such circumstances, the young 
African players in former Portuguese colonies would be more inclined to migrate abroad to 
represent the more famous and reputable Portuguese clubs, rather than remain in Africa and 
represent their own home teams. A secondary practice adopted by the prominent Portuguese 
clubs was to put in place recruitment networks and means of identifying and exporting 
African football labour that would withstand the collapse of colonialism.487 
Former FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, once referred to some European clubs who benefitted 
from their previous colonial links to conduct their recruitment of players as neo-colonialists, 
as he argued that they “engage in social and economic rape by robbing the developing world 
of its best players”.488 When considered alongside academic studies on Africa’s football 
player migration to Europe in previous years, Blatter’s comments are not far-fetched, as the 
evidence shows the existence of neo-colonial practices through the exportation and 
exploitation of young African players. 489 Therefore, the practices of the European clubs 
have contributed to the impoverishment of African football. As African players are viewed 
as commodities and are trafficked and transported abroad in ways that are not altogether 
dissimilar to the slave trade. Players find themselves in precarious situations as part of their 
quest to migrate and play professional football in Europe. Whilst the sport garners more 
global coverage, appeal, and increased profitability, often at the expense of these young 
boys. 
3.2 MOTIVATIONS FOR PLAYER MIGRATION  
African footballers have several motivations for wanting to emigrate from the continent. 
Africans could be described as having a “migratory disposition” 490  because they view 
migrating abroad as an opportunity to be successful, attain wealth, and provide for their 
families.491 The increased economic rewards available in Europe permeates the perception 
that life abroad is better than life in Africa. This perception is one which is engrained in the 
minds of Africans, to the extent that some of the footballers view merely making it out of 
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Africa and into Europe as success in itself, irrespective of whether or not they sign a 
professional playing contract at a foreign club.492 Unfortunately, this migratory disposition 
puts the Africans at an increased risk of trafficking and exploitation.493  
African players often associate spatial mobility with social mobility, and this makes them 
predisposed to leaving their home countries and continent.494 The African migrants conflate 
both spatial and social mobility as essential facets of success, even though there may not 
always be a link between the two. 495  Nevertheless, the African players possess this 
predisposition to migration as part of a range of complex and multifaceted factors that 
motivate them to migrate.496 The relevant factors are deemed complex because they often 
entail not only economic, but also political, historical, geographical, social, and cultural 
factors which all affect the structuring of football migrant trails.497 These factors influence 
the decision-making of the players who choose to pursue certain migratory strategies, and in 
so doing accept the risks associated with labour migration.498  
Motivating factors could include the import of Western media into Africa,499 which provides 
insight into the accomplishments of other successful African migrants and portrays the 
comparatively high standard of living they are able to achieve abroad.500 The prior colonial 
links and established migration routes between African countries and European teams could 
also be a motivating factor for the African migrants.501 Examples of this include the feeder 
arrangements and links between EU teams and the clubs in developing countries. The 
migratory routes reinforce the perception that spatial mobility is the primary means in which 
the players can achieve social mobility. Hence, the players become convinced that migration 
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(even by irregular means) would be worth the risk, especially if the potential reward is an 
opportunity to become self-sufficient and provide for their families.  
Maguire noted that to understand how football migration patterns, routes, and motivations 
are likely to develop in the future,502 a broad approach must be taken. He explained that 
specific questions pertaining to the circumstances of the football migrants should be 
connected to wider sociological issues to gain an understanding.503 Thus, Stead and Maguire 
developed a range of these specific questions,504 but given that there may be motivational 
differences for football migrants coming from countries with economically strong and high-
quality leagues (e.g., EU migrants moving within Europe),505 the questions have been limited 
to those that are of specific importance within the context of African football migrants. 
 Is the move part of the ‘developmental’ stage in the personal life of the player?  
 Is the player’s motive tied to financial lure or imperative?  
 Does the player see migration as a ‘rite de passage’ that will enhance their playing 
development? 506 
From these questions, the development of the individual will be analysed in line with the 
player’s obligations to his family as a reason for migration; the financial lure of a lucrative 
footballing career abroad will be considered alongside the socio-economic circumstances of 
several African players; and migration will be discussed as a means of enhancing a player’s 
footballing development, through the push-pull dynamics of human migration.  
3.2.1 Family  
Families of African footballers typically play an influential role in the player’s decision to 
migrate to another country to play professionally.507 The families support the players and 
produce the capital to make the emigration and mobility to a foreign league a possibility.508 
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This migration often coincides with the player developing into a central figure in the 
household, as African families increasingly view their children as a symbol of hope.509 For 
these families who mostly associate spatial mobility with social mobility, the priority is for 
the young player to leave Africa by whatever means necessary. In leaving Africa, the young 
player is expected to become the family breadwinner,510 and to meet “intergenerational 
obligations towards family”, 511  such as alleviating the family out of any pre-existing 
poverty-stricken conditions.512 These pressures force the players and their families to search 
for routes to migrate which may be dangerous and detrimental to the child player. 
Esson explained how the African player’s desire to use football to generate income and help 
their families financially is usually matched with their family's willingness for this to take 
place.513 This subsequently plays a key role in how an unscrupulous person who offers an 
opportunity to play professional football abroad, can exercise and abuse power over the child 
and their family to facilitate football trafficking. African players have been trafficked to 
countries such as, India, Bangladesh, and Laos in search of professional football contracts,514 
just so they can receive remuneration and be able to remit money back home to their 
families.515 
3.2.2 Socio-economic circumstances 
Sporting migration is influenced by the economic rewards available to owners, agents, and 
athletes.516 From the perspective of the athletes, particularly, the aspiring African footballers, 
migration is considered as key to improve their socio-economic prospects. 517  Through 
migration, they would be better placed to take advantage of the increased sporting 
opportunities available abroad and social capital. The players believe that playing 
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professional football abroad will give them the opportunity to be “self-employed”, as they 
can depend on their own inherent abilities to provide economic and financial stability for 
themselves and their families.518 The general perception amongst the African footballers, 
due to their migratory disposition, is that their lives would not improve if they were to remain 
in Africa. 519  Thus, the future development of Africa and African football is often not 
appealing to the players, as they assume that the only way they can attain social mobility and 
increase their quality of life and socio-economic circumstances is via spatial mobility.520 The 
African player’s intention to migrate towards the core football economies in Europe ties in 
with wider understanding of sports migration, whereby athletes are known to “follow the 
money”.521 
For the Africans, the key obstacle in tying their development and social mobility to spatial 
mobility is often an inability to migrate through regular channels. Thus, the motivations of 
the players to leave Africa to improve their social and financial status, is generally met with 
a lack of means to gain legitimate entry and professional football employment at a foreign 
football club.522 This culminates in the situation whereby the aspiring players use irregular 
migration channels to travel, consequently leading to circumstances where they at times end 
up as victims of trafficking.523 Yet, owing to their prevailing socio-economic circumstances, 
the players and their families continue to deem irregular migration as a worthy risk, 
irrespective of the possible dangers involved.524  
3.2.3 Push-pull dynamics 
African players, like other elite sports migrants, regularly seek migration opportunities to 
enhance their development and trade their sport labour to attain a better livelihood.525 As a 
result of the lowly nature of African football,526 the player’s motivations for migration can 
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be examined and explained in line with the push-pull dynamics of human migration. The 
International Organisation for Migration defined this dynamic as “an analysis of migration 
[regular and irregular] which takes into consideration the push factors which drive people to 
leave their country against the pull factors attracting them to the country of destination.”527 
Push factors in a general context include economic, social, or political problems that an 
individual faces in his home country, whilst the pull factors are a higher demand for labour 
and better social opportunities in a foreign or destination country. 528 These factors feed into 
the process of football migration and the movement of sporting labour from the economic 
periphery (African football) to the economic core (European football). 529  The African 
players look to leave the weak national economies and financial crises they face in African 
football which pushes them away from the continent. As they aim to take part and benefit 
from the financial rewards that pull them towards pursuing a better life in Europe. Since they 
are sports migrants who equally see the benefit in “following the money”, 530 many of the 
African players believe that playing professional football in Europe is indeed a ‘rite de 
passage’. This is because the increased opportunities will enable them to develop in both a 
professional and personal capacity, subsequently giving them the ability to provide for 
themselves and their families. 
The push-pull dynamics will be expanded upon in chapter 6,531 as part of the discussion on 
the social factors that have affected FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy performance. 
3.3 EFFECTS OF FOOTBALL LABOUR MIGRATION 
There are arguments for and against the emigration of African youths, and as Maguire noted, 
examining the “good” or “bad” effects of football migration can be based on issues such as 
power, culture, and control of the sport.532 
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Migration could potentially provide great benefits not only to the migrants and their families, 
but also to their host (EU) and home (African) countries. These benefits could be in the form 
of bringing much-needed skills and labour to their new teams and communities in the EU, 
or in the form of the transfer of remittance, knowledge, and other social capital to their 
families and communities back home in Africa.533 
Africa 
In African societies which are at times devoid of State welfare,534 the aspiring footballers 
see sporting migration as an opportunity to assert agency and control over important aspects 
of their lives and migratory movements.535 Migration offers them conditions which can 
improve rather than diminish some of the child’s life chances,536 by offering them a means 
to earn money and become self-sufficient. 537  The migrating players hope to gain 
opportunities to play football at a professional level, whilst being able to enjoy the 
accompanying benefits to their health and well-being that could come about as a 
consequence of a potentially lucrative footballing career. 538 The lucrative career and better 
salaries would benefit the players and their families,539 and this exposure would provide 
them with the platform to become upwardly socially mobile.540 
International migration could also contribute positively to the player’s professional 
development. 541  Statistics show that a significant number of Africa’s most talented 
footballers play professional football in Europe.542 With opportunities provided to these 
players and the enhanced training facilities on offer in Europe, the African players are able 
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to develop their footballing abilities and gain from playing alongside other talented players 
from elite leagues around the world. 543  This experience is often termed as the ‘feet-
exchange’, and it occurs when overseas players have a positive influence on the technical 
skill of other players around them.544 The feet-exchange could lead to more technically 
gifted African players, which would then influence the successes of Africa’s national 
football teams in international competitions.545 
The performance of the African teams and the instances of successful migrant African 
footballers could have a reverberating effect on the continent. European teams, being 
impressed with the quality available in Africa, may choose to reinvest financial and 
intellectual capital back into the continent.546 This investment may be through the opening 
of more Afro-European academies which could have various positive long term effects in 
the communities they are situated, such as: free quality education for those within the 
academies; employment opportunities for local coaches, teachers, cleaners and 
administrative staff, and construction workers in the communities; 547 opportunities to 
graduate from the academy and play professional football abroad for the most talented 
African players; and contributions to the quality of the country’s domestic and international 
teams. 548  Some academies go further and attempt to contribute to wider development 
agendas by up-scaling individual benefits to the broader community and societal levels. This 
is done by encouraging trainees to take part in community projects and entrepreneurial 
activities in Africa and supporting the activities of several local micro-businesses.549 
Europe 
In Europe, several clubs and national teams have benefitted from African football labour 
migration over the years. In club football, African players are numerous in the smaller 
leagues such as Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
Turkey, whilst leagues in Central and Eastern Europe also draw a fair number of footballers 
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from the African continent. 550 During the 2019-20 football season of the English Premier 
League, there were at least 47 African players who featured across the competition.551 Asides 
from European players, only South American players were represented more than Africans 
in the Premier League. 
With European national teams, several nations have benefitted significantly from 
colonisation and the longstanding links they have with their former African colonies. During 
the 2016 UEFA European Championships, the squads of the two finalists (France and 
Portugal) contained 17 players of African descent, making 37% of both sides.552 The French 
national side consisted of 11 players of African descent, whilst the Portuguese team had six. 
In fact, the deciding goal of the competition in the final was scored by Portuguese player 
Eder Lopes, who was born in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa.553 Further statistics from the 2016 
UEFA Euros competition showed that 12 of the 24 countries which competed in the 
tournament comprised of at least one player of African heritage in their squad.554  
In the 2018 FIFA World Cup, France benefitted from a second generation of its 1998 
“rainbow team”. France won the World Cup in 2018 with 80% of its players being of African 
descent.555 Following the triumph, there were arguments about the identities of the players, 
as most of them were children of migrant parents. Some in the media termed France’s win 
as a World Cup won by Africa, whilst some of the French players and the US Ambassador 
to France were quick to refute this claim.556 
3.3.2 Disadvantages 
The various advantages of football migration for Africa and Europe could have a potentially 
precarious effect on the lives and aspirations of the African footballers who increasingly 
view migration as the primary means in which they can achieve success. The increased 
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opportunities to enrol in more football academies across the African continent and the 
possibility of playing professionally in Europe furthers the migratory disposition of the 
Africans about a career away from their home country and continent.557 The African players 
expend time and energy to try and earn a professional contract abroad,558 and their eagerness 
contributes to the illicit market of young players which leads to instances of football 
trafficking. 
The aspirations of the African players are enhanced by the sight of their fellow African role 
models who represent big teams across Europe, without knowing that for a large majority of 
the African players, their aspirations are antithetical to the true circumstances which most 
football migrants face. Though there are African football migrants who are successful in 
securing professional contracts abroad, merely securing this contract does not always mean 
that the player is safeguarded from exploitative practices and situations that threaten their 
security and well-being in the foreign country.559 With majority of players being unable to 
secure playing contracts, the players could potentially end up on the streets and parks of 
Europe, 560  and at times, in more precarious circumstances than they were in back in 
Africa.561 Therefore, in discussing the downsides to football labour migration, these can be 
divided into the disadvantages for irregular migrants (questioned status), and the negative 
effects of regular migration on Africa and African football (muscle drain and football 
dependence). 
Questioned Status 
When unsuccessful players are identified on the streets of Europe they may be met with 
questions about their status. The differentiation between illegal migrant and trafficking 
victim may be key to their future. Players who are considered to have been trafficked by 
virtue of their fitting the legal definition of human trafficking,562 could be categorised as 
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“victims” and therefore granted some, albeit limited, form of assistance and protection.563 
Whereas, other players who are trafficked and abandoned, or who do not suffer any form of 
exploitation in the destination country, could be categorised as smuggled and 
“undocumented” migrants, and subsequently be viewed as undeserving of protection.564 
Though victims of trafficking can also be removed, illegal migrants are more likely to be 
criminalised and removed from the destination country.565 This is due to their lack of legal 
documents to reside or work,566 and also because of the prism of criminality which labels 
them as potential dangers to the public. 
With the grey areas around the status of identified unsuccessful football migrants, and the 
shared characteristics between migrants and victims,567 law enforcement and social workers 
sometimes display an inability to differentiate between the two. This difficulty arguably 
stems from the isolated and covert nature of the crime,568 but more so, the overriding belief 
by law enforcement that within the continuum of abuse not all migrants would be 
“deserving” of the victim status. 569  Such beliefs have negative consequences for the 
trafficked persons, as authorities have remained cynical and hardened to the plight of victims 
who are easier to treat as illegal immigrants.570 As Lin pointed out, “wrong expectations of 
how a victim should behave often leads to misinterpretations by both the authorities and 
service providers, which may often shift blame on to the trafficked persons.”571 By shifting 
the blame, many victims of the egregious harm caused by trafficking, fall within the category 
of irregular or illegal migrants in the eyes of the state.572 
Blazek and others noted that institutions in Europe (police and other support organisations) 
tended to encourage people who claim to have been trafficked to return to their country of 
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origin.573  The authorities’ justification for this is often a claim that more suitable support 
would be provided to the supposed “victim” if they returned home, as opposed to that which 
would be given to the victims if they chose to remain in the destination country. 574 
Consequently, trafficked African players who choose to stay in the European country 
(sometimes illegally) due to the increased economic opportunities available in the region,575 
could have their claim to being victims questioned. The players may be viewed as fraudsters 
who pretended to have been trafficked to gain an advantage when they are in actuality, 
irregular economic migrants.576 However, when authorities equate the victim status of a child 
to their willingness to return home when given the opportunity, Esson stated that this is 
arguably an anti-immigrant sentiment.577 Such a sentiment contradicts the existence of the 
neo-colonial links created to foster the migratory disposition of the Africans, and which were 
designed in the post-colonial era to ensure the continued exportation and exploitation of 
cheap African talent within Europe. Hence, the questioned status and subsequent treatment 
of the African players in the destination countries, neglects the environment formed in 
Europe to encourage the continued inward migration of skilled foreigners.578 
Muscle Drain  
African teams and countries invest in the production of sporting talent, only for the talent to 
be recruited at an undervalued rate579 by the economically developed teams and leagues in 
Europe.580 The loss of the most talented African players lowers the quality of football on the 
continent581 as the African teams are de-skilled.582 The current extent of the muscle drain 
could be escalated further by the advent of more Afro-European academies on the continent, 
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as the rate in which talented African players are found and exported could significantly 
increase.583 The academies primarily follow sporting and economic goals which contribute 
to the commodification of players, whilst their efforts to contribute to local sport 
development may not always be to the benefit of the communities in which they are based.584 
Furthermore, in these academies the players could also have their inherent African abilities 
coached out of them to fit a more European mould before they are exported abroad.585  
As a consequence of the muscle drain, the local fans of the African football clubs are denied 
direct access to watching the best players nurtured and developed in their country.586 This 
influences match attendance and revenues for the teams, and it limits other financial options 
such as sponsorships for the African sides.587 Moreover, the continued exportation hinders 
the formation of a cohesive group of players that are ready to represent their national 
teams.588 And, in some instances, the African national teams could suffer with key absences, 
as EU football clubs sometimes refuse African players permission to play for their national 
sides when there is a clash with the club’s domestic playing schedule.589 
Football Dependence 
Due to the increasing levels of football migration between Africa and Europe, Poli 
acknowledged that the football economy is administered in a manner which fosters the 
financial discrepancies between the smaller (African) countries and leagues, and the bigger 
(European) countries and leagues. 590 Poli argued that the financial discrepancies favour the 
teams and countries from the bigger European leagues and allows for the continued 
exploitation of the smaller leagues and teams.591 These financial discrepancies have been 
maintained by the global expansion of FIFA, which has caused tensions over the balance of 
power between the established European bodies and other emerging nations.592 Therefore, 
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because Europe is football’s core economy, 593 the non-core leagues and countries are kept 
in a dependent relationship with the dominant European core.594 Thereby leaving the African 
sides to remain impoverished and under-developed.595 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that there are multiple factors that contribute to football labour 
migration. The history of football migration between Africa and Europe shows that former 
EU imperialist powers saw African players as part of the cheap labour that could be 
transported and exploited abroad. Such practices created migratory and neo-colonial links 
between Africa and several EU countries. The motivations for the players’ migrations 
showed that though socio-economic benefits were key, there were often additional and 
underlying factors that pushed and pulled the players towards wanting to migrate, legally or 
otherwise. With a general absence of legal routes for migration for the aspiring players, 
several end up in more precarious conditions that are more related to human trafficking than 
irregular migration. The effects of migration then showed that though there were several 
positives for the few African players who successfully migrated through football, many 
aspiring African players suffer very contrasting circumstances if they are unsuccessful in 
attaining a professional playing contract. Yet, an underlying perception amongst the African 
minors persists that the socio-economic rewards associated with irregular migration and 
potentially, human trafficking, could outweigh the purported risks to their person.  
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Chapter 4 - REGULATION, REGULATORY SPACE, AND FIFA’S ANTI-
TRAFFICKING POLICIES 
Regulation plays an important role in the analysis of football trafficking, as it is apparent 
that the continued exploitative procurement of child players has yet to be met with the 
appropriate regulatory responses and allied practices needed to sufficiently curb the 
problem.596 So far, FIFA has been accused of instituting regulations which are not fit for 
purpose,597 as the policies have failed to protect the aspiring young players from being 
trafficked in and through the sport. Therefore, understanding the use and application of 
regulation and its importance in curbing the football trafficking problem is essential. 
To consider the regulatory regime and landscape around football, the “regulatory space”598 
account put forward in 1989 by Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran is pertinent, because it 
allows for a detailed look at regulatory practices beyond centred (State) regulation.599 By 
analysing football’s regulatory space, the interplay, inter-relationships, and the institutional 
connections,600 between the public (State) and private (non-State) actors involved in football 
will be established.601 This is in order to illustrate which party has the “power”602 to ascribe 
importance and prioritise certain regulatory issues in the space, and to identify who the onus 
falls on to regulate against such problems. After which, the relevant FIFA anti-trafficking 
policies will be discussed. 
4.1 WHAT IS REGULATION? 
Several writers have noted that the term “regulation” is notoriously difficult to define.603 It 
is an expression that is often found in both legal and non-legal contexts, and for this reason 
has acquired a variety of meanings over time.604 Baldwin and others claimed that the lack of 
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a singular meaning for the term is due to the growth in regulation as an institutional 
phenomenon within the academic industry.605 This has had the resultant effect of academics 
and professionals trying to colonise this field by devising their own varied definitions of the 
term, in order to mould the understanding of regulation in their own image.606 Black agreed 
with this point, as she contended that regulation is often given a particular tone or 
conceptualisation depending on the problem looking to be addressed by a writer.607 Other 
authors have argued that the lack of cohesion amongst the several definitions of the term is 
due to various political and ideological battles that ensue when trying to determine the 
appropriate scope of regulation. 608  Orbach provided a short summary on the differing 
viewpoints surrounding the definition of regulation, as he suggested that the confusion stems 
out of unrelated matters, as one group is focused on the abstract concept of regulation, whilst 
the other group is concerned with the desirable scope of regulatory powers and policies.609  
The two groups can loosely be classed into those who define regulation through a narrow 
lens and those who view regulation through a broad lens. Those who view regulation in a 
narrow form aver that regulation is an instrument of the state to influence social behaviour,610 
as a government promulgates rules which are accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring 
and enforcement, 611  often through a specialist public agency aimed at promoting 
compliance. 612  In contrast, those who view regulation through a broad lens argue that 
regulation encompasses all forms of social613 or behavioural control whatever the origin,614 
and this includes non-state processes as forms of regulation.615 Though there are differences 
between the groups, it is argued that regulation should not be reduced to a simple essence 
(i.e., regulation should not be deemed as only to restrict behaviour and prevent undesirable 
activities616) or a singular concept, in order to appease any definitional issues.617 
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Black proposed a general definition for regulation, as she asserted that regulation is a 
“sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined 
standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or 
outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and 
behaviour-modification.”618 Black explained that behaviour modification would be able to 
address the collective problem often through a combination of rules as well as a means for 
their implementation and enforcement.619 Black’s definition was affirmed by the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, as they asserted that “regulation is achieved by 
decisions intended to control or influence specific elements of the regulated activity. [And 
regulations] are implemented by the setting, monitoring, and enforcement of standards 
designed to achieve chosen objectives.”620 
This context within which regulations are actioned to achieve the regulatory goal is what is 
known as a “regulatory regime”. May explained that a regulatory regime comprises of an 
institutional structure assigned with the responsibilities for carrying out regulatory 
actions. 621  The institutional structure and regulatory regime in this analysis related to 
football, is FIFA. 
4.1.1 The Types of Regulation 
Centred regulation 
Centred regulation (narrow lens perspective on regulation) involves some form of direct state 
intervention to alter behaviour or impact the economy. 622 At its conception, regulation was 
primarily centred and viewed as a tool by government to modify behaviours and attain 
certain outcomes within a community.623 In centred regulation, governments promulgate 
rules to be applied and effected by a body devoted to this purpose.624 However, regulation is 
increasingly being viewed as more than a centralised tool by governments to cause behaviour 
change.625 
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Decentred regulation (broad lens perspective on regulation) is different from centred 
regulation, 626 as here there is no direct connection and instruction from the state, and there 
are no boundaries regarding the scope of regulation, or the impact of factors which may 
influence the desired outcome.627 Decentred regulation draws attention away from the state 
and denies the necessity of the state to play a central role in regulation. 628  Decentred 
regulation sees regulation and the question of “who can regulate?” as an area which could 
consist of a combination of both state and non-state actors who can interact in a variety of 
complex and dynamic ways in the regime.629 Therefore, decentred regulation can be formed 
by various industries and institutions who possess regulatory functions which could be 
performed by one actor or dispersed between several actors in a regime.630 
Academic writers have played a key role in the development of the different perspectives 
associated with decentred regulation, as they have provided an expanded list of non-state 
institutions which are able to engage in regulation through decentred means.631 This could 
include corporations and independent organisations which practice self-regulation (such as 
FIFA), professional or trade bodies, and private organisations.632 These bodies all have the 
capacity to regulate and create regulation without state interference, in order to achieve their 
collective goals. 
4.1.2 Theories of Regulation 
Despite the different types of regulation, at its core, regulation plays a major role in all 
contemporary societies and often flows from public or private sources of authority,633 or a 
combination of the two. With this flow of authority between the regulator and the regulatees, 
there are often three main theories of regulation. These include public interest, private 
interest, and institutionalist theories of regulation. 
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The public and private interest theories explain why a regulator passes certain rules and how 
it intends to affect the behaviour of its regulatees to achieve the desired outcomes. 634 
Whereas, the institutionalist theories concentrate on the process of how regulation works.635 
The focus of this section is mainly on the public and private interest theories of regulation 
due to their increased significance in the context of analysing FIFA. 
Public Interest 
The public interest theory proffers that regulation is brought about as a result of an 
underlying pursuit of public interest related objectives by the regulators. 636  The public 
interest theory is mostly seen in centred regulatory regimes, as governments use regulation 
to achieve the desire of the public in pursuance of a collective goal,637 and to promote the 
general welfare of a community.638  The public interest theory assumes that governments (in 
the form of politicians and other regulators) are inherently benevolent in nature, and that 
they aim to address objective failures within a community through regulatory intervention.639 
However, Baldwin and others posited that the idea of a pure public interest-oriented 
regulation is utopian.640 As regulatory decisions are rarely based on objective standards and 
the public interest approach to regulation does not always deliver on the desired public 
interest outcomes. 641 
Private Interest 
The increased occurrences of regulatory failure and regulatory capture in public interest and 
centred regulatory regimes led to the growth in private interest theories. Proponents of the 
private interest theory questioned the true intentions behind regulation,642 and the “public-
interestedness” of regulators. This was because regulators were adopting regulations which 
maximised the private self-interests of a select group within the community,643 as opposed 
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to being in the interests of the wider public, for which the regulations should have primarily 
benefitted.644 The private interest theory of regulation explains regulation from an interest 
group behavioural perspective. 645  The theory entails that parties within a regime come 
together to form a politically effective and powerful group which is able to capture and 
dominate the regulatory process.646 The parties in the group are then able to pursue their self-
interests, 647  as they affect the decisions of the regulators to go in their favour. 648 
Nevertheless, because the traditional concept of an autonomous private interest group within 
the regulatory regime acting in pursuit of its own immediate goals, may not always contradict 
the public interest incentives, it is argued that the differences between both public interest 
and private interest theories may no longer reflect the differing dynamics and complexities 
seen within regulatory regimes.649  
4.2 REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS AND STRATEGIES 
The choice of regulatory strategy is a crucial decision for regulators, especially when trying 
to produce regulation which can bring about the intended behaviour modification amongst 
its regulatees. Regulatory instruments and strategies can be classified according to the type 
of regulation (centred or decentred). 650  This could range from command and control, 
economic incentives, private regulation, competition rules, and direct action. 651 For this 
analysis, the focus will be on the command and control and private regulation instruments. 
4.2.1 Command and Control (C&C) Regulation 
C&C is also referred to as classical regulation, and it is the regulatory instrument most 
adopted in centred regulation. It consists of the promulgation of legal rules by a government 
through the prohibition of certain conduct and the setting of conditions for the behaviour 
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expected of its regulatees.652 The prohibitions set in C&C regulations are considered to be 
an effective deterrent from undesirable behaviours, because C&C stipulations are often 
underpinned by coercive sanctions (either civil or criminal in nature) if the rules are 
violated.653 There are however several difficulties with C&C regulations, such as: 
 C&C regulations often suffer from a lack of innovation and flexibility to 
accommodate for the changes in the society. The complex and inflexible rules could 
also lead to over-regulation, legalism, etc. 654 
 C&C rules could be too complex and cumbersome that the regulatees lack the 
requisite motivation to comply.655  
 C&C may not prevent the occurrence of regulatory capture when the relationship 
between regulators and regulatees becomes too close.656 
 The enforcement of C&C could be done in an overzealous, uninformed, or expensive 
manner,657 which would lead to uncertain effects within the regime.658 
4.2.2 Private (Self-) Regulation 
As C&C is seen in centred regulatory regimes, private self-regulation is mostly witnessed in 
decentred regimes. Private regulation occurs when parties voluntarily come together to form 
a regulatory structure as a result of their common interests.659 The private parties identify a 
gap in regulations pertaining to a specific activity or vocation, and decide to establish 
themselves as an alternate form of governance by adopting a self-regulatory strategy.660 Self-
regulation takes place when the rules applicable to regulatees emanate from a private 
institution which has a rule-making authority,661 these are referred to as Self-Regulatory 
Associations (SRAs). 
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SRAs share several consistencies with decentred regulation,662 such as the lack of direct 
government interference, and the SRAs ability to regulate itself.663  This self-regulatory 
capacity is an essential facet of any SRA, as they are the dominant actor within the regime, 
have an effective monopoly, and are able to represent the specific interests of their group of 
actors.664 The SRA is the dominant party that has the capacity to achieve compliance among 
its members, and can sanction violations of its Codes of Conduct (CoC).665 To this end, 
SRAs are mostly professional associations or sports organisations with an ability to regulate 
its members according to prescribed policies and procedures for adherence. 
For an SRA to be recognised as a viable regulatory body, the agreement and arrangements 
between the private actors should be recognised by a government. 666 The state will surrender 
its authority in the specific field so that the SRA can be recognised as an alternate power 
structure that is outside the direct control of political institutions.667 The SRA would then be 
able to regulate itself, which is not only a cheaper form of regulation for the taxpayer,668 but 
also acts as recognition by the state that its involvement may not always be needed to bring 
about the desired behaviour change in the given sector.669  Though the state surrenders 
authority in the field, SRAs may at times face threats of state intervention when a problem 
is not being adequately regulated against within its regime.670  
Types of Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation encompasses a wide variety of institutional arrangements and types,671 these 
include pure, co-opted, negotiated, and mandated self-regulation. The pure self-regulation is 
the most pertinent to the analysis of FIFA, but the other forms of self-regulation are also 
briefly explained. 
Pure Self-Regulation 
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This occurs when an industry takes the initiative to develop its laws,672 and enforces its rules 
and CoC with no government involvement, or if government involvement does occur, it 
takes a limited form.673 Pure self-regulation ensues through an agreement where the involved 
parties decide to regulate their own behaviour through the formation of a regulatory body.674 
Upon formation of the SRA, the parties will be involved in the promulgation and 
enforcement of its rules and CoC, along with the monitoring of the entire regulatory 
process.675 The SRA is left to conduct these tasks in the absence of governmental control in 
the given field.676  
There are several professions and sports associations which practice pure self-regulation. 
SRAs like FIFA guide their members’ behaviours through established rules, monitor their 
regulatory performance, and are able to sanction their members in instances of non-
compliance.677 The power of the SRA is derived from the contractual agreement with its 
members, which ensures the SRA has specific mechanisms for dealing with disputes within 
the regime, and underlines that law operates as a fall-back mechanism.678  
Co-Opted Self-Regulation 
This occurs when the industry, on its own volition, involves non-industry people (e.g., 
consumer and government representatives, independent members of the public, experts) in 
the development, application, and enforcement of laws in the regulatory regime.679 In this 
self-regulation, the additional input by non-members could be through statutory 
prescriptions and objectives, rules that are drafted by or approved by other bodies or 
ministers, and ministerial guidelines for consideration by the self-regulator.680 
Negotiated Self-Regulation 
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This takes place when the industry voluntarily negotiates the development, use, and 
enforcement of laws with an external body (e.g., a government department or a consumer 
association).681 This form of self-regulation involves the state contributing to the creation of 
conditions, whereby the SRA is able to steer itself and its members on its own and in the 
direction that the government prescribes, but without the government being directly involved 
in the regulatory set up.682  
Mandated Self-Regulation 
This occurs when an industry is ordered or designated by the government to develop, use, 
and enforce laws pertaining to an industry, whether alone or in collaboration with other 
relevant bodies.683 
Advantages and Disadvantages of SRAs 
On the one hand, there are several advantages attached to the use of self-regulation as a 
regulatory strategy. These include: 
 SRA’s regulations show an increased expertise and technical knowledge of industry 
practices and requirements, and also display an innovation with regulatory policies, 
which may not take place if the industry was regulated by the State;684 
 Information costs for the formulation and interpretation of standards are lower;685 
 Administrative costs of the regime are internalised and paid for by the SRA rather 
than by the government through taxpayer’s money;686 
 Monitoring and enforcement costs in private self-regulation are reduced due to ease 
of access to regulatees;687 
 Regulatory policies are often responsive to the industry, flexible, informed, targeted, 
and tailored to the interests of the involved actors,688  
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 The conditions within the SRA prompt greater compliance on the part of the 
regulatees.689  
On the other hand, self-regulation also has its disadvantages, as SRAs have been criticised 
for: 
 Being self-serving, self-interested, lacking sanctions;690 
 Anti-competitive practices on certain requirements, and furthering the interests of its 
members over that of the wider public;691  
 Poorly imposing enforcement standards against errant members;692 
 Producing regulations that are unjustifiable due to the lacking legitimacy and 
accountability;693 
 Circumventing state interference in its affairs,694 even when problems stemming 
from the SRA are affecting the wider public and are not being adequately addressed 
through its regime; 
 Carrying out all the functions of policy formulation, monitoring, adjudication, and 
enforcement. With the absence of power separation within the SRAs, this could lead 
to instances of conflicting interests, the possible abuse of power, 695  and the 
occurrence of regulatory capture;696  
 Not consulting third parties or non-members who could be affected by the SRA’s 
regulatory policies during its decision-making processes. 697 
4.3 FIFA’S REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND SYSTEM  
FIFA was founded in 1904 by seven nations in Europe as an umbrella organisation to 
standardise the rules of the game of association football across borders, 698  to arrange 
international tournaments, and to develop a commonly shared fixture calendar for 
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participants. 699  FIFA was formed as a non-profit Swiss-based association with a small 
network to accomplish these objectives.700 In 1974, FIFA began to enter the modern era as 
a major international sports power,701 with an intention to build on its small foundation by 
adding to its regulatory capabilities.702 This growth coincided with the rise in prominence of 
Brazilian FIFA president, João Havelange, who ran the association like a for-profit 
enterprise to generate significant revenues 703 and increase the benefits for members of the 
“football family”.704 Havelange initiated the commercial exploitation of the World Cup and 
all related property rights for FIFA (e.g., by increasing television and sponsorship returns) 
and opening the game to the influences of new media and new markets.705 Havelange did so 
whilst centralising FIFA’s control over its increased revenues.706 FIFA is now considered to 
be a significant player in the global economy, with its football-centred decisions having 
effects on the wider world of business.707 In the 2015-2018 financial cycle, FIFA reported 
that it generated more than $6.4 billion, which was a new revenue high.708  With such 
revenues, FIFA has developed a complex organisational structure, practically spanning 
every area of football, to enhance its powers within the sport and to maintain a level playing 
field for its participants.709  
FIFA’s organisational structure is pyramidal in nature, consisting of 211 national 
associations. FIFA member associations (MAs) represent FIFA in their country,710 and the 
associations are bestowed with equal voting power in the FIFA congress.711 The MAs are 
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organised into six confederations (see Figure 1),712 they represent the hundreds of football 
clubs, and at the base of the pyramid, the thousands of professional players registered at 
these clubs.713 
 
Figure 1: The FIFA Structure714 
FIFA’s governing body consists of three branches: the FIFA congress, the executive 
committee, and the general secretariat. The FIFA congress is the legislative and largest 
branch and is comprised of the MAs and confederations. The executive committee governs 
FIFA, and consists of the president, eight vice-presidents (one from each confederation, 
except UEFA),715 and 15 members. The FIFA executive determines the venue of the FIFA 
World Cup competition and the number of teams permitted to take part.716 The general 
secretariat is the third branch and takes on the administrative role for FIFA. The general 
secretariat is responsible for FIFA’s finances, international relations, the organisation of the 
FIFA World Cup, and other football competitions.717 
With its global powers, complex organisational structure, and different branches of control, 
FIFA can practice a complete self-regulatory system of governance, as it occupies a vital 
role coordinating organised football. FIFA functions as the rule-making body which can 
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resolve football related disputes, 718 and its position in the regulatory regime allows it to 
induce or coerce compliance across the sport.719 
4.3.1 Rulemaking 
FIFA formed its own footballing rules and regulations in order to continue attracting 
audiences, and to further its regulatory system and stranglehold over the sport.720 FIFA 
created a diverse range of codes, guides, and recommendations that set out the principles 
and fundamental values it considers necessary to ensure football’s future.721 FIFA relies on 
three tools to comply with its overall aims, these are the Code of Conduct, the Code of Ethics, 
and the Fair Play Code. Through these codes, FIFA sets out its guiding values of integrity, 
clean play, zero tolerance of discrimination, and transparency.722  FIFA’s organisational 
structure and processes are “in theory” 723 dedicated to the defence and cultivation of its 
guiding values, as FIFA expects its MAs and related partners to comply with them.724 FIFA 
requires its MAs to abide by its statutes, regulations, directives, sanctions and decisions, as 
well as the awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS),725 as this contributes to the 
private system of adjudication and enforcement which FIFA practices.726  
FIFA uses its values to justify its position as a powerful player on the transnational stage,727 
as the organisation is able to render private self-regulatory policies which extend over 
national boundaries, due to its organisational structure.728 FIFA’s ability to provide this 
private law is referred to as lex fifa,729 derived from the broader lex sportiva which underlines 
the autonomy of Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) from state control. Lex sportiva allows 
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FIFA to have its own 'internal constitutionalism' and operate a sporting 'rule of law' within 
football.730 However, the transnationality of FIFA means that it not only passes rules which 
pertain to matters within football (e.g., football transfers and labour contracts),731 but its laws 
often have a global reach which is able to supplant the domestic laws of its MAs.732   
Through its private transnational rules, FIFA’s regulations apply to the ‘football family’ 
whilst simultaneously being able to influence football at all levels and affect both members 
and non-members affiliated with the sport.733 Regarding its members, FIFA applies rules 
directly to the national MAs and everyone participating in the matches and tournaments 
organised by FIFA. Also, FIFA is able to stretch its influence to the bottom of its pyramidal 
structure, so that its rules apply to clubs, coaches, players, referees, their representatives, and 
other involved persons.734 FIFA can similarly exert its transnational regulatory powers over 
non-member participants in football.735 To do this, FIFA uses three methods to make its 
regulations applicable. First, FIFA applies its regulations directly to all participants in 
matches and competitions organised by FIFA, such as the FIFA World Cup. Second, MAs 
are charged with applying FIFA regulations directly to all involved parties within their 
borders, allowing FIFA’s rules to have an indirect effect on all actors affiliated with the 
MAs, such as investors, sponsors of tournaments, and even spectators of the game.736 Third, 
MAs are under obligation to transpose FIFA’s policies into their national regulations and 
policy actions, where FIFA considers this to be necessary.737 
4.3.2 Autonomous Judicial System 
FIFA’s rules state that all disputes within football (such as contractual disputes involving 
clubs, players, or other actors) are subject to the exclusive adjudication of FIFA's internal 
dispute resolution bodies, and the specialised Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).738 FIFA 
                                                 
730 Foster, Ken, 'How can sport be regulated?' in Greenfield, S. and G. Osborn (eds), Law and sport in contemporary 
society (Frank Cass Publishers, 2000) p/267 
731 Duval, Antoine. "The FIFA regulations on the status and transfer of players: Transnational law-making in the shadow 
of Bosman." In The legacy of Bosman, pp. 81-116. TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2016. p/92 & 99 
732 Latty, Franck. "Non-state authority: FIFA". In Global Private International Law, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019) p/153 
733 Castilla, José L., Aníbal Mesa, and Manuel González-Ramallal. "Football and justice devices: hybrid ethical narratives, 
sanctions and legitimacy of interests." Soccer & Society 18, no. 4 (2017): 575-590. p/582 
734 Gomtsian, Suren, Annemarie Balvert, Branislav Hock, and Oguz Kirman. "Between the green pitch and the red tape: 
The private legal order of FIFA." Yale J. Int'l L. 43 (2018): 85. p/99 
735 Freeburn, Lloyd. "The fiction of democracy in FIFA’s governance of football and the case of Football Federation 
Australia." The International Sports Law Journal (2019): 1-21. p/5 
736 Gomtsian, Suren, Annemarie Balvert, Branislav Hock, and Oguz Kirman. "Between the green pitch and the red tape: 
The private legal order of FIFA." Yale J. Int'l L. 43 (2018): 85. p/86 
737 Gomtsian, Suren, Annemarie Balvert, Branislav Hock, and Oguz Kirman. "Between the green pitch and the red tape: 
The private legal order of FIFA." Yale J. Int'l L. 43 (2018): 85. p/107 
738 Gomtsian, Suren, Annemarie Balvert, Branislav Hock, and Oguz Kirman. "Between the green pitch and the red tape: 
The private legal order of FIFA." Yale J. Int'l L. 43 (2018): 85. p/128 
109 
 
makes significant efforts to prevent external intervention into its private legal order, as it 
forbids its regulatees739 from resorting to an external court of law for judicial remedies.740 
Players or MAs who revert their matters to a court of law could end up with negative 
consequences for the athlete's personal career, or heavy sanctions for the MA involved. 741 
The judicial system formed by FIFA for dispute resolution consists of specialised third-party 
decision-making arbitration bodies. These are the FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber (DRC) 
and the Player Status Committee (PSC), and they decide on matters related to international 
transfers and contracts within football. The PSC includes both the president and vice 
president of the FIFA executive committee, and the DRC is comprised of an equal number 
of players and club representatives.742 The PSC and the DRC adjudicate with at least three 
members, who are supposed to possess and offer a better knowledge of football-related 
disputes and make decisions swiftly and at a rate cheaper than a court of law. 743  The 
decisions of the PSC and DRC may be appealed at CAS, which FIFA recognised the 
mandatory jurisdiction of in 2002. 744  CAS is the final appeal jurisdiction for football 
disputes, and CAS is able to resolve matters between FIFA and its members, football clubs, 
players, and officials. Furthermore, CAS’ arbitral awards have the same enforceability as a 
judgment by a court of law.745 
4.3.3 Sanctions & Enforcement 
As a self-regulatory association, FIFA can use its powers to impose the resolution and 
decisions made by the DRC, PSC, or CAS, on its regulatees in a quick and cost-effective 
manner. This uniformity of application of football norms under FIFA would otherwise be 
difficult to achieve if football was within state control. This is because the application of the 
decisions of national courts in the different countries involved in football would be difficult 
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to enforce uniformly across all nations, as such a process would take a significant amount of 
time and resources to achieve.746 
Nevertheless, FIFA does not rely on the State to coerce compliance amongst its regulatees, 
but rather relies on its own strong sanctions and enforcement systems. 747  FIFA’s 
enforcement system is not dissimilar to other SGBs which have private self-regulatory 
governance procedures and aim to induce compliance through increased sanctions. 748 
However, unlike most other SGBs (except the IOC), FIFA has a substantial coercive power 
which stems from its exclusive control of market access to global football. 749  FIFA 
subsequently uses this exclusive control, and its enforcement and incentive systems, to 
complement the sanctions imposed on actors within its regulatory regime.750 
FIFA’s sanctions could include fines, suspensions, exclusions, or even an expulsion from 
the organisation, if a party has not abided by its rules.751 With suspensions, for example, if 
FIFA believes that football’s autonomy is not being respected by a country’s judicial system, 
the corresponding MA could be suspended752 until it is able to show that it manages its affairs 
independently and without the influence of third parties.753 This is a step by FIFA to prevent 
external intervention in football matters through the threat of suspension or revocation of 
FIFA membership status. 754 The sanctions can be applied directly to MAs, clubs, players, 
and other involved actors, or the sanctions could be applied to a player or club indirectly 
through the MA. In the latter instance, the MA would be obliged to ensure its own members 
(the club or player) complies with the decision of the FIFA adjudicatory body. 755  The 
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suspensions of MAs often represent an efficient enforcement mechanism within the sport.756 
As a suspension or exclusion from FIFA competitions, like the World Cup and other 
international matches, may have a severe economic impact on a MA (including its clubs, 
referees, and administrators). 757 The suspension could lead to a loss of match revenue and 
players, along with an exemption from the ‘club goods’ and benefits which FIFA 
membership ordinarily provides. 758  These club goods include hosting rights for FIFA 
competitions and the development funds granted to MAs for individual projects.759 
A suspension from taking part in international football competitions could also have a far-
reaching impact for the country, as the decision will not be well received by the public.760 
Football has a symbiotic relationship with modern media industries,761 and a substantial 
share of the electorate in most countries often have emotional stakes with a football team 
and their national sides.762 Thus, the effect of FIFA’s sanctioning powers on the public can 
best be summarised by Garcia and Meier, who noted “no politician wants to be remembered 
as the one that prevented the national team from participating in the FIFA World Cup”.763 
FIFA’s sanctions and enforcement regulatory system capitalises on the increased 
significance of football to be an effective disciplinary tool, since the nation states are 
sensitive to the socio-political implications of FIFA’s sanctions. 764  FIFA’s regulatory 
structure and system has shown how the organisation practices this “pure form of self-
regulation”765 as an SRA. Yet, another essential aspect of an SRA is their recognition as an 
alternate power structure within the regulatory space of a specific field.766 
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4.4 FIFA’S PRIVATE LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Prior to a state surrendering its powers in an industry and before recognising the authority 
of an SRA,767 it is common for the state and the non-state actors to struggle for legal authority 
within the space. In fact, the regulatory space account provides that regulatory authority 
within a space is generally shared between private (non-state) and public (state) actors.768 
This shared authority often means that the actors compete and contest for an advantage to 
become the dominant party within the space.769 However, in some contexts, when authority 
is shared it could limit the understanding of the power structures between the actors in the 
space,770 which could then hinder the identification of the dominant actor.771 It is said that 
the dominant actor within the space is one who possesses the power to prioritise regulatory 
issues and decisions,772 and is the party that is able to influence the general practices within 
the space.773 Without being able to identify which party is the dominant actor, this would 
undermine the regulatory processes and decision-making within the regime.  
There are common hindrances involved in identifying the dominant actor, which are at times 
caused by the shifting powers and boundaries between the private and public actors in the 
space.774 These powers could shift in instances whereby the state threatens and subsequently 
chooses to interfere in the operations of a private regulator.775 Such state interventions are 
often to induce the necessary behaviour change and achieve an outcome which may 
otherwise not occur through strict private regulation. So, to determine the dominant actor in 
football and to account for any shifting powers, the inter-relationships between the actors 
and domains of authority in football’s regulatory landscape need to be examined.776 
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4.4.1 Shared Authority? 
FIFA’s private legal authority differs from the general understanding of shared authority 
seen in the regulatory space account. Within football there is arguably no shared authority, 
nor are there shifting regulatory powers between the involved public and private actors. In 
football, the regulatory authority lies firmly with FIFA. This is because the inter-
relationships in the sport are unlike other industries governed by SRAs. In other SRAs, the 
state maintains its legal authority to intervene and shift the regulatory powers back to itself 
through intervention.777 Whereas, in the case of football, the state has not only surrendered 
its authority to FIFA to carry out all the governance functions related to the sport,778 but 
there has been a notable reluctance by the state and other public bodies to intervene in 
regulating football.779 This reluctance becomes problematic when there are identifiable areas 
within the private regulatory institution that have an impact on the wider public. An example 
of such an area of concern involves child protection and trafficking in football, whereby 
rather than interfering in the sport to correct the way this issue is being regulated against, the 
state has left football and FIFA to address this important area of public interest, almost 
entirely by itself. 780  In addition, the economic and social importance of sport, and the 
investment of public funds in the running of sports events, has also been considered as an 
area of public interest for which the state could and should intervene in the running of 
sport.781 However, because of the “specificity of sport” and sporting autonomy, nation states 
have remained unwilling to interfere in the affairs of the private SGBs.782  
The state’s reluctance to intervene in sport (especially football) is a longstanding issue, and 
it is one which arguably led to the formation of FIFA as an SRA in the first instance. The 
reluctance resulted in a regulatory vacuum of laws applicable to international football 
competitions. 783  The involved actors subsequently came together to form FIFA as a 
transnational private governance body 784  to fill the regulatory gap and to better 
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accommodate and represent the needs of the actors within the self-regulatory regime.785 In 
filling the gap, FIFA benefitted from an institutional ‘first-mover advantage’,786 as FIFA 
profited from its sporting autonomy, along with the special treatment given to sports by the 
state and other public bodies.787 The act of FIFA receiving special treatment from the state 
establishes the absence of any competition for authority or shifting of powers within 
football’s regulatory landscape. The state ceded its authority in football to allow FIFA to 
become the dominant party in the regulatory space.788 FIFA then used its position in the 
space, the special treatment it received from the state, the growing popularity, 789 
commercialisation, and globalisation of football,790 and its complex interaction with the 
‘politicisation of sport’,791 to further increase its regulatory powers and cement its status as 
the SRA in control of football.792 
FIFA’s private authority grew stronger owing to some overarching factors. Its unique 
concentration of powers allows it to exclusively control access to international football,793 
and the favourable socio-economic trends and the global popularity of football, such as the 
way it “connects the world”, 794  helped confirm FIFA’s importance and socio-political 
relevance.795 This mainly came about in the aftermath of WWII, whereby there was an 
increased popularity of football and the politicisation of international sports. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, FIFA membership was seen as a badge of status for emerging 
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independent nations on the international stage.796 This led to the subsequent politicisation of 
sport, particularly football, on account of how the sport was able to serve as a symbol of 
cohesion or exclusion within and between countries.797 Politicians have often sought to 
benefit from the goodwill shown by the public when their nation is involved in international 
football competitions.798 A notable example of this took place in 2012, when Poland and 
Ukraine experienced a boost in national pride from hosting the European Football 
Championships.799 In Qatar, the 2022 World Cup is being utilised as an opportunity for the 
UAE to rise in the international political and business scene.800 These instances exemplify 
the importance nation states place on football, as the continued popularity, 
commercialisation, and politicisation of football subsequently resulted in the attraction of 
more FIFA members. This in turn allowed FIFA to extend its global reach and transnational 
powers,801 whilst the organisation has been able to increase its revenues and provide its MAs 
with more money through development funds.802  
FIFA uses its natural monopoly powers803 and political leverage804 to force state authorities 
to revoke legislations which it considers to be unwelcome.805 FIFA is able to invoke the 
doctrine of Lex sportiva,806 as a means of fending off state intervention and safeguarding its 
private authority from third party input or other external challenges. 807  These factors 
combine to put FIFA in a position where its private legal authority has grown substantially 
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with little intervention from the state.808 Therefore, as a result of its transnationality809 and 
its ability to resist external challenges,810 FIFA is in a unique position within football’s 
regulatory space. Some have even argued that FIFA’s private authority has departed from 
traditional laws governing other SGBs and SRAs,811 because of the level of dominance FIFA 
possesses within the space. 
4.4.2 The Dominant Actor 
FIFA has a complex organisational structure that spans the entirety of football.812 This 
characteristic of the organisation is one which is common amongst other public and private 
bodies that dominate their regulatory space, as they are mostly “large entities with elaborate 
internal divisions of administrative labour and hierarchies”.813As previously noted, private 
self-regulatory SGBs who dominate the space are able to fulfil state-like functions over their 
members, without possessing the coercive power of a state.814 The SGBs can fulfil this 
function through their disciplinary powers, their private legal authority, and their definitional 
regulatory monopoly. Their private legal authority stems from the acceptance of the SGBs’ 
rules by its members (athletes and MAs) and non-members (the public) who are affected by 
the regulations.815 This acceptance enables the SGBs to lay down binding rules and impose 
strong sanctions when there is a breach.816 
It is frequently argued that the private governance regimes of SGBs need a definitional 
regulatory monopoly structure in order to achieve meaningful sporting competitions.817 This 
definitional monopoly provides the SGBs with the capacity to have clear and consistent rules 
for its participants, and to be able to determine uncontested winners for their respective 
                                                 
808 Meier, Henk Erik, and Borja Garcia. "Protecting private transnational authority against public intervention: FIFA's 
power over national governments." Public Administration 93, no. 4 (2015): 890-906. p/894 
809 Castilla, José L., Aníbal Mesa, and Manuel González-Ramallal. "Football and justice devices: hybrid ethical narratives, 
sanctions and legitimacy of interests." Soccer & Society 18, no. 4 (2017): 575-590. p/577 
810 Garcia, Borja, and Henk-Erik Meier. "The power of FIFA over national governments: a new actor in world politics?" 
(2014) Presented at: FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference, Global and Regional Powers in a Changing World, 
23rd-25th July 2014, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. p/10 
811 Gomtsian, Suren, Annemarie Balvert, Branislav Hock, and Oguz Kirman. "Between the green pitch and the red tape: 
The private legal order of FIFA." Yale J. Int'l L. 43 (2018): 85. p/131 
812 Castilla, José L., Aníbal Mesa, and Manuel González-Ramallal. "Football and justice devices: hybrid ethical narratives, 
sanctions and legitimacy of interests." Soccer & Society 18, no. 4 (2017): 575-590. p/582 
813 Hancher, L., and M. Moran. "Organizing Regulatory Space." In A Reader on Regulation, by Baldwin, Robert, Colin 
Scott, and Christopher Hood, eds., Oxford University Press, 1998. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012. p/162 
814 Gomtsian, Suren, Annemarie Balvert, Branislav Hock, and Oguz Kirman. "Between the green pitch and the red tape: 
The private legal order of FIFA." Yale J. Int'l L. 43 (2018): 85. p/110 
815 Wolf, Klaus Dieter. "The non-existence of private self-regulation in the transnational sphere and its implications for the 
responsibility to procure legitimacy: The case of the lex sportiva." Global Constitutionalism 3, no. 3 (2014): 275-309. 
p/290-1 
816 Wolf, Klaus Dieter. "The non-existence of private self-regulation in the transnational sphere and its implications for the 
responsibility to procure legitimacy: The case of the lex sportiva." Global Constitutionalism 3, no. 3 (2014): 275-309. 
p/290-1 
817  García, Borja, and Henk-Erik Meier. "Keeping private governance private: is FIFA blackmailing national 
governments?" (2013) 13th EUSA Biennial Conference, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 11-13, 26pp. p/5 
117 
 
competitions. 818  By virtue of its position, FIFA evidently possesses this definitional 
monopoly in football. Hence, Lewis and others contended that it is this monopoly that makes 
an SGB the dominant actor: 
Whether a sport’s governing body holds a dominant position depends on the 
definition of the relevant market in the particular context, and the body’s position on 
it. Where the governing body is acting to regulate the particular sport, and is 
controlling access to it for the players and clubs, it is likely to be held to be in a 
dominant position, as it has a de facto monopoly on the market for access to 
competition in the particular sport.819 
With its definitional monopoly and its position as the dominant actor in the sport, FIFA is 
able to establish football’s rules and organise football tournaments.820 FIFA acts as both a 
transnational private regulator, and a competition organiser for the sport, giving it total 
control over access to international football.821 FIFA’s multi-functional position allows it to 
exclusively control822 and restrict access to the football market as it sees fit.823 With this 
control, FIFA imposes membership requirements on its MAs, by demanding that they submit 
to FIFA’s private authority “autonomously”, 824  to enable them take part in football 
competitions. The MAs consequently have little choice but to oblige.825 
It has been suggested that the extent of FIFA’s monopolistic powers exceeds any functional 
need for an SGB.826 Though the level of monopolistic control that is “functional” is a 
subjective matter open to the interpretation of the reader or writer, the objective facts about 
FIFA’s monopolistic powers is that with no shared authority or shifting powers in football’s 
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regulatory space,827 FIFA exclusively controls access to the sport, and it possesses the legal 
authority to prioritise issues of concern within the space.828 
4.5 FIFA’S TRANSNATIONALITY AND REGULATORY POWERS 
With FIFA’s position within the space and its legal authority, it is worth considering the 
factors which motivate FIFA’s choice of regulatory instruments, 829 and the rationale it uses 
to determine what matters are of increased concern or importance within its regime.830 
FIFA has been able to adopt regulatory instruments which go beyond the confines ascribed 
to other SRAs. FIFA has developed a “global law without the state”,831 and has established 
itself as a transnational private regulator (TPR) with laws that are accepted by national 
football associations and governments beyond the Swiss borders where FIFA is registered.832 
Though private bodies can be TPRs due to their legal authority and regulatory stipulations,833 
FIFA has extended and cemented its transnational powers through its monopoly control of 
the sport,834 and as a result of its dominant position in football’s regulatory space. 
Through FIFA’s extended TPR, it has been able to arguably compete and challenge the 
powers of nation states.835 FIFA’s organisational structure allows it to operate a global 
governance regime through its members. 836  This enables FIFA to impose its will on 
sovereign nations,837 and gives FIFA a platform to force the introduction or abandonment of 
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legislation in these countries.838 For instance, in the course of hosting the 2014 World Cup, 
Brazilian politicians were obliged to vote for a ‘World Cup’ exception. The exception was 
to make the World Cup’s spectators and attendees exempt from the Brazilian law which 
prohibited the sale of alcohol, in or around sports stadiums.839 This example illustrated one 
of the core rationales behind FIFA’s regulatory actions, as it evidenced the ability of the 
organisation to take a strong stance when there are potential factors which could affect its 
economic interests or the commerciality of football. The Brazilian example also showed the 
extent of FIFA’s TPR powers in being able to change nation state’s laws. FIFA has therefore 
become strong enough to resist effective state intervention,840 even in the face of key public 
interest concerns arising within the sport. This has led to questions about FIFA’s TPR powers 
and whether it has gone beyond the necessary threshold.841 
FIFA’s regulatory powers have been able to transcend both public and private spheres of 
regulation. 842  The extent of FIFA’s TPR powers indicate that the organisation has the 
capacity to have social roles which could exceed the confines of football. With FIFA’s 
capacity to influence sovereign states, it has been argued that its TPR could even “improve 
the world”,843 and have a positive effect on the wider public by addressing problems which 
nation states have so far been unable to tackle adequately.844 Therefore, FIFA’s TPR allows 
it to reside in a position of global importance.845 FIFA’s relevance in the economic, political, 
and cultural processes in various countries, especially when regarding football matters, 
evidences its global impact.846 The importance of sport and the enormous public interest in 
its conduct is why SGBs like FIFA are often seen as trustees of public assets. 847 
Consequently, FIFA’s impact as a global governance structure has led to comparisons with 
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other supra-national institutions such as the United Nations (UN).848 However, unlike the 
UN, a major criticism of FIFA and its regulatory strategies and rationale is that the 
organisation is not the product of a global democracy, but rather that FIFA practices obscure 
political processes that raise key questions about its legitimacy.849 
Criticisms of FIFA’s lacking legitimacy are furthered by the instances of conflicting interests 
within FIFA’s governance structure. As key personnel focus on commercialisation and the 
widening of FIFA’s revenue streams,850 notwithstanding the human rights violations that are 
being caused to participants and others involved in the running of the sporting events.851 
When FIFA’s regulatory actions are dictated by self-interests, and the organisation is 
primarily concerned with the pursuit of its economic targets, this tends to undermine the 
positive impact which FIFA could achieve across the globe. Since FIFA directly and 
indirectly possesses enormous power over people's livelihoods, hopes, and their 
expectations,852 it is argued that the organisation’s regulatory actions must be able to protect 
and safeguard the wellbeing of its members and non-members affected by its policy actions. 
4.6 FIFA’S ANTI-TRAFFICKING POLICIES 
FIFA acknowledges that whilst football migration and international transfers involving 
young players may prove beneficial to the child, there are times where these transfers are 
contrary to the best interests of the child, such as in instances of football trafficking and child 
exploitation.853 FIFA has recognised its position as the international global regulator of 
football, and the organisation notes that it must take into consideration the life prospects of 
all young players involved in the sport, including the majority of the young players that never 
make it to the highest professional level. 854 To this end, FIFA have introduced rules aimed 
at safeguarding children within football and preventing them from experiencing trafficking. 
These rules are derived primarily from the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of 
Players (RSTP), though the organisation also has additional toolkits, policies, and 
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mechanisms which it uses to dictate practices within the sport that apply to all players – 
including minors.855 The policies contribute to FIFA’s claim that it is more concerned with 
“protecting the appropriate and stable development of a minor…over purely sporting 
interests.” 856  
4.7 ARTICLE 19 FIFA RSTP 
After Bosman, FIFA realised that the international transfer of minors (ITMs) was having 
some negative effects on the sport, such as with the increased commodification of children 
and the exportation and exploitation of the cheaper African football minors to the bigger and 
richer EU clubs. FIFA, thereby, sought to offer minors greater protection from these 
dangerous situations, such as by introducing regulations which would be able to tackle the 
growing concern of human trafficking in the sport. 857  Article 19 of the RSTP was 
subsequently formed to achieve this.858 The article bans the international transfer of players 
under the age of 18,859 unless the transfer is conducted under the following five exceptions: 
4.7.1 Parent Exception 
This exception allows a minor to register with a club provided the player’s parents moved to 
the country in which the new club is located for reasons other than football.860 This exception 
is considered to be the most used and abused of the FIFA exceptions, 861 which will be 
elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
4.7.2 EU Exception 
This exception provides a means for FIFA rules to comply with EU law,862 as Article 19 
would otherwise be in contravention of the minor’s freedom of movement rights as a worker 
under Article 45 of the TFEU.863 The EU exception permits ITMs when the transaction takes 
place within the EU, and the player is between the ages of 16-18.864 The exception stipulates 
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that the receiving club should: provide the player with adequate football education or 
training;865 guarantee the player academic or vocational education;866 make all necessary 
arrangements to ensure that the player is looked after in the best possible way (such as being 
given optimum living standards);867 and provide proof to the relevant FA that it is complying 
with the aforementioned obligations upon registration of the EU player.868 
The EU exception has an emphasis on academic education to provide the players with a 
possible dual career opportunity to football, which is a common aspect of EU laws 
concerning young sports athletes. 869  The education and football training requirements 
prevent players who have immigrated from falling into difficult socio-economic 
situations. 870  However, the exception has been subjected to some scrutiny since its 
implementation, but FIFA’s judicial system and CAS have so far been able to combine to 
prevent the abuse of this provision. 
4.7.3 Border Exception 
This exception allows players from neighbouring countries to move to clubs across the 
border, (within 50km of that border with the maximum distance between the player's 
domicile and the club's headquarters being 100km), as far as the player continues to live at 
home, and both Football Associations consent to the transfer.871 
4.7.4 Humanitarian Exception 
This exception permits the registration of a minor where the minor has fled their country of 
origin without their parents for humanitarian reasons, specifically due to their life or freedom 
being threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, belonging to a particular social 
group, or political opinion.872 The provision expects that the player must be allowed to 
reside, at least temporarily in the destination country, and the player’s custodian must 
consent to their registration with the new club.873 
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4.7.5 Academic Exception 
This exception allows for the registration of a minor where the player is a student and moves 
without his parents to another country temporarily for academic reasons, such as to 
undertake an exchange programme. 874  The rule states that the duration of the player’s 
registration for the new club is until he turns 18, or until the end of the academic or school 
programme, which may not exceed one year. FIFA expects that during the player’s 
programme, he will be supervised by host parents who will provide him with 
accommodation, and that both the player's parents and the host parents must consent to the 
registration with the new club.875 The provision states that the registration of the minor must 
be with a purely amateur club which does not have a professional team, and which is without 
a legal, financial, or de facto link to a professional club.876 
FIFA claims that the aforementioned exceptions are drafted carefully and reduce avenues 
for its regulatees to circumvent the policies.877  
4.7.6 The first registration requirement 
Article 19 RSTP has further provisions such as the first registration requirement. The 
requirement makes it a prerequisite for a player to be registered with an FA in the territory 
their club or academy is located, in order to be eligible for them to play organised football 
in that region.878 The requirement was to result in more restrictions to ITMs, unless a player 
had lived continuously for at least five years in the territory of a country in which he is not 
a national, prior to his first registration in that region.879 If the minor and the receiving club 
are unable to meet this requirement, the transfer would be subjected to the decision of the 
FIFA subcommittee.880 
4.7.7 FIFA Subcommittee 
FIFA introduced the Player Status Subcommittee to deal exclusively with ITMs so that it 
could better restrict and monitor the transfers involving youth players. This Subcommittee 
of the FIFA Players’ Status Committee is authorised to inspect and approve every 
international transfer and every first registration of a minor in football.881 The Subcommittee 
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process incorporates a mandatory use of FIFA’s Transfer Matching System (TMS) during 
the course of a transfer,882 and the Subcommittee’s approval is a requirement before an 
International Transfer Certificate (ITC) is granted to allow the minor register with a new 
club.883 
4.7.8 Article 19bis FIFA RSTP 
Article 19 was amended to include Article 19bis, upon the realisation that academies which 
were not registered with their local football association provided a loophole to circumvent 
the ban on ITMs. 884 Article 19bis was introduced to prevent ITMs by improving the 
monitoring of Football Associations.885 The provision requires that all clubs and academies 
report all the minors who attend their academies to their football association, 886  and 
stipulates that the football associations must in turn keep a register comprising of all the 
names and dates of birth of the minors who have been reported to it.887 This provision aims 
to manage, monitor, and safeguard youth footballers through their registered football 
association, in order to promote the ‘ethical principles of organised football’.888 
4.8 THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER CERTIFICATE (ITC) 
FIFA’s regulations provide that players registered at one association may only be registered 
at a new association once the latter has received an International Transfer Certificate (ITC) 
from the former association. 889 The granting of the ITC signifies that the player in question 
has no contractual disputes with his previous club, and that he is free to join the new club.890 
The ITC is therefore a key procedural requirement for any international transfer, including 
those involving minors.891 Without the ITC, the transfer will likely be null and void.892 
The ITC assists in the calculation and arrangement of training compensation, payable to the 
selling club for the training and education the player received between the ages of 12 and 
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23.893 Due to an increased number of international transfers of players younger than 12 in 
football,894 FIFA reduced the age limit for the requirement of the ITC to 10 years old.895 This 
rule change means that the FIFA Subcommittee can only consider cases for the international 
transfer of players aged 10 and above,896 which itself creates a loophole for the transfers of 
players who are less than 10 years old. 
4.9 THE TRANSFER MATCHING SYSTEM (TMS) 
FIFA explains that the TMS is a web-based data information system which has the primary 
objective of simplifying the process of international player transfers, alongside improving 
transparency and the flow of information.897 The TMS modernised the transfer process by 
implementing an online system for registering international transfers, and this replaced the 
previous procedures of paper contracts and fax machines. The use of TMS is a mandatory 
step for all international transfers of professional and amateur players within the scope of 
organised football, and any registration of such a player without the use of the TMS will be 
deemed invalid. 898 
Under the TMS, each club and its FA is responsible for the information entered on the system 
during a transfer. TMS requires that football associations keep all information relating to a 
player up to date, as this will be used in any transaction or transfer the player is involved in. 
FIFA stipulates that all applications for a first registration or an ITM according to 
Article 19(3) and 19(2) RSTP, must be submitted and managed through the TMS.899 The 
TMS requires that transacting clubs upload a series of documents as proof of accuracy of the 
information entered into the system.900 This information allows FIFA to detect fraudulent 
transfers and irregular aspects involved in the deal. The TMS is supposed to increase the 
transparency of individual transactions, which will in turn improve the credibility and 
standing of the entire football transfer system and its procedures.901 
Through the TMS, FIFA highlights its commitment to use the system to safeguard and 
protect minors, 902 to investigate potential breaches of FIFA regulations, and to hand over 
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relevant cases to the Disciplinary Committee for consideration and decisions leading to 
possible sanctions where there is a breach.903 The TMS also provides effective safeguards 
against fraud and money laundering in the sport. Football associations are required to ensure 
that a player being transferred to another club is a real individual and not a fictitious character 
being used for illicit activities.904 
4.10 FIFA’S BALANCING MECHANISMS 
FIFA's RSTP has established regulations designed to create a balance between the freedom 
of movement for players, protection of minors, and free competition, whilst redistributing 
income and guaranteeing that those clubs involved with training and developing players 
receive rightful compensation.905  The two mechanisms which are most relevant for the 
protection of minors are the training compensation and the solidarity contribution. These 
mechanisms are aimed at incentivising EU clubs to invest in the development of their own 
youth players, rather than to continuously conduct ITMs. 
4.10.1 Training Compensation 
This is an attempt by FIFA to reimburse clubs that have invested in training and educating 
players. It provides value for the training and education which the player received between 
the ages of 12 and 23.906 Training compensation is paid to a player's training club by his new 
club when (1) a player is registered for the first time and signs his first contract as a 
professional player; or when (2) a professional player is transferred between clubs before the 
end of the season of his 23rd birthday.907 The obligation to pay training compensation arises 
whether the transfer takes place during or at the end of the player’s contract.908 The training 
compensation could act as a disincentive for the bigger clubs who would be required to pay 
increased sums by way of this compensation when signing players.  
4.10.2 Solidarity Contribution 
FIFA implemented this contribution to ensure that clubs who choose to invest in their 
academy systems by training youth footballers are compensated for their efforts. The rule 
provides that when a professional player is transferred before the expiry of his contract, any 
                                                 
903 FIFA, “Protection of Minors: FAQ” (September 2016) <https://img.fifa.com/image/upload/xbnooh14lcaxzadstknx.pdf> 
accessed on 10/07/2020 
904 Annexe 3 (1.2) of the FIFA RSTP 2020 
905 Najarian, Alex C. "The Lost Boys: FIFA's Insufficient Efforts to Stop Trafficking of Youth Footballers." Sports Law. 
J. 22 (2015): 151. p/178-9 
906 Article 20 of the FIFA RSTP 2020 
907 Article 20 of the FIFA RSTP 2020 
908 Article 20 of the FIFA RSTP 2020 
127 
 
club that has contributed to his education and training (between his 12th and 23rd birthday) 
shall receive a proportion of the compensation paid to the selling club.909 Money received 
by a club or association as compensation for the player’s transfer is to be invested in further 
youth training and development. 910  This allows the solidarity contribution to act as a 
monetary incentive for the EU clubs, and serves to prevent the possible exploitation of 
foreign minors.  
4.11 REGULATIONS ON INTERMEDIARIES 
In 2015, FIFA chose to revamp its regulations on intermediaries as it was alleged that the 
licenced agents were involved in only 25-30% of international transfers.911 FIFA  believed 
that it lacked the resources to rectify such a large-scale problem and claimed that its Dispute 
Resolution Chamber was being overworked.912 In a bid to devise regulations that would be 
more transparent and simpler to administer and monitor,913 FIFA chose to deregulate the 
control of intermediaries/agents, stipulating that the individual football associations would 
be responsible for the governance and registration of intermediaries in their regions.914 This 
FIFA decision had some effect on ITMs, such as a recommendation for players and clubs to 
cap the commission rates of intermediaries at three per cent,915 as well as a stipulation for 
intermediaries to not be paid for ITMs.916 FIFA believed that these regulatory changes would 
act as minimum standards and would prevent intermediaries from exploiting young 
players.917 However, FIFA’s deregulation ultimately proved controversial. The laws were 
accused of opening the door to more unscrupulous persons and giving them valid access to 
vulnerable youth players. Some argued that if FIFA maintained a tight monitoring process 
on agents’ activities and enforced its regulatory framework against unscrupulous agents in a 
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strict and indiscriminate manner, “there would be no need for any new set of regulations, let 
alone for a comprehensive form of deregulation.”918 
In response to the criticisms it received, in 2019, the FIFA Council endorsed the reform of 
the regulations on football agents to improve transparency, protect player welfare, enhance 
contractual stability, and also to raise professional and ethical standards by reducing the 
abusive practices which exist within the sport.919  This changed approach takes a more 
regulatory stance to handling the problem rather than the previous deregulation, as FIFA 
realised that it is its responsibility to govern the agents in the field and not that of its 
subsidiary football associations.920 FIFA’s changes are aimed at increasing transparency and 
the credibility of the football transfer system, whilst also trying to reintroduce key provisions 
that will restrict the access of unscrupulous persons to the vulnerable child players in 
football. For instance, the mandatory licensing system for agents is being reinstated, which 
could raise the professional standard of the agents acting within the sport.921 FIFA will also 
require any agent wishing to represent a minor to undergo various clearances and 
safeguarding training. Furthermore, an online football agent directory will be made publicly 
available, and it will list all licensed agents with the authority to represent minors.922 
4.12 FIFA GUARDIANS/CHILD SAFEGUARDING TOOLKIT 
FIFA released a Child Safeguarding Toolkit in 2019 for its MAs. The toolkit was based on 
5 principles: 
1. Ensuring the best interest of each child. 
2. Respecting and promoting children’s rights as per the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. 
3. Applying the principles to all children and without any discrimination. 
4. Safeguarding children, as part of everybody’s responsibility. 
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5. Defining specific roles and responsibilities within each sport organisation, to ensure 
that all concerns are reported and dealt with immediately in accordance with stated 
procedures.923 
The toolkit acknowledges the existence of child trafficking, yet it states that football 
associations who suffer from this trafficking should handle the problem by developing and 
implementing procedures that can better safeguard children in their region. Step 3, part C of 
the toolkit provides that: 
Guidelines for the identification, prevention, or minimisation of risk to 
children involved in football. As a minimum, these guidelines should be 
developed and implemented by MAs and include: Procedures or programmes 
for addressing any specific issues of risks that children in your country or 
community may face, for example trafficking…924 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained regulation and evidenced the position of FIFA within football’s 
regulatory space. It has shown that FIFA’s structure as a TPR enables it to make rules, 
operate its own dispute resolution mechanism, and enforce regulatory awards in a manner 
that extends its powers beyond national borders. Discussions highlighted the extent of 
FIFA’s private legal authority, differentiating FIFA from the other types of regulatory 
institutions alluded to within the regulatory space account. Since in football, there is no 
shared authority and FIFA dominates the regulatory space. FIFA’s dominant position means 
it has the capacity to not only influence the actions of its members, but also that of non-
members, via its extensive TPR powers. However, the regulatory strategies of the 
organisation tend to primarily be driven by economic gain and improved profits. This chapter 
considered a range of FIFA’s policies relevant to anti-trafficking and safeguarding child 
players. And the next chapter begins the evaluation on the efficacy of the policies in 
achieving the intended outcome of protecting minors from trafficking and exploitative 
situations.  
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Chapter 5 - EVALUATING FIFA’S REGULATIONS - POLICY OBJECTIVES 
To ascertain the quality and performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies, FIFA’s 
regulations will be evaluated to highlight any discrepancies between the policy objectives 
and the intended regulatory outcomes. This evaluation will show the positive, negative, 
and/or unintended consequences of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies.925 Baldwin and others 
averred that there are four general means of evaluating policy objectives, which are, the 
input, process, output, and outcome-based evaluations.926 They explained that input-based 
evaluations look at inspectors, inspections, and the resources devoted to control.927 Process 
or compliance-based evaluations look at the adherence to procedural requirements in the 
regime.928 Output-based evaluations measure the extent to which the goals of the specific 
programme are achieved. 929  And outcome-based evaluations assess the impact of the 
regulatory system,930 in the achievement of the specific regulatory outcomes.931  For this 
analysis, the outcome-based evaluation will be adopted to assess FIFA’s regulatory 
strategies and the performance of its anti-trafficking policies.932 
The outcome-based evaluation is most suitable for assessing FIFA for three reasons: First, 
the evaluation will help to ascertain the true impact that FIFA’s policies and regulatory 
system has had on the problem of football trafficking;933 second, the assessment will aid in 
determining if FIFA’s policies have influenced the behaviours and recruitment strategies of 
football clubs, and ultimately, if the policies have been able to achieve the specific regulatory 
outcome of limiting football trafficking and the exploitation of minors in the sport;934 and 
third, because outcome-based evaluations provide a greater value of findings due to its direct 
link to the assessment of regulatory objectives.935 In Coglianese’s expert paper on outcome-
based evaluations, he explained that the examination should involve an assessment of the 
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extent to which the regulatory policies have caused any changes in the regime (impact), as 
well as a measurement of the reduction or improvement of the problem in the regime 
(specific outcome).936 
5.1 IMPACT 
The impact of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies can be determined by an analysis of its effect 
on FIFA members and the non-members influenced by its regime. 
5.1.1 Members 
Generally, it is not always clear how FIFA member clubs (and their respective MAs) manage 
to circumvent the prohibition on ITMs.937 However, of the clubs which have been detected 
in their attempts to evade FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies, their recruitment strategies 
involve them identifying and utilising loopholes in FIFA’s regulatory system. These 
loopholes give clubs the opportunity to discretely recruit international foreign minors 
without alerting FIFA to these transactions. For example, European clubs have used gaps in 
immigration law to conduct ITMs, by capitalising on EU countries with lesser restrictions.938 
Some loopholes in FIFA’s regulatory system have also appeared as a result of its 
contradictory policy responses to football trafficking over the years.939 
Despite the significant restrictions on conducting ITMs provided by Article 19 RSTP, the 
exceptions to the rule have created a leeway for FIFA member clubs to bypass and continue 
engaging in the illicit transfer of minors. For instance, the border exception is often 
considered to be a straightforward policy with limited avenues for abuse. However, the 
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) showed that living 
close to a border may itself be a risk leading to the potential trafficking of minors.940 IPEC 
argued that this is especially the case where the neighbouring country has a thriving labour 
market, such as a prevalent football league or established academy structure, as this may 
increase the likelihood of the child and his family being deceived, trafficked, and 
                                                 
936 Coglianese, Cary, 'Measuring Regulatory Performance evaluating the impact of regulation and regulatory policy' (2012) 
Expert Paper No. 1 OECD. Pg. 15 
937 Drywood, Eleanor, '“When we buy a young boy …” Migrant Footballers, Children’s Rights and the Case for EU 
Intervention' in Stalford, Helen and Ingi Iusmen (Eds), The EU as a children’s rights actor. Law, policy, and structural 
dimensions (Barbara Budrich Publishers, Toronto 2015) 191-220. p/202 
938 Lembo, Christina. "FIFA transfer regulations and UEFA player eligibility rules: major changes in European football 
and the negative effect on minors." Emory Int'l L. Rev. 25 (2011): 539. p/539 
939 Esson, James, Paul Darby, Eleanor Drywood, Carolynne Mason, and Serhat Yilmaz. "Children before players: Current 
risks and future research agendas." (2020) <https://hdl.handle.net/2134/11590800.v1> accessed 2 March 2020. p/11 
940 IPEC, Combating trafficking in children for labour exploitation: A resource kit for policy-makers and 
practitioners (International Labour Office; ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva 
2008). Book 4: Understanding What Child Trafficking Is, pg. 10 
132 
 
exploited.941  The border exception tends to be exploited by unscrupulous persons and 
intermediaries within the EU and Western countries because of their close proximity to one 
another. Such as in the case of Malcolm Rodger, who was trafficked from Scotland to 
England as a young footballer but later became a victim of sexual exploitation.942 African 
minors are not commonly put at risk through this border exception, though there are still 
some circumstances where they have been made susceptible to exploitation. In Ghana, the 
proximity between West African countries led to what was described as “exploitation within 
exploitation”,943  as African boys migrated irregularly and were made to pay money to 
procure Ghanaian passports to join the official football academies in the country. In other 
instances, the interrelatedness and connections between EEA countries is used to deceive 
and traffic foreign minors. The traffickers promise the minors that upon arrival in one EU 
country they would train and rest, and that this would make the players move to other parts 
of Europe easier,944 which does not often materialise for the Africans. 
The humanitarian exception and the circumstances around its use could also create a 
loophole for teams looking to conduct ITMs. Certain criteria within the exception such as 
religion, belonging to a particular social group, or having a political opinion, could be 
fabricated to mislead the FIFA PSC Subcommittee to permit the transfer of the minor. With 
the academic exception, some football clubs have partnerships with schools in their 
regions945 and covert links with amateur clubs. Therefore, there is a possibility that a club 
could sign a foreign minor to an amateur club under the guise of the child travelling for 
educational purposes. The PSC Subcommittee may be unable to discover proof that the 
player is transferring for non-academic reasons, nor would they ordinarily be able to prove 
the absence of any legal, financial, or de facto links between a signing club and another 
professional club.946 Minors could be registered as amateurs until they turn 18, at which 
point they could then be signed by a professional club in the region. This means that the 
exception could be used as an extended trial period to test out young foreign players. As the 
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Subcommittee may not be equipped to prevent every instance where there is potential abuse 
of this exception. Nevertheless, the humanitarian and academic exceptions are new additions 
to the FIFA RSTP, and how the provisions will be used and/or abused by the FIFA members 
in practice is yet to be known. The parent and EU exceptions will be discussed separately. 
FIFA places an increased responsibility on its MAs in Article 19(bis) RSTP. With the 
provision, there are subsequent questions about its long-term impact due to the difficulties 
involved in keeping track of unaccredited academies in developing regions. For example, in 
Ghana, there are reportedly 500 illegal academies operating in the city of Accra alone, and 
thousands more are spread across the country and continent.947 Considering several MAs 
lack the resources, personnel, and structure to undertake this type of comprehensive record 
keeping, it is unlikely that the MAs would be able to meet their responsibilities in accordance 
with this provision.948  This thereby limits the impact of the provision and creates loopholes 
in which illicit ITMs could take place. FIFA’s policies like the first registration 
requirement also has the capacity to prevent some instances of football trafficking. 
However, its use and adoption by clubs and football associations potentially creates a legal 
basis for institutional discrimination against migrant youths. Migrant children could be 
denied the right to play organised football if they are unable to support their application to 
play with identification documents, which could be discriminating against them, considering 
this is not a requirement for national citizens or citizens of other EU countries.949  
The FIFA Subcommittee, when combined with the mandatory ITC requirement, arguably 
gives clubs a reason to bypass the Subcommittee and ITC provision to exploit young players. 
FIFA reduced the age limit to which an ITC is required from 12 to 10 because of an increased 
number of applications for ITCs for players younger than 12.950 This decision created an 
avenue for the potential abuse of even younger players, as ITCs are required only for 
international transactions involving players aged 10 and above.951 FIFA entrusts its MAs 
with the responsibility of ensuring the safety and protection of minors who are aged less than 
10.952 With FIFA’s provisions, a club transferring a nine year old player is not required to 
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attain an ITC, nor would they be expected to apply to the Subcommittee to scrutinise the 
nature of the transfer.953 Some MAs do not have the resources, structure, or general capacity 
to adequately ensure the safety of all the young players within their region. Therefore, by 
delegating such a task to some ill-prepared MAs, FIFA indirectly creates a loophole within 
its regulatory system for unscrupulous persons, intermediaries, and clubs, to circumvent its 
anti-trafficking policies and conduct illicit ITMs. This loophole is similar to that created by 
the home-grown player’s rule, which led to clubs prioritising the recruitment of foreign 
minors in order to convert the players to home-grown talents by the time they become 18.954 
For instance, Barcelona FC used the age loopholes to sign a seven-year-old British boy, 
enrolling him in their training academy in 2016.955  FC Barcelona has previously been 
accused and sanctioned for signing several international minors into their youth academy, 
without notifying either the Spanish Football Federation, or the FIFA Subcommittee about 
the transactions.956 FC Barcelona were accused of signing 31 minors between 2005 and 
2012, and were charged by FIFA for repeatedly breaching its transfer regulations.957 The 
FIFA sanctions have arguably not had the intended impact of deterring other members, 
because since the Barcelona incident, there have been further discoveries of similarly illicit 
transactions involving minors by the other major clubs in Spain,958 i.e., Real Madrid and 
Atletico Madrid.959 
Thus, it is argued that the impact of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies has been limited by the 
environment around football recruitment. Clubs continue to seek a competitive advantage 
by sourcing for cheap, foreign, talented labour, and recruiting such players by capitalising 
on gaps in FIFA’s regulatory system. The clubs use the ITC requirement, the home-grown 
rule, and other national policies on the minimum age at which players can sign professional 
contracts in Europe, to create an environment which inadvertently increases the 
precariousness within the industry for child players (especially migrants) and for those 
aspiring to play football professionally. 960  Organisations such as FIFPro, which is the 
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worldwide representative for professional footballers, have urged FIFA to reduce the 
loopholes within its regulations on player transfers. FIFPro called on FIFA to require that 
ITCs be granted for all transfers (including that of players less than 10 years of age961) and 
requested that FIFA only permit ITMs in exceptional circumstances.962 FIFA, however, has 
retained its stance on ITMs, and in fact, there has been a significant increase in the number 
of applications to register foreign minors. In 2019, FIFA’s TMS and Subcommittee approved 
the registration of 4,133 minors approximately,963 which is significantly higher than the 
2,323 minors it registered in 2015.  
As the number of registered minors in football continues to rise, FIFA remains acutely aware 
of the football environment where young vulnerable players are being subjected to potential 
trafficking and exploitative situations. FIFA admits that though international transfers may 
at times be favourable to some young player’s sporting careers, for the “vast majority” of 
minors, these international transfers may not be in their best interests as children.964 Still, 
FIFA looks to strike a balance between strictly regulating against ITMs to protect all minors 
and adopting regulatory practices which continues to promote the profitability and 
commercialisation of football. It can be argued that FIFA is averse to limiting ITMs because 
the organisation does not want to regulate against football trafficking to the extent that 
youths living in developing countries may be denied opportunities to play professionally and 
develop abroad.965 Examples such as Lionel Messi are regularly used to buttress this latter 
point. The Argentinian Lionel Messi, now widely regarded as one of the greatest players 
seen within the sport, benefited from FIFA’s lax approach to limiting all ITMs. As Messi 
was signed by FC Barcelona in the year 2000, when he was only 13 years old.966 
FIFA claims that it looks to create an environment where there is a “stable development of 
a minor as a whole … over purely sporting interests”.967 Yet, FIFA’s practices, such as its 
balancing mechanisms, commodifies children and turns them into assets and items of 
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financial value. FIFA’s classification systems and the financial weaknesses affecting African 
football perpetuate the circumstances in which football trafficking thrives, as African 
academies and teams are regularly underpaid when their players are sold.968 This has led to 
an increase in the search for talented minors (by licenced and unlicensed intermediaries in 
the region) as a means of either selling the players to other African sides, or more so, selling 
the players to foreign teams to make additional profits. The circumstances are increasingly 
precarious for the child players, as the intermediaries know that their value can only be 
realised once they are sold.969 With such practices existing within the sport, it can be said 
that FIFA’s policies do not afford the football minors with the requisite protections from 
being exploited, in both the physical and economic sense. 
FIFA’s previous regulations on intermediaries deregulated the international transfer 
market and ended the licensing scheme for player’s agents.970 The rule change was aimed at 
bringing the unlicensed agents conducting transfers on the boundaries of the sport to come 
under FIFA’s regulatory structure, however, the deregulation invited more people with 
ulterior motives to become registered intermediaries. 971  FIFA’s rules removed the 
independent vetting and exams process,972 and increased the capacity constraints on several 
football associations to manage the intermediaries in their regions.973 Though the changes to 
the regulations approved in 2019 are considered to be a positive development in regards to 
the protection of children involved in football,974 it could be argued that the re-regulation 
plan by FIFA still does not put children’s rights at the forefront of the change. Rather, the 
new changes centre on the restriction of agency fees and a general concern about the amount 
of money leaving the game and going into the pockets of the agents. Thus, the true impact 
of this change in limiting the regulatory loopholes and reducing the “abusive and excessive 
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practices which unfortunately have existed in football”, 975  will be seen when the new 
regulations are fully introduced. 
In the child safeguarding toolkit, FIFA acknowledges that some MAs have well developed 
policies and procedures in place regarding child protection, whilst others are just starting out 
on their safeguarding journey.976 FIFA stipulates that the toolkit is to provide minimum 
requirements to keep children safe in football.977 Yet, its wording suggests that FIFA is 
leaving its adoption and application to the responsibility of the individual MAs, for them to 
dictate and enforce their own child protection norms as they see fit. Though it acknowledges 
that certain MAs do not yet have the structure in place to adequately safeguard children, 
FIFA still prescribes to these associations to safeguard the child players within their regions, 
as FIFA appears to be absolving itself from direct responsibility for child protection. Thus, 
the impact of the toolkit is limited in practical effect as it does not offer a specific overarching 
and uniform approach to safeguarding children and preventing the occurrence of football 
trafficking. Moreover, the toolkit fails to recognise the transnationality of football trafficking 
and the difficulty that ill-equipped MAs face in trying to protect children from this cross-
border crime. The individual MAs ultimately do not have FIFA’s TPR powers. FIFA claims 
that: 
FIFA can only regulate activities within the scope of organised football. Issues 
related to “child trafficking”, like any other criminal activity, fall within the 
competence of the relevant national and international authorities (police, judicial, 
governmental). Such matters are outside of FIFA’s jurisdiction, although we 
certainly welcome measures that show authorities are taking them very seriously, 
and by means of our provisions on the protection of minors we are committed to 
making a contribution towards tackling this important issue within FIFA’s sphere of 
competence. 978 
This view from FIFA is problematic, for the following reasons. First, it undermines the role 
FIFA itself has played in furtherance of the problem through its regulations and promoted 
practices which have resulted in the increased commodification of incredibly young foreign 
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players. As Esson and Drywood note, some of FIFA’s regulatory responses completely fail 
to meet basic welfare needs for the children involved, and in some cases, FIFA’s policies 
have even served to exacerbate the football trafficking problem.979 Second, FIFA’s claim 
attempts to change the narrative in relation to the problem by diverting attention to the state 
(and FIFA’s MAs) as the appropriate bodies and authorities able to regulate against this 
transnational child trafficking problem within the sport. This position ignores the difficulty 
of nation states to regulate against a global problem, in the same way that a TPR like FIFA 
is capable of doing. Similarly, FIFA’s assertions ignore its sporting autonomy and the 
restrictions it has put in place to prevent state interference in footballing matters. Third, FIFA 
argued that the trafficking problem is not within its competence. But FIFA, as a TPR and the 
dominant actor in football’s regulatory space, is able to dictate matters of importance and 
regulate against all the problems affecting the football community. Thus, this specific 
problem of football trafficking (notwithstanding the intersection with the broader global 
issue of child trafficking) arguably falls into FIFA’s jurisdictional capacity and authority, 
particularly owing to the actors regularly involved in its occurrence, and the FIFA member 
parties who continue to benefit from the illicit transfers involving football minors. 
Though most of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have been subjected to possible misuse to 
the detriment of foreign minors, the Parent and EU exceptions of Article 19 RSTP are 
generally the most prone to abuse by the unscrupulous persons within FIFA’s regime. 
Article 19: Parent exception 
FIFA argues that its Article 19 exceptions are drafted carefully, and that it limits the 
opportunities for its regulatees to circumvent the policy.980 Yet, the parent exception is the 
most commonly used route around FIFA’s prohibition on ITMs.981 The provision permits 
ITMs when a child’s parents moves to a country for “reasons not linked to football.”982 The 
exception provides a loophole in FIFA’s regulations because the reasons not linked to 
football can be created after the club has expressed an interest in the minor as a player, and 
provided the PSC believes this to be true, the ITM will proceed as an exception.983  
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Football clubs have consequently resorted to creating local jobs for parents, and even bribing 
the parents so that their child can qualify for the parent exception and register with their club. 
For example, Chelsea FC were accused of making illegal payments by way of a bribe to the 
father of former Nigerian international, John Obi Mikel, to persuade his son to sign for the 
English club from a Norwegian side.984 There have been other situations where a father was 
given a position as a gardener in the stadium, and another as the team bus driver, in order to 
convince the parents to move and for their child to sign playing contracts at EU clubs.985 
These situations occur because the relationships between the family members, the employer, 
and the club or middleman cannot always be proved, this makes it difficult for the FIFA PSC 
to declare the transfer as being illicit and contrary to Article 19.986  
The case of Paraguayan footballer Carlos Caballero showed an attempt to abuse this 
exception which the PSC were able to identify and prevent. Caballero was sixteen years old 
at the time of the dispute, having taken part in an Under-20 FIFA tournament, he was noticed 
by a FIFA agent who offered to represent him and give him an opportunity to play in 
Europe.987A month after the tournament, Caballero's mother and younger brother left for 
Cadiz, Spain, where she signed an employment contract with a restaurant the week after she 
had contracted for her son to play for Spanish first-tier club Cadiz C.F., for a period of six 
and a half years.988 FIFA refused the ITC from being granted for the player’s transfer and 
Cadiz appealed to CAS, who subsequently upheld FIFA’s decision.989 CAS concluded that 
the player’s decision to move to Spain was made first, and that the decision of his mother to 
move to Spain was thus directly linked to the contract signed between the player and the 
club.990 This case showed how the FIFA PSC and CAS, could have an impact in limiting 
attempts to exploit minors through the regulatory loopholes. However, the issue remains that 
of the many other cases which FIFA have been unable to identify as breaches, due to the 
obscure links between the involved parties.  
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Article 19: EU exception 
This exception has similarly provided an avenue within FIFA’s regulations for football clubs 
to export and exploit foreign minors. In the case of FC Midtjylland AS v FIFA,991 a Danish 
Premier League club entered into an agreement with a Nigerian club (FC Ebedei) that 
provided the Danish club with exclusive access to the most talented players from the 
Nigerian side’s first team and youth academy.992 The Nigerian club, situated in the most 
populous city in the country, provided Midtjylland with a vast talent pool in which to identify 
and cherry-pick the best players in the region.993  
Between the years of 2006 and 2007, Midtjylland attempted to register six Nigerian minors 
with the Danish Football Association (DFA), with the players being listed as “amateurs”. 
The DFA issued the necessary licenses to three of the players, refusing to grant amateur 
permits to the others because of potential violations of Article 19. In accordance with DFA 
regulations, Midtjylland were required to pay the Nigerian minors about 3,000 Euros, which 
would cover their necessities of food and accommodation. For residence and work permit 
purposes, the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) classified the players as students and the 
players were given access, on a part time basis, to some secondary schooling.994 Midtjylland 
went on to treat the boys as workers, and FIFPro subsequently brought this potential 
violation of Article 19 to FIFA’s attention.995 FIFA’s PSC thereafter held that Midtjylland 
were in contravention of the rules and sanctioned both the club and the DFA with a “strong 
warning” to refrain from further infringements of FIFA’s Article 19 provisions.996 
Midtjylland challenged the decision of the FIFA PSC and the matter was taken to CAS, as 
the club alleged that the minors who had been transferred from Nigeria were being 
discriminated against by the decision of the FIFA committee.997 The Danish club argued that 
according to EU law, the players were “workers” within an EU member state, and because 
both Nigeria and Denmark are parties to the Cotonou Agreement, any discrimination which 
the players face based on their nationality would be contrary to the provision.998 The CAS 
panel held that the application of FIFA’s Article 19 in this case was not in contravention 
with any mandatory provision of EU law, and more so, was not in violation of the Cotonou 
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Agreement.999  CAS decided that the players in question were not legally employed in 
Denmark and were therefore not “workers” but rather “students”, and thus fell outside the 
scope of Article 13(3) of the Cotonou Agreement.1000 
Despite the FIFA PSC and CAS again combining to prevent the exploitation of minors 
through this exception, football clubs continue to look for other means of circumventing 
FIFA’s regulations. Clubs have obtained EU passports for sixteen-year-old non-EU players 
(via links to the player’s extended family) because the EU exception allows for intra-
European migration.1001 This intra-European migration is not restricted to just EU citizens, 
as young players of any nationality moving between two clubs within the EU/EEA area will 
be permitted. The exception therefore provides an incentive for unscrupulous persons to use 
countries within the EU who have more relaxed nationality laws to gain access to the 
territory, and subsequently conduct ITMs within Europe.1002 
In general human trafficking literature, such intermediate countries are referred to as transit 
countries, because they are passed through by the victims of trafficking during their transport 
from their origin country or region (Africa) to destination countries (in this case, football’s 
core economy, Europe).1003 The unscrupulous agents and football teams know that once an 
international minor is legally resident in a transit EU country, or once they have signed with 
a club within the area, the agent would have access to the EU football market, and would be 
better placed to move the player around the region even before the player turns 18.1004 At a 
time, Belgium and France were reported as having the highest concentration of African 
footballers per club,1005 and this was because both countries were regarded as the primary 
transit EU countries. Belgium, in particular, was considered to be a prime market to leave 
“cheap foreign [and] often African talent”. 1006  This was because of: the country’s lax 
immigration requirements; its exemptions on work permits for non-European sports persons 
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who did not already reside in Belgium;1007 the fact that there were no limits on the number 
of non-EU players who could play in their leagues; and the relatively low minimum wage 
requirement for foreign players.1008 Thus, several African players and agents considered 
Belgium to be a steppingstone EU country that would enable them to access the other more 
profitable EU leagues and clubs,1009 even though only a few players ever made it to the other 
major leagues.1010  
Unscrupulous agents falsified the ages of players to make them younger so Belgian clubs 
would not breach transfer rules.1011 The agents bound players to exploitative contracts and 
made arrangements so as to benefit financially from any subsequent sale involving the 
players. 1012  Dedecker, a former Member of the European Parliament for Belgium, 
discovered several Nigerian players who were transferred to the country but were not being 
paid or were being paid less than minimum wage at Roeselare FC. Upon Dedecker’s 
discovery, four people which included the intermediaries and the president of the Belgian 
club, were consequently summoned to court to face the charge of human trafficking. Though 
this was one of the few reported instances whereby a club or group of people had been 
charged for the trafficking of young footballers, the court found in favour of the club, stating 
that the boys could not be victims of trafficking because they were not forced to leave their 
home countries to embark on the journey to Europe.1013 The court’s decision, it can be 
argued, directly contradicts with the provisions of the Trafficking Protocol. Seeing as the 
players were children at the time of the act, they did not need to be forced into making the 
trip to Europe for them to be considered as victims of the crime. In accordance with the 
protocol, the fact that the young players were trafficked or transported for the exploitative 
purpose of playing football for less than minimum wage, should have been enough to justify 
that the boys had been trafficked. 
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Nonetheless, the existence of loopholes in FIFA’s regulatory system and the way the 
problem is being managed has resulted in clubs and unscrupulous intermediaries believing 
that they have no choice but to engage in the identification, exportation, and exploitation of 
the young foreign players, arguing that “if we don’t do it, our competitors will”.1014 The 
perpetrators are motivated by the footballing environment that promotes the 
commodification of children, yet does not offer significant sanctions for the defaulting 
parties that contravene the anti-trafficking rules. The FIFA members, like other perpetrators 
of trafficking, are generally safe in the knowledge that there is a limited likelihood of 
apprehension and prosecution for their actions, thus making trafficking the “perfect 
crime”.1015 With the increased economic gains involved with a club discovering the next 
“football superstar” for little financial outlay, the buoyant trade in young international 
footballers (occurring in both legal and illegal forms) is likely to continue.1016  
Based on the responses of FIFA’s members to its policies for preventing football trafficking 
and child exploitation, one could argue that the impact of the policies has been limited in 
restricting the occurrence of the problem. FIFA members are constantly seeking to exploit 
loopholes in FIFA’s regulatory system to bypass the anti-trafficking policies and conduct 
ITMs to gain a competitive advantage and make increased profits. These occurrences 
undermine the impact of FIFA’s policies, most significantly when considering that the 
organisation has the resources and capacity to ensure that ITMs take place only in 
exceptional circumstances, per the recommendations of FIFPro. Seeing that FIFA may not 
always be aware of the covert methods being adopted by its members when they conduct 
ITMs, it may be argued that the organisation is culpable for the occurrence of football 
trafficking within football’s regulatory space. With the role FIFA has played in the initiation 
of the trafficking problem, the commercialisation of the sport, and the commodification of 
children,1017 its anti-trafficking regulations have arguably had a limited positive impact on 
the minors involved with football, as the policies have been ineffective in changing the 
behaviours of its regulatees. 
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FIFA is primarily responsible for the actions of its members, however, due to its position as 
gatekeeper, monopoly power, and global regulator for football, the involvement and 
engagement of non-members (those on the periphery of the sport) should not be roundly 
discounted as being outside FIFA’s jurisdiction.1018 FIFA has previously shown its capacity 
to effect behaviour change in a manner which goes beyond the organisation’s pyramidal 
structure to affect non-members, especially when its sporting autonomy is being threatened, 
or where the potential profitability of the sport is being limited, such as during the 2014 
World Cup in Brazil.1019 The Brazilian example illustrated the strength of FIFA’s TPR, and 
how the organisation is not only strong enough to resist effective state intervention,1020 but 
that FIFA has the power to impose its will on nation states, and to effect change amongst its 
non-members who are affiliated with the sport.  
Despite the global capacity of the organisation, the issue of football trafficking has not yet 
been treated with the requisite level of urgency. An urgency that would result in FIFA using 
its transnational power and authority to effect widespread behaviour change amongst all 
involved. FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have had a limited impact on those on the 
periphery of the sport, as illegal intermediaries and unscrupulous persons continue to 
circumvent the organisation’s regulations.1021 This limited impact is arguably as a result of 
the barriers which typically prevent anti-trafficking policies from having their desired effect, 
such as the complexities related to trafficking which encompasses many perpetrators, routes, 
sectors, victims, and forms of exploitation.1022 With these barriers, the fact that FIFA’s rules 
apply primarily to its members rather than the non-members who are often the perpetrators 
of football trafficking,1023 is a further constraint on the effectiveness of the policies. The 
limited applicability undermines the dominant position which FIFA possesses within 
football’s regulatory space, and it allows both FIFA members and non-members to conduct 
illicit ITMs. FIFA’s policies, such as the TMS, represent the organisation’s limitation in 
effecting behaviour change amongst non-members. The TMS is considered to be a useful 
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provision when the transfer of a player is legal, and it is also useful to prevent money 
laundering through football.1024 However, the policy loses its effectiveness in the case of 
illicit transfers involving unscrupulous intermediaries on the periphery of the sport. This 
prevents FIFA from being able to identify when there is a potential breach to its rules, and it 
also makes FIFA unable to detect when football trafficking is taking place. 
FIFA’s current anti-trafficking approach creates no legal obligation for the non-members 
operating on the boundaries of the sport to the benefit of the FIFA member clubs.1025 There 
have been instances whereby players are trafficked to clubs abroad for trials by unscrupulous 
persons, but the clubs do not verify the origin of the player when signing them.1026 In other 
cases, there have been teams which did not adequately probe the relationship between a 
player and their supposed ‘agent’, to verify that the player is not being held as a victim of 
trafficking and being forced to work or play football due to debt bondage.1027 Still, despite 
the connection between the non-members collaborating with FIFA members to perpetuate 
football trafficking, FIFA questionably maintains that this trafficking problem is outside its 
jurisdiction.1028 With FIFA’s rules not resulting in the required behaviour change for both 
members and non-members, it is argued that the loopholes in FIFA’s regulatory system 
underlines the inefficacy of its policy to have the desired impact in preventing football 
trafficking and child exploitation. 
5.2 SPECIFIC REGULATORY OUTCOME/SUFFICIENT REDUCTION 
For there to be a claim that FIFA’s policies have contributed towards a sufficient reduction 
in the football trafficking problem,1029 its regulations would need to prevent and protect 
minors from the situations of trafficking and exploitation related to the sport. However, the 
recurrent media reports suggest that FIFA’s policies have been unable to achieve this 
outcome, as minors are still being put in precarious positions owing to their involvement 
with football.1030 There are several examples which illustrate this. 
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First, Culture Foot Solidaire (CFS) a charity organisation who are one of the only charities 
which targets the victims of football trafficking, and one which has been recognised by FIFA 
for its work,1031 estimated that up to 15,000 youth footballers are taken out of Sub-Saharan 
Africa each year.1032 According to CFS, 98 per cent of the would-be footballers who make 
it to Paris are illegal immigrants (players trafficked or smuggled from Africa), of which 70 
per cent of the total sum are players under the age of 18..1033 Others involved in football 
trafficking research have since held that due to the lack of monitoring in the area, the exact 
figure of the victims of football trafficking taken abroad could be even higher than CFS’ 
estimation.1034 
Second, in 2015, 23 West African minors were trafficked to the Laos football team, 
Champasak United, by former Liberian international Alex Karmo. Karmo admitted that 
Champasak brought in the players to sell them on for profit afterwards.1035 The Global 
players’ union FIFPro discovered the illicit situation, as it revealed that the club had no 
proper coach, medical facilities, had no provision for education, forced the players to train 
twice a day, fed them only twice a day, and made them sleep on the floor of the club’s 
stadium. The club held the boys’ passports and controlled their mobility so that the boys 
rarely left the stadium. The trafficked players had signed binding contracts with exploitative 
terms that meant they were earning between zero and 140 dollars at Champasak United. In 
addition, the living conditions of the players were described as “deplorable and 
disturbing”.1036  
Third, in 2017, more than 100 people from West Africa reportedly entered Nepal. Though 
Nepal, South Asia, is an unlikely destination for aspiring footballers, the African minors 
were deceived into making the trip as part of their search for professional football contracts. 
The players believed that being outside Africa would increase their visibility and the 
possibility of them being scouted by an EU team. The report noted that “the players [were] 
victims of an informal network of recruiters and brokers, which stretched from “managers” 
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in West Africa, to Africans who have lived in Nepal or India for years.” 1037  These 
circumstances which foreign minors face, led FIFA’s former head of security to admit that 
FIFA is failing in its moral duty to protect the thousands of boys, who are attracted by the 
Premier League and footballing stardom, but end up as victims of trafficking.1038 
Fourth, in 2017, the Independent reported that boys were being told they would become the 
next football stars in England but ended up being “made to work on building sites until their 
bones break”.1039 Reuters also noted and reported a concern for the estimated 2,120 minors 
trafficked to the UK to play football.1040 In 2019, the BBC reported that a Nigerian boy was 
trafficked to the UK to play football but ended up locked away and subjected to sexual 
exploitation upon his arrival.1041 After the World Cup in 2018, several Nigerian boys were 
scammed and trafficked to Russia in the hope of joining a professional team but were 
abandoned and left to face the “ugly side of football” in the EU country.1042 Reports on 
trafficking show that human trafficking at major sporting events like the World Cup are not 
uncommon, because such tournaments are usually prime targets for human traffickers as 
people converge onto the hosting country during that period. 1043  Although FIFA has 
established several rules to combat football trafficking,1044 there remains clear weaknesses 
in the regulatory strategies and commitments of the entire football community to truly 
curbing this crime.1045 
The examples discussed illustrate this lacking commitment by FIFA. The football trafficking 
problem persists whilst FIFA has increased the commodification of young football talent,1046 
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allowing children to be treated as assets for economic and financial gain.1047 Though, as 
FIFA have claimed, most instances of football trafficking are “trafficking through football” 
cases, and therefore may be interpreted as being outside of its direct jurisdiction. Still, 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have done little to restrict the avenues used by the 
unscrupulous persons and teams (both members and non-members) to transact, transport, 
and exploit young African players within football’s regulatory environment and FIFA’s 
regime.1048 Without instituting effective anti-trafficking policies and consequently putting 
the lives of child players at risk of trafficking and exploitation, FIFA’s policies have arguably 
not resulted in a sufficient reduction of the problem, and neither have the policies achieved 
its intended regulatory outcome of safeguarding minors. 
5.3 COMPARING PERFORMANCE 
The key question to then ask is, considering the impact of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies 
and the absence of a sufficient reduction to the problem, are the international law instruments 
considered earlier in this thesis better suited to curbing football trafficking?1049 
5.3.1 The impact of the Palermo Protocols 
The Palermo Protocols made significant steps forward in the fight against the trafficking and 
smuggling of persons, but the instrument is plagued with some problems which have 
burdened other similarly motivated international anti-trafficking efforts.1050 For example, 
due to the wide-ranging nature of the definition of human trafficking which it provides, 
nation states have created different variations of what would constitute as being 
trafficking.1051 Over the years, this has led to conformity problems across and within State 
parties, 1052  resulting in instances where traffickers are rarely being prosecuted for this 
offence whilst trafficking victims are increasingly criminalised.1053 Within football, FIFA 
have yet to explicitly state what “football trafficking” would entail, rather than grouping its 
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occurrence under the same parameters as the illicitly conducted ITMs. Such a definitional 
gap also pre-empts and undermines the direct application of the Protocol in a footballing 
context. 
As trafficking and smuggling are part of the same continuum of the growing ‘criminal 
industry’1054 in which people exploitation is rising,1055 there is often a need to distinguish 
between the two phenomena, to determine if the identified person is an illegal/irregular 
migrant or a victim of trafficking.1056 Admittedly, making this identification is difficult 
because the patterns of movement are often similar1057 and there are shared characteristics 
which vulnerable children face in the hands of smugglers and traffickers.1058 Individuals 
(like football players) often begin their journeys as smuggled migrants, but by their journey’s 
end find themselves in exploitative situations,1059 such as debt bondage and other slave like 
conditions.1060 Thus, it is on the way to the destination country that voluntary smuggling 
transitions into the involuntary trafficking of persons for exploitative purposes.1061 Yet, as 
Gallagher posits, the Protocols do not acknowledge the operational link between the 
occurrence of smuggling and trafficking.1062 
The failure of the Protocols to provide guidance on how trafficked persons and smuggled 
migrants are to be identified is said to be a significant weakness which compromises the 
object and purpose of the trafficking treaty agreement. 1063  By not providing this 
guidance, 1064  many victims of trafficking run the risk of being misidentified as illegal 
migrants. This is because the tag ascribed to the person often influences the treatment they 
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are given.1065 In the Travaux Préparatoires, trafficking victims who agree to testify are to be 
accorded special protection, and all efforts should be made to avoid their re-victimisation, 
including placing them in a safe and suitable accommodation with skilled people taking care 
of them.1066 State parties are also expected to ensure that victims are not removed from the 
destination country against their will.1067 This type of protection that the Protocol stipulates 
should be offered to trafficking victims, creates significant financial and administrative 
burdens on the state authorities, more than they would face in the case of a smuggled 
migrant.1068 The increased burdens subsequently acts as an incentive for border authorities 
and immigration officials to identify victims of trafficking as illegal migrants.1069 
Often, the onus is placed on the victims to prove their innocence, such as their lack of 
knowledge of the trafficking or smuggling circumstances, as this will then enable them to 
receive the aid and protections normally afforded to victims.1070 In a football context, for 
example, the agreement of a player to leave their home country may be read as a legitimate 
form of capitalist exchange, because both parties are considered to have consented to the 
transaction.1071 With the way this exchange was previously interpreted by a court in favour 
of a Belgian club who trafficked African minors,1072 it is arguable that the trafficked minors 
are placed at a disadvantage when they have to prove their innocence in a destination 
country. Esson concurs, as he explained that many of the trafficked minors he met in Paris 
were misidentified as illegal ‘adult’ migrants.1073 This was because the minors did not have 
any official identification (as it was taken by the traffickers), and the predominantly white 
support service staff claimed they could not assess the age of dark-skinned people, and by 
default, the minors were aged, racialised, and gendered as Black African men.1074 
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Generally, an individual who fails to satisfy the burden of proof placed on them by the 
national authorities is tagged as an illegal migrant.1075 This results in them being denied 
access to rights and services available to trafficked victims, as they subsequently could be 
removed from the country, or even prosecuted for engaging in criminal activities whilst they 
were being exploited.1076 The imposed burden of proof allows State parties to potentially 
mishandle a wide range of real victims, rather than affording them the requisite care, respect, 
and rights they deserve.1077 This treatment stems from an embedded belief amongst some 
nation states that the “proper place” of the trafficked individuals is back at home. 1078 
Consequently, the nation states look for means to expedite the removal of persons, despite 
the fact that sending victims back could place them in danger and could expose them to 
retaliatory measures by traffickers.1079 These actions by State parties continue to occur, 
contrary to the Travaux Préparatoires of the Protocol.1080  
The circumstances of people being misidentified and removed undermines the law 
enforcement objectives of the instrument.1081 Victims do not want to come forward as they 
could be at risk of being ‘voluntarily returned’, thereby limiting avenues for prosecuting the 
perpetrators and allowing the traffickers and smugglers to continue operating with impunity. 
However, despite the importance of prosecution, it is argued that without instituting stronger 
obligations on state parties to address the root causes and factors leading to trafficking, as 
alluded to in Article 9(4) of the Trafficking Protocol, the current victim protection program 
is likely to be ineffective and unable to provide the requisite protections for the minors in 
the long-term.1082 This is evidenced by Haynes’ claim that “trafficking is neither slowing 
[down], nor is the prosecution of traffickers or the protection of their victims becoming any 
more certain”.1083 This argument is valid, considering the ILO reported that on any given 
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day in 2016, there were an estimated 40 million people in forced labour and forced marriage 
circumstances in the world. 1084  Though it is difficult to estimate how many of these 
individuals are specific victims of human trafficking, the figures are an indictment of the 
extent of these related forms of exploitation. 1085  These situations also indicate the 
circumstances of the African football minors, who are neither being given the requisite 
protections that are reflective of their conditions and increased vulnerability towards 
trafficking, nor are they even given the appropriate status and services that are generally 
afforded to the other child victims of trafficking. 
5.3.2 The Effectiveness of the UNCRC in Sport 
Although it is commonly held that it is the State parties to the UNCRC that have the primary 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with its provisions, the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child noted that the responsibilities to respect the UNCRC extends beyond the State to 
individuals, parents, legal guardians, and other non-state actors.1086 As sport is not immune 
from respecting the rights of children, the non-State Sports Governing Bodies (SGBs) 
including FIFA, also have an obligation to contribute to the effective protection of children 
and child athletes. In fact, as David argues, if States are said to have a direct responsibility 
to promote and protect children’s rights, even in sports, then third parties such as FIFA have 
an indirect responsibility to do the same under the UNCRC.1087 Still, because of sport’s 
prevailing competitive culture and the commodification of children in such circles, sport is 
seldom a fertile ground for meaningful discussions on the interaction between children’s 
rights and the impact of sport on the lived experiences of participants.1088  
David contended that sport is one of the domains in which the rights of the child are often 
ignored or overlooked.1089 Donnelly concurred with this point via an earlier statement, as he 
argued that “national and international sport organisations, and governments, have singularly 
failed to deal with issues regarding the human rights of children, and some 14 Articles of the 
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UNCRC are occasionally or routinely violated in sports.”1090 Though the UNCRC does not 
expressly mention sport or the involvement of children in sports, certain provisions of the 
instrument could serve to protect young athletes due to their broad formulation.1091 For 
example, with football trafficking, the UNCRC contains measures which combat trafficking 
in children (Article 35), protects young people from economic exploitation (Article 32), and 
protects children from violence, abuse, neglect, and maltreatment (Article 19) in all aspects 
of life, including sport.1092 
Despite the existence of these provisions and their applicability in sport, there remains a 
significant under-recognition of football trafficking. On a broader level, this under-
recognition can be attributed to the perception of the “victim” in the football trafficking 
context. Greenbaum and others argued that the number of boys who are trafficked and placed 
in modern slavery-like conditions may not be appropriately reflected.1093 This is because of 
an apparent tendency by some state authorities to treat male victims of trafficking as 
offenders, rather than as children in need of help and protection.1094 As Esson also noted, 
this is likely exacerbated by the fact that the trafficked African boys do not fit the 
stereotypical view of a “victim of trafficking”, and this is subsequently used against them.1095 
On a sports specific level, the under-recognition of the problem could be due to some 
suppressed factors within the football recruitment environment. For instance, despite Article 
32 UNCRC preventing the economic exploitation of children, football's global production 
network and the transfer market system has been noted for being inconsistent with this 
provision.1096 Child players are increasingly viewed as club assets, which underlines the fact 
that football’s transfer system prioritises economic gain over the welfare (and best interests) 
of the child.1097  
When child victims of trafficking are detected, Article 3 UNCRC (the best interests 
principle) is increasingly cited as state parties contemplate the subsequent admission or 
                                                 
1090 Donnelly, Peter. "Sport and human rights." Sport in society 11, no. 4 (2008): 381-394. p/391 
1091 Weber, Romana. "Protection of children in competitive sport: Some critical questions for London 2012." International 
Review for the Sociology of Sport 44, no. 1 (2009): 55-69. p/57 
1092 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice (2018). p/68 
1093 Greenbaum, Jordan, Nia Bodrick, and Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect. "Global human trafficking and child 
victimization." Pediatrics 140, no. 6 (2017). p/6 
1094 Ibid. 
1095  Esson, James. "Playing the victim? Human trafficking, African youth, and geographies of structural 
inequality." Population, Space and Place (2020): e2309. p/7 
1096  Mason, Carolynne, Paul Darby, Eleanor Drywood, James Esson, and Serhat Yilmaz. "Rights, Risks and 
Responsibilities in the Recruitment of Children within the Global Football Industry." The International Journal of 
Children's Rights 27, no. 4 (2019): 738-756. p/745 
1097 Esson, James, and Eleanor Drywood. "Challenging popular representations of child trafficking in football." Journal of 
Criminological Research, Policy and Practice (2018). p/68 
154 
 
removal of the child from the destination country.1098 Article 3 is relevant to the procedures 
and treatment applicable to children seeking international protection, as the UNCRC’s 
General Comment number 6, provides that “return to the country of origin shall in principle 
only be arranged if such return is in the best interests of the child”.1099 Yet, this aspect of the 
UNCRC’s obligation is often overlooked by State parties.1100  This is arguably because 
several nation states, and the private actors including FIFA who are equally obliged to 
uphold this principle, 1101  ignore the “consideration” word used in the provision. 
Consideration emphasises that the child's best interests must be considered in “all actions 
concerning children”,1102 and as Alston expanded, such consideration must be “genuine 
rather than token or merely formal and must ensure that all aspects of the child's best interests 
are factored into the equation.”1103 In practice, this principle is not consistently upheld, as 
parties fail to note that the best interests of a child in a specific situation of vulnerability, will 
not be the same as a child who is not in the same vulnerable situation.1104 Thus, decisions 
regarding trafficked African minors should be made on a case by case basis, without 
prejudice to their appearance, and in acknowledgement that actions pertaining to their status 
and subsequent treatment are to be made in their best interests, and with consideration given 
to their peculiar circumstances. 
Furthermore, the Committee on the Rights of the Child which was formed to ensure the 
implementation of the UNCRC, lacks effective enforcement and controlling measures to put 
pressure on parties to implement the Convention.1105 The Committee is mainly concerned 
with controlling state reports and making non-binding recommendations,1106  it receives 
funding from UN donor states, and does not have the power to sentence parties for non-
compliance. This means that there is no international court to adjudicate on children's rights 
issues,1107 and no institution that children can petition to seek to have their UNCRC rights 
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vindicated.1108 Consequently, academics have posed significant questions about the role of 
the Committee and its capacity to monitor sports-related issues 1109  such as football 
trafficking. These questions stem from the inability of the Committee to issue binding 
recommendations on defaulting parties, as it diminishes its ability to proffer effective 
protections for child athletes.1110 
Though the UNCRC contains pertinent provisions which should prevent the occurrence of 
child trafficking in sport, its regulations have not been utilised in a manner that achieves this 
intended outcome. This can be attributed to problems such as victim identification, the 
recruitment practices of football teams, or as described by detractors of the UNCRC, the fact 
that the provisions are too unwieldy and therefore more “aspirational” than enforceable.1111 
Nevertheless, what remains clear is that the UNCRC has been undermined by the footballing 
environment and the embedded incentives which allow the unscrupulous persons and teams 
to circumvent the regulations to exploit children and make profit. Thereby leading to 
questions about the effectiveness and suitability of this lex generalis instrument in curbing 
the specific problem of football trafficking. 
5.3.3 The UN SDGs and Football Trafficking 
The focus of the SDGs on safe migration and the goal of ending child trafficking provides 
the requisite intersection and applicability between the SDGs and football trafficking. Like 
the UNCRC, the recruitment strategies in football weaken the implementation and 
effectiveness of the SDGs in limiting child trafficking in sport. The circumstances in football 
exist despite FIFA and other government agencies acknowledging and accepting the SDGs 
global goals of ending abuse, exploitation, and trafficking in persons.1112 And, similar to the 
Trafficking Protocol, the long-term effects of the SDGs in curbing this problem could be 
undermined by the fact the instrument does not provide a concrete means of tackling some 
of the core issues in source countries that lead to situations of trafficking and exploitation. 
For example, though the SDGs contain a commitment to eradicating inequality within and 
amongst countries in Goal 10,1113 the implementation of this goal in developing countries 
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and how it would be tailored to limiting the vulnerabilities of potential victims of trafficking 
remains to be seen.  
The SDGs propose that to eradicate inequality, nation states must facilitate orderly, safe, 
regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people (Goal 10.7). However, when this 
is considered within the context of football, the call for increased labour migration may itself 
constitute both the possibilities and the limitations of the SDGs’ applicability within 
sport. 1114  As a possibility/positive, labour migration could lead to a reduction in the 
inequalities between nations, as it could have several developmental benefits to both the 
source and destination countries when a talented player migrates. Yet, increased labour 
migration could also be a limitation/negative when several skilled individuals migrate, as 
their country could face underdevelopment resulting in their continued dependence on richer 
countries and economies for support.1115  This underdevelopment potentially puts many 
young people at a heightened risk of trafficking and exploitation. 
Though there are instances where players have migrated legally, received professional 
playing contracts and remitted money to improve the lives of their families back home 
(thereby potentially reducing some inequalities), most of the aspiring foreign players are 
subjected to a different state of affairs. Unfortunately, the practical implications of the SDGs’ 
call for more labour migration aligns more with the negative argument associated with the 
provision. This is evidenced by the occurrence of football trafficking, as the problem is a 
consequence of the continued African football labour migration, which has resulted in the 
stagnation, underdevelopment, and dependence of African football on European countries 
and football leagues. 
Conclusion 
FIFA’s regime has not achieved its intended policy objective of curbing football trafficking 
owing to the numerous loopholes in its regulatory system. The loopholes have created an 
avenue for FIFA’s members to circumvent the organisation’s regulations. Whilst 
simultaneously creating an incentive for unscrupulous persons (both FIFA members and 
non-members) to enter strategic deals with football teams to traffic and exploit young 
players, as a means of benefitting from football’s global transfer market. It becomes apparent 
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that the football environment (similar to other sporting circles) has turned a blind eye to these 
trafficking circumstances, as “the law of silence”1116 is regularly practiced. 
The comparison of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy performance to wider international law 
instruments showed that the instruments face similar problems of detection, implementation, 
and enforcement, when it comes to the cases of human trafficking. Whilst policies such as 
the UNCRC and the SDGs prioritise the best interests of the child and promote the creation 
of safe routes of migration respectively, the treatment of the trafficked minors upon 
identification in the destination countries suggest that the players are being criminalised as 
illegal migrants, even though they are victims of human trafficking. This renders key 
questions about the applicability of the policies in being able to curb the specific problem of 
child trafficking in sport. Ultimately, the discussions have shown that the FIFA and 
international law instruments both fail to adequately tackle the root causes of the problem. 
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Chapter 6 - EVALUATING FIFA’S REGULATIONS – SPECIFIC ASPECTS & 
LOOKING AT FIFA AS THE ASSESSED PARTY 
It is essential to analyse the aspects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations that may be 
hindering the policies from achieving their specific regulatory objectives. This is according 
to the benchmarks for evaluating policy performance,1117 and this practice is also necessary 
when adopting regulatory theory as a diagnostic tool. Additionally, and in line with 
aforementioned benchmarks, it is equally important to assess FIFA as the key party in the 
particular regulatory regime being considered.  
To critically discuss the specific aspects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations, the analysis 
is divided into both social and systemic factors. The social factors will build on the push and 
pull dynamics of human migration first considered in Chapter 3. The analysis will illustrate 
how the push and pull factors potentially motivate an averseness to FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policies amongst the African youths, thereby leading them into the hands of unscrupulous 
persons. Whereas, the systemic factors will examine how the data deficits in human 
trafficking research and policy formation, as well as other aspects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policy approach (e.g., the issues with regulatory enforcement, and the imbalanced treatment 
of African football minors), combine to inhibit the optimal performance of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies.  
Furthermore, to evaluate FIFA as the assessed party, various structural factors affecting the 
organisation (e.g., its corrupted structure, its non-profit status, its one member one vote 
practice, and the conflicts of interest seen amidst top FIFA personnel) are expanded upon to 
highlight how these inherent characteristics of the organisation could be impeding the 
organisation’s own policy performance.     
6.1 THE ASPECT OF REGULATION 
Baldwin and others posed that a key question to ask during an evaluation is “what aspects 
of the regulatory regime are affecting the policies from achieving the objectives?”.1118 To 
answer this question, the social and systemic factors will be discussed. 
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6.1.1 Social Factors 
There are often social factors that have the propensity to undercut regulatory efficacy and 
result in the continuation of a problem within a regime. Consideration of such broader social 
issues coincides with the recommendation of academics Lodge and Wegrich, who contended 
that during an evaluation, tough questions which reflect the real-life complexities of 
regulation must be asked about the regulations and regulatory performance.1119 Thus, in 
determining the real-life complexities affecting FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies, the push-
pull dynamics in human migration are pertinent. The dynamics/factors were introduced 
earlier as the push factors which drives people to leave their home country,1120 and the pull 
factors which attracts them to a destination country.1121 
Push Factors 
These can be divided into general,1122 and football specific push factors.1123  
General  
There are several general factors that push young people into the arms of unscrupulous 
persons. For example, youth unemployment is an issue that is not only prevalent in Africa 
but is a global problem with wide ranging ramifications. This unemployment pushes young 
people to migrate (legally or illegally) to find work when there is a shortage of opportunities 
available in their home country, or if they lack the requisite skills needed to do the work that 
is available.1124 With the absence of jobs, there is a subsequent lack of income that could 
lead to poverty, which is one of the “risk factors” that make youths vulnerable to the ploys 
of human traffickers looking to exploit them. 1125  This is because poverty generates a 
vulnerability to exploitative practices like forced labour.  
Other push factors include the circumstances of age and gender discrimination that take place 
across Africa, thereby making it difficult for African youths to gain employment and sustain 
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themselves.1126 Unequal opportunities to gain education in Africa is a push factor which 
limits the access to skilled occupations for the African youths, and this is often coupled with 
a general lack of awareness of the risks involved in irregular migration.1127 The proximity of 
an individual to a border of a neighbouring country with a thriving labour market may also 
be a push factor.1128 This is best illustrated in the case of the West African minors who 
migrated irregularly to enrol in the football academies in Ghana, where they were 
subsequently subjected to “exploitation within exploitation”.1129 The example shows that 
economic instability on the part of the Africans,1130 and the added restrictions on the process 
of regular migration, combine to provide the basis in which smuggling, irregular migration, 
and trafficking, is allowed to thrive in the region.1131 Thus, as Saner and others contend, 
human trafficking is a symptom of wider underdevelopment in the source countries.1132 
In the specific instance of child trafficking, there are often supplementary push factors which 
expose children to heightened risks of violence, abuse, and exploitation. These include 
natural disasters, armed conflicts,1133 separation from families, minimal education, and a 
lack of vocational skills. These supplemental factors are identical to the factors that have 
generally been identified as triggering children’s independent migration, 1134  but in this 
instance, the risk factors potentially kick-start the trafficking process and push the vulnerable 
children into exploitative situations.1135  These factors result in trafficking and irregular 
migration for a few reasons. First, the absence of opportunities for persons under the age of 
18 to migrate both legally and independently, thus leaving the children to rely on 
intermediaries to realise their migratory aspirations.1136 Second, stricter European border 
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control has made it increasingly expensive for undocumented immigrants to enter.1137 This 
has led aspiring migrants to explore more dangerous avenues to migrate illegally, and has 
contributed to the growing market for clandestine migration services, including smuggling 
across borders and faking travel documents.1138 Third, owing to the reduced costs for the 
smugglers and traffickers when moving children, the higher potential returns, and the ease 
of controlling, manipulating, and/or replacing vulnerable children,1139 there appears to be a 
constant incentive for unscrupulous persons to circumvent national, international, and also 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations.  
Football Specific 
Playing football professionally outside Africa is considered to be a vehicle to elevate and 
change the life of an individual and their family.1140 This perception often coincides with 
certain football specific factors which make it difficult for the youths in Africa to envision 
playing and being successful if they remained on the continent. Some of the relevant factors 
include: the fragile political economy and instability affecting football in several African 
countries; the high levels of poverty leading to an uncertain football landscape;1141 the 
substandard administration of African leagues; the corrupt practices of those in the football 
associations; the limited state investment in the leagues; and the occurrence of unnecessary 
government interference in football matters.1142 Darby posited that these factors combine to 
make playing football in Africa a less appealing option for the youths, and that there is often 
little in the way of financial reward and stability for the players if they were to choose to 
remain on the continent.1143 These factors subsequently give aspiring African footballers a 
reason to seek better playing and paying opportunities, stability, and financial rewards, at a 
club outside the continent.1144 
The main difficulty for these aspiring youths lies in their inability to secure safe and legal 
passage to the foreign country. The limited opportunities for safe passage is a consequence 
                                                 
1137 Plambech, Sine. "Between “Victims” and “Criminals”: Rescue, deportation, and everyday violence among Nigerian 
migrants." Social Politics 21, no. 3 (2014): 382-402. p/389 
1138 O'Connell Davidson, Julia. "Moving children? Child trafficking, child migration, and child rights." Critical social 
policy 31, no. 3 (2011): 454-477. p/460 
1139 Ellis, Tom and James Akpala, 'Making sense of the relationship between trafficking in persons, human smuggling, 
and organised crime: the case of Nigeria' (2011) 84(1) The Police Journal 13. pg. 5-6 
1140 Esson, James, “Better Off at Home? Rethinking Responses to Trafficked West African Footballers in Europe”, 
(2015) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41:3, 512-530, pg. 521 
1141 Esson, James, 'You have to try your luck: male Ghanaian youth and the uncertainty of football migration' (2015) 
47(6) Environ Plann A 1383, p. 1387 
1142 Darby, Paul, 'African football labour migration to Portugal: colonial and neo‐colonial resource' (2007) 8(4) Soccer & 
Society 495. p. 499 
1143 Ibid, pg. 500 
1144 Darby, Paul, “‘Go Outside’: The History, Economics and Geography of Ghanaian Football Labour Migration” (2010) 
African Historical Review, 42:1, 19-41, pg. 36 
162 
 
of the tightening of state borders and the introduction of stricter visa requirements and 
immigration policies for people coming from developing countries.1145 The stricter border 
control leads to the perception amongst the African youths that they would be unable to 
make the trip to a foreign club via legal channels,1146 seeing as they may not ordinarily 
qualify for the requisite visas which allow them legitimate entry to stay and work.1147 The 
youths then turn to intermediaries, middlemen, and facilitators who are able to provide 
services to make the now clandestine trip feasible.1148 Consequently, the African youths 
become open to exploitation and other precarious circumstances in the destination country 
due to their search for better footballing and economic opportunities,1149 and as a result of 
their reliance on unscrupulous intermediaries and traffickers to gain access to the region.1150  
However, some African footballers may consider that the precarious conditions in the 
foreign country are better than the alternative of remaining in Africa with the deficient 
football infrastructure, and an unstable football governance system on the continent.1151 This 
unstable climate owes largely to the impact of corruption in African football, and is one 
which Poli asserts is similar to “internal neo-colonialism”.1152 The corruption acts as a push 
factor because the funds stipulated for the development of the local game are regularly 
misappropriated by the football associations.1153 Anecdotally, some prior statistics showed 
that 90 out of every 100 dollars meant for the development of grassroots football in Africa 
“disappears” into the pockets of private individuals.1154 The problem here, however, is not 
that there is corruption in African football (as this problem affects all parts of FIFA1155), but 
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it is the scale in which corruption occurs in African football that is considered to be the most 
worrying and contributory push factor for the majority of the youths.1156 
The issue of corruption in African football is one that is not easily solved, seeing as FIFA’s 
rules on non-interference hinders governments from combating corruption and interfering 
with their respective Football associations.1157 The FIFA rules protect those at the centre of 
the corrupt practices within the African Football Associations,1158 by shielding them from 
being the target of any democratic process. Thus, any attempts by African governments to 
overhaul their respective Football association to rid corrupt practices and make the 
association more accountable, is likely to be considered as an intrusion by FIFA and could 
lead to a possible warning, sanction, or a suspension from football tournaments for the 
country.1159 
When these general and football specific push factors are considered collectively by the 
African youths, it often leads to the triggering of the trafficking or irregular migration 
process, as the youths seek the help of smugglers and unscrupulous intermediaries to 
facilitate their trips abroad. It could be argued that the African youths view irregular 
migration (and their potential trafficking) as a worthwhile risk, even if migrating in such a 
manner has little chance of resulting in a sustained career in professional football.1160 This 
view by the African players is often as a result of two predominant factors. First, West 
African boys believe that international migration to Europe or US would aid the attainment 
of future success and social mobility. 1161  Esson, having interviewed several of the 
migrant/trafficked African boys in Paris, as well as the aspiring footballers in Ghana, 
explained that there is a common belief amongst them that a career in professional football 
and migration to a league outside of Africa is a viable livelihood strategy to lift them, and 
vicariously, their families, out of poverty.1162 Second, the perception of the youths and their 
eagerness to migrate to play professionally exists in the backdrop of a plethora of regulatory 
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policies which are ordinarily formed to prevent irregular migration and football trafficking 
from taking place. With the general absence of routes for the African youth players to legally 
migrate, and with the tighter controls on football migration applied without addressing the 
wider global inequalities that push the players to want to migrate, the possibility of 
exploitation or trafficking taking place becomes increasingly pronounced for the aspiring 
players.1163 
Hence, the football environment in Africa recurrently puts one party, the desperate African 
player willing to leave the continent to play professionally abroad by any means necessary, 
with the other party, the unscrupulous persons and intermediaries who are tasked with 
finding innovative means of circumventing existing anti-trafficking regulations to export and 
exploit players for monetary gains. This combination challenges the efficacy of FIFA’s 
policies, and is consequently a key aspect affecting the organisation’s policy performance. 
Pull Factors 
Several African clubs find themselves unable to pay their players’ salaries, and this limits 
their ability to stop their best players from migrating.1164 In Africa, there are only a few teams 
which have the capacity and financial resources to pay players the kind of salaries that could 
encourage them to remain and play professionally on the continent. In an earlier analysis by 
Darby, he identified that Al Ahly and Arab Contractors in Egypt, and Esperance in Tunisia, 
were the “primary player exporting zones” with some pulling power within Africa.1165 This 
limited list is rooted in the inequalities and economic disparities between the EU and African 
teams, and is reflective of the wider economies and economic markets between the 
regions.1166 The few options available in Africa are in stark contrast to the numerous options 
that exist in Europe for the aspiring players, with teams willing to give them the opportunities 
and economic incentives which do not exist anywhere else in football, let alone in African 
football.1167 
With their elevated financial strength and the globalisation of football’s transfer market since 
Bosman, the recruitment strategies of European clubs have revolved around locating talented 
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youth players abroad and “pulling” said players to Europe through economic incentives.1168 
The law of supply and demand operates in football just as in any other sphere of the 
marketplace.1169 The demand exists in Europe, whilst the supply is the plethora of talented 
Africans looking to travel abroad, which results in the cross-nationality migration (both legal 
and illegal) prevalent in football today.1170 European clubs are constantly scouting for cheap 
and talented players to import,1171 as their increased financial capability allows them to offer 
players uniquely high salaries,1172 and gives the European clubs the “pick of the bunch” 
when it comes to selecting from Africa’s football talent pool.1173 However, this recruitment 
method of pulling players to Europe through economic incentives has been described as one 
of the root causes of labour exploitation and human trafficking.1174 The method has also been 
criticised due to its similarities with economic imperialism and the continued neo-colonial 
exploitation of cheap labour between developed and developing countries.1175 
Though the financial benefits on offer are important, pull factors could also be related to a 
shared language, culture, and heritage, which are factors formed through the historical and 
colonial links between African and European countries. 1176  These factors motivate the 
migratory patterns and disposition of the young African players, and the factors have at times 
been considered to be just as important as the economic incentives. 1177 As previously 
discussed,1178 during colonial times, players from all over Africa were transferred to the 
respective European colonial powers, such as France, 1179  Portugal, and Belgium. 1180 
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Following the independence of African states, prior colonial links were still used to recruit 
the best players from the continent.1181 The shared colonial history between imperialist 
powers and their former colonies acts as a significant pull factor for the African players, as 
the similarities in language and culture improves the ease of migration and acclimatisation 
in the EU country.1182 This results in Africans increasingly viewing playing in Europe as a 
true ‘rite de passage’ to enhance their footballing development.1183 And this is consistent 
with the African players Darby encountered in Ghana, who wanted to migrate to England 
because of the shared colonial history.1184 
Another relevant pull factor is the media which reinforces the appeal of going abroad to 
obtain wealth and possible socio-economic betterment through football.1185 The widespread 
broadcasts of European football have not only increased the sport’s popularity around the 
world,1186 but has exposed the aspiring players to quality leagues and matches in the major 
championships of other nations.1187 The aspiring players become attracted to the leagues, see 
other football migrants that have succeeded, and the successful players become their role 
models.1188 They then idolise the football stars abroad and harbour intentions of playing in 
the same countries and leagues as their football heroes.1189 The media similarly increases 
opportunities for European clubs to conduct their recruitment,1190 as the global expansion of 
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TV coverage on football has put far more African players in the “shop window” for 
purchasers.1191  
The aspirations of the African minors to travel and play abroad is a common trait amongst 
football migrants.1192 The players often view migration as a means of improving their careers 
by testing themselves at a higher level on a regular basis.1193 Many sports athletes spend a 
part of their career abroad,1194 and Poli reported that nearly half of all the active professional 
footballers in the top 5 European leagues are sports expatriates/migrants.1195 The problem 
that arises for the aspiring African players is that the figures in support of sporting migration 
do not render a complete appraisal of the underlying trafficking problem. The figures do not 
show the many aspiring players who migrated irregularly or were trafficked and kept in 
precarious situations abroad, unable to secure professional playing contracts.1196 
These pull factors promote the notion amongst the Africans that migrating to Europe is an 
essential part of their development process. Along with the notion that the absence of 
opportunities to attain spatial mobility is directly linked to their inability to achieve social 
mobility and provide for them and their families. As a result, the African boys seek ways to 
migrate to other parts of the world, as they do not anticipate that the development and 
transformation of their lives would occur if they remained on the continent.1197 This creates 
a significant incentive to bypass FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations. It also extends the 
avenues for unscrupulous persons to capitalise on the boys’ migratory disposition, the shared 
colonial history with European countries, the loopholes in FIFA’s regulations, the economic 
incentives available in Europe, and the demand for cheap labour, to deceive parents and 
smuggle, traffic, export, and exploit the young and vulnerable African players. Furthermore, 
with the continued demand for cheap foreign labour, if FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies do 
not accommodate for these social factors, the policies are likely to remain ineffective. 
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6.1.2 Systemic Factors  
There are several systemic factors which have affected FIFA’s policy performance, such as 
the data deficits in human trafficking. 
Data Deficits 
The entrenched issue with data in human trafficking related research is broad, and one which 
football is not exempt from. It can be argued that when it comes to data on trafficking in 
football, the sport is significantly behind nation states and governmental bodies in its 
approach to bridging the knowledge gap in relation to the occurrence of the crime. Antonio 
Costa, the former Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), once warned that "if we do not overcome this knowledge crisis, we will be 
fighting the problem [of human trafficking] blindfolded".1198 The knowledge gap/crisis here 
are the data deficits which prevent a thorough understanding of trafficking and the migratory 
trails commonly used to perpetuate the crime. Costa stated that “we fear the problem is 
getting worse, but we cannot prove it for lack of data”.1199 Gallagher concurred with Costa’s 
assertion and explained that there are in fact compelling indications that show human 
trafficking is increasing, becoming more organised and more profitable, and steadily being 
integrated into the fabric of the new global economy, despite the absence of precise numbers 
regarding its continued occurrence.1200 
This lack of data is said to exist as a consequence of the complex and transnational nature of 
the crime.1201 Therefore, available data is mostly based on the few reports that come to light 
about trafficking taking place, such as when trafficked victims are identified and appear in 
official police, immigration, or social welfare statistics. 1202 There are several undetected 
victims of human trafficking who do not appear in official statistics,1203 and there are those 
who are victims of trafficking but have been misidentified and treated as irregular migrants. 
The statistical gap is one which the UN has tried to fill through mechanisms chaired by the 
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UNODC, as well as calls in the UNSDGs, to promote better monitoring and reporting of the 
progresses made in tackling human trafficking.1204 The UNSDGs request that improved 
monitoring takes place,1205 as Member States are to collect proper trafficking data and 
defined methodologies to estimate the total number of trafficking victims, and to report these 
numbers by sex, age, and form of exploitation.1206 Such information is required to shed more 
light on the problem and is needed to limit the data deficits in the field. It will also allow 
evaluators and regulators alike to gain a better understanding of the circumstances around 
trafficking, and to track the performance of the various anti-trafficking policies.  
Despite the UN initiatives, it has been reported that some countries have declined to report 
data altogether,1207 whilst other countries lack the capacity to sufficiently record and share 
data on trafficking in persons.1208 Data collected on victims or offenders may be missing or 
incomplete, and at times it may not be systematically collected, or could be available for 
only some years, or for some parts of the country.1209 These disparities in data collection 
practices often take place in developing countries and regions such as Africa and Asia, and 
result in there being less knowledge about trafficking patterns and flows, weaker detection 
of victims, and a reduced conviction of traffickers.1210 The disparities typically lead to an 
underestimation of the trafficking problem,1211 as evaluators of policy performance end up 
having to extrapolate data from trends and the victims who have been detected. However, it 
is argued that evaluating policies without core data on the problem would lead to inherent 
biases about the crime. For example, there would be notions that because many identified 
victims have faced a specific form of trafficking and exploitation (i.e., involving sexual 
activities) there would be more victims of this type than other forms of trafficking (i.e., 
football trafficking).1212 Such inherent biases fail to recognise that the identified victims may 
simply be easier to detect by law enforcement due to the form of trafficking and exploitation 
                                                 
1204 United Nations News, ‘Rising human trafficking takes on ‘horrific dimensions’: almost a third of victims are children’ 
(7 January 2019) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1029912> accessed on 16/11/2019 
1205 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.19.IV.2) p/16 
1206 UN General Assembly, "Sustainable Development Goals." SDGs, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda (2015). 
Goal 16, Indicator 16.2.2 
1207  Saner, Raymond, Lichia Yiu, and Laurel Rush. "The measuring and monitoring of human trafficking." Public 
Administration and Policy (2018). p/95 
1208 United Nations News, ‘Rising human trafficking takes on ‘horrific dimensions’: almost a third of victims are children’ 
(7 January 2019) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1029912> accessed on 16/11/2019 
1209 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.19.IV.2) p/15 
1210 Ibid. 
1211 IPEC, Combating trafficking in children for labour exploitation: A resource kit for policy-makers and 
practitioners (International Labour Office; ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva 
2008). Book 2: Understanding What Child Trafficking Is, pg. 6-7 
1212  Saner, Raymond, Lichia Yiu, and Laurel Rush. "The measuring and monitoring of human trafficking." Public 
Administration and Policy (2018). p/98 
170 
 
being practiced. Whereas the victims of other forms of trafficking and exploitation such as 
football and labour trafficking, may not be as easily recognisable. 
The human trafficking data deficits are even more pronounced in the case of football and 
FIFA’s regime, as the sourcing of data regarding its occurrence has proven to be cursory, at 
best, especially when compared to the approach taken at international levels. In football, 
plainly, the problem is “underreported, under-detected, and therefore, under-prosecuted”.1213 
Beyond FIFA admitting that the problem exists,1214 there is a lack of precise statistical 
indicators of the extent of trafficking in the sport.1215 This lack of official data on the problem 
hinders a clear understanding of: player movements; the exact role of intermediaries and 
unscrupulous persons in the football trafficking process; if third party ownership takes place; 
the intra and inter club mechanisms used to source and access foreign talent; and, the regular 
and irregular migratory routes and transfer flows as related to football trafficking.1216 With 
FIFA requiring its individual football associations to manage ITMs in their respective 
regions, 1217  the possible lack of coherence in data between the associations prevents 
regulators and evaluators from attaining comprehensive data on football transfers.1218 If 
comprehensive data on the problem existed, this would have increased the likelihood of more 
effective and tailored regulatory responses to the crime being formed.1219 Nevertheless, it is 
argued that the absence of requisite data on the true extent of football trafficking should not 
preclude FIFA from creating better avenues for monitoring the problem, in addition to 
fostering practices which promote better data collection and exchange within its regime. 
Aspects of FIFA’s regulations 
Certain aspects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have hindered the performance of its 
regulations. FIFA’s rules have been described as “demonstrably ineffective” in limiting 
football trafficking,1220 but the organisation has not amended its policies to better prevent 
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the crime. Instead, FIFA maintains that its policies are able to curb the trafficking problem 
if applied strictly.1221 Yet, FIFA’s rules and sanctions have not always been applied strictly, 
and the sanctions have not had a deterrent effect on other football clubs looking to traffic 
and exploit child players. For instance, though FC Barcelona were charged by FIFA for 
repeatedly breaching its transfer regulations regarding the recruitment of foreign minors,1222 
soon after the sanction, the other big clubs in Spain (Real Madrid and Atletico Madrid) were 
similarly accused of breaching the same FIFA rules.1223 Thus, it is argued that the deterrent 
effect of the FIFA policies have been undermined by the disparities in its implementation. 
Such as, after being accused of breaching FIFA’s rules, Real Madrid were able to 
successfully challenge their sanction at CAS, and they had their punishment (the fine and 
duration of their transfer ban) halved. 1224  Whereas, Atletico Madrid’s appeal was 
unsuccessful, and their transfer ban was upheld (though their fine was reduced by 38%). 
Atletico argued that this decision was “unfair” and accused FIFA and CAS of "comparative 
disadvantage and discriminatory treatment" considering the successful appeal of the bigger 
team, Real Madrid.1225 Since these sanctions for the Spanish teams, English club Manchester 
City have undergone several investigations about their conducting of ITMs,1226 and Chelsea 
have also been sanctioned by FIFA for the questionable recruitment of 29 foreign minors.1227 
Hence, clubs continue to engage in illicit ITMs despite the existence of the FIFA policies, 
as the clubs are somewhat safe in the knowledge that if they are caught, their punishment 
would not be severe and their sanctions could be overturned (or reduced) upon appeal to 
CAS. 
Another key aspect undermining FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy performance is the fact that 
the regulations arguably do not cater to the specific needs of the African minors. Oberg 
explained that a change of environment and cultural setting could place physical, 
sociological, and psychological demands on athletes, even resulting in a “culture shock”.1228 
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These conditions are arguably more predominant when dealing with foreign minors who 
often suffer from homesickness and loneliness when they come to Europe, 1229  but are 
required to adapt to their new environment and perform to the highest standards of play, 
despite the socio-cultural changes.1230 The predominant football environment dictates to the 
foreign minors that if they do not adjust and adapt quickly they could lose their chance at 
achieving a professional playing contract, and because they are “foreign”, they are not 
provided with a “plan B” career opportunity. With FIFA’s regulations, EU minors are 
provided with this “plan B”, as they are protected by FIFA’s Article 19(2)(b) RSTP which 
establishes obligations in respect of football education, academic provision, and living 
standards for EU players.1231 Celen and others contended that these obligations for the EU 
teams when signing EU minors were put in place to ensure the players were given a good 
education and training, and importantly, to guarantee that the player could have an 
alternative career or occupation if they fail to make it as professional footballers. 1232 
However, for the African minors, current FIFA regulations do not reflect any such fail-safe 
measures if they are unsuccessful in their footballing trials.1233 This gap exists within the 
policies despite the socio-cultural changes the foreign minors are known to face during their 
acclimatisation to a new country and environment. Yet, if a non-EU minor is unable to secure 
a playing contract abroad after undergoing trials, he runs the risk of being released from the 
club. After the release, there is then a heightened risk that the minor could be exploited or 
trafficked to another team, or he could be put in a precarious situation by unscrupulous 
persons in the foreign country.1234 
The imbalanced treatment between the aspiring African and EU minors creates the avenue 
for EU teams and unscrupulous intermediaries to transfer and treat the African minors with 
no long-term regard for their welfare and safety. For this reason, there are bound to be key 
questions about the rights and welfare of young foreign players within the sport.1235 Jean-
Claude Mbvoumin, the founder of the football trafficking charity Culture Foot Solidaire 
                                                 
1229  Egilsson, Birnir, and Harald Dolles. "“From Heroes to Zeroes”–self-initiated expatriation of talented young 
footballers." Journal of Global Mobility: The Home of Expatriate Management Research (2017). p/185 
1230 Najarian, Alex C, 'The Lost Boys: FIFA's Insufficient Efforts to Stop Trafficking of Youth Footballers' (2015) 22 Sports 
Law.J. 151.p/155. 
1231 FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (2020). 
1232  Celen, Burcin, Leo Lederman, Angelo Rigopoulos, Jos6 Alfonso Rodriguez, and Piotr Sadowski. "International 
Transfers of Minors: Recommendations to Improve the Protections of Young Players in the Current Transfer System." 
(2010) CIES. p. 33-4 
1233 Najarian, Alex C, 'The Lost Boys: FIFA's Insufficient Efforts to Stop Trafficking of Youth Footballers' (2015) 22 Sports 
Law.J. 151., p. 171 
1234 European Commission, “White Paper - White Paper on Sport” Brussels, COM (2007) 391 final. Article 4.5 
1235 Drywood, Eleanor, '“When we buy a young boy …” Migrant Footballers, Children’s Rights and the Case for EU 
Intervention' in Stalford, Helen and Ingi Iusmen (Eds), The EU as a children’s rights actor. Law, policy, and structural 
dimensions (Barbara Budrich Publishers, Toronto 2016) 191-220. p. 192 
173 
 
(CFS), stated that the circumstances in football are dangerous for young players as they are 
increasingly “treated like objects”.1236 Mbvoumin argued that for the African players to be 
protected through FIFA’s regulations, FIFA would need to change its current stance and be 
more paternalistic and social with its approach.1237 It is therefore argued that FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies will continue to perform ineffectively in curbing football trafficking, 
unless, FIFA modifies the aforementioned aspects of its regulations to have a more 
paternalistic anti-trafficking stance. In so doing, FIFA should prioritise the welfare and 
wellbeing of the young participants in its regime, over other sporting or commercial interests. 
6.2 THE ASSESSED PARTY  
Baldwin and others explained that during an evaluation there should be an analysis of the 
regulatory body/assessed party. They argued that this analysis is to identify the involved 
actors in the space, and to note the dominant party who is ascribed authority within it.1238 In 
an earlier chapter, this thesis identified the involved parties in football’s regulatory space 
and explained FIFA’s position as the dominant actor.1239 Through the analysis, it became 
evident that there were likely to be some structural factors caused by FIFA’s organisational 
setup which could be affecting its policy performance.  
6.2.1 Structural Factors 
With FIFA’s structure and its TPR regime, FIFA’s leadership undoubtedly sees FIFA as a 
big player on the global stage.1240  FIFA’s formal composition has led to analogies being 
drawn between FIFA and other public international organisations (such as the UN1241) where 
the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and impartiality, guide the decision-making 
processes.1242 The key difference between the UN and FIFA, however, is that FIFA does not 
have the same requirements or imposed objectives as the public international organisations. 
FIFA's main mission remains "to promote the game of football, protect its integrity and bring 
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the game to all”,1243 and it will do so by acting in the best interest of its members1244 and 
stakeholders.1245  FIFA is not generally tasked with ensuring the prevention of negative 
externalities which affect the wider public,1246 such as football trafficking.  
There has been a growing critique of FIFA’s governance procedures over recent years, and 
this has created a crisis in the confidence ascribed to the organisation, 1247  and has 
undermined FIFA’s public image.1248 The core problem with FIFA’s governance is that as 
FIFA’s revenues and TPR regime has grown and it has gained global prominence, the 
organisation’s procedural requirements have not grown with it. 1249  FIFA retains the same 
practices for selecting leaders, controlling funds, and conducting business as it did when it 
was newly formed. 1250  These predated practices have made the organisation prone to 
corruption and various scandals. For instance, though set up as a democratic organisation 
with an executive, legislative, and judicial arm, in practice, there is no real devolution of 
powers or autonomy within the FIFA body.1251 FIFA’s personnel and committee members 
often bow to the wishes of the FIFA leader,1252 which means that due to the concentration of 
powers on the FIFA president, the organisation often operates as a centralised private 
organisation.1253 This, rather singular, concentration of powers has in turn established the 
culture of self-aggrandisement, unaccountability, and corruption seen at FIFA.1254 
Corrupted structure 
Corruption is defined as “illegal, bad, or dishonest behaviour, especially by people in 
positions of power.”1255 Corruption is a global problem and it is a risk wherever power and 
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politics are practised. 1256  In sport, corruption could range from a simple bribe, to 
multinational crime syndicates seeking to manipulate sporting events across the globe.1257 
Considering FIFA’s significant TPR regime and its likeness to public organisations, the 
constant reports of corruption at FIFA could have a widespread effect beyond the sport.1258 
Scholars have linked corruption by nation states to weak governance systems which have 
had a detrimental impact on society, as it could lead to problems like human trafficking.1259 
Thus, it could be argued that there is equally a connection between corruption and the corrupt 
practices at FIFA, and the occurrence of football trafficking at the bottom of FIFA’s football 
pyramid.  
FIFA have faced corruption scandals and allegations of governance problems regarding their 
announcement of Russia and Qatar as the hosts for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, 
respectively. 1260  Such allegations have been a constant at FIFA because FIFA has the 
capacity to “ignite a geopolitical fire”1261 with its sporting decisions, as these tend to have a 
longstanding socio-political and economic effect on nation states. Yet, when matters related 
to corruption occur, nation states are reluctant to intervene in FIFA affairs. FIFA’s power 
ensures that the corruption scandals it is involved in often lead to no more than internal 
sanctions and minor sectoral crises within the organisation.1262 Consequently, there is no 
long-term or significant improvements to FIFA’s practices in the aftermath, thus leading to 
claims that “football and FIFA are corrupt. Very, very corrupt”.1263 
FIFA has arguably faced issues in adequately handling corruption because of its 
organisational and structural composition.1264 FIFA’s pyramidal structure means that its 
resources and benefits are not distributed evenly across the different levels of football.1265 
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This opens the door for the smaller and more corruptible MAs1266 to be flattered, cajoled, 
rewarded or bribed, for their support and votes when elections for the next president or World 
Cup location arises.1267 FIFA executives and board members are in a unique position to 
demand payoffs, and they are able to punish adversaries with their venue selection for 
football tournaments. 1268  The following examples illustrate the depth of the corruption 
problem in football and how this could limit optimum policy performance.1269 
In May 2015, Swiss authorities arrested top FIFA executives at the behest of U.S. officials 
because of “rampant, systemic and deep-rooted” corruption spanning “at least two 
generations of soccer officials.”1270 It was reported that forty-one people or entities were 
charged with fraud, bribery, and money laundering and other schemes to solicit and receive 
more than $200 million in bribes and kickbacks.1271  Though the true extent of FIFA’s 
corruption scandals could potentially go beyond this reported sum,1272 it was believed that 
the money that was diverted for private gain was supposed to trickle down to the benefit of 
the people at the bottom of FIFA’s pyramid.1273 The fact that the diverted funds were meant 
for social causes could have enhanced the vulnerabilities of the at-risk minors, thus 
increasing the likelihood of their being trafficked and exploited. 1274 
During the raid of FIFA, former president, Joseph Blatter, and former UEFA President, 
Michel Platini, along with the presidents of other football confederations, were also indicted 
and/or suspended for several ethical violations related to corruption.1275 After the arrests and 
scandals, FIFA’s new president, Gianni Infantino, stepped in to try and improve the 
governance issues and reshape the organisation’s image, but the corruption problems seem 
to have persisted.1276 During his campaign to be elected president, Infantino promised that 
FIFA would pay each of its MAs $5 million. This was a promise that FIFA’s public 
accounting auditors, KPMG, alerted that FIFA did not have the necessary internal 
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procedures to ensure that these funds would be properly utilised.1277 Nevertheless, Infantino 
insisted that the sums be paid, and KPMG subsequently resigned, citing a lack of “trust that 
the new management would do what they said they were going to do to improve 
governance.”1278  
Moreover, with  FIFA’s personnel and committee members bowing to the wishes of the 
FIFA leader,1279 Infantino has been able to reshape the billion-dollar FIFA empire into an 
organisation that is subservient to him.1280 FIFA, as with most sports organisations, have 
been unable to operate a good governance structure with an appropriate separation of 
powers,1281 thereby allowing Infantino to push through key resolutions which enable the 
FIFA Council to remove members of FIFA’s “independent” committees. Infantino was faced 
with allegations of ethical violations, after reports emerged that he had ordered the 
destruction of tapes of a FIFA Council meeting, made lavish expenditures without 
authorisation, and improperly attempted to influence the election of the next UEFA and CAF 
president.1282 During Infantino’s investigation, the FIFA president arranged for the sudden 
removal of the FIFA ethics committee chairmen and members.1283 This led to the suggestion 
that Infantino was subsequently cleared of any ethical violations because the members of the 
independent committee were worried that they would be replaced if they voted against 
him.1284 In 2020, Infantino was again faced with allegations of corruption,1285 and he was 
cleared by the ethics committee several weeks later.1286 
Non-Profit Private Legal Order 
Though FIFA acts as a supranational entity, it is domiciled in Switzerland and registered as 
a non-profit organisation (NPO) under Swiss law. 1287 FIFA’s NPO status has provided 
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several benefits to the organisation, but these benefits equally reflect some of the structural 
factors hindering FIFA’s policy performance.  
First, no domestic government has the power to subject FIFA to formal state authority, with 
the exception of Switzerland. 1288 This is because NPOs are often only subject to regulation 
from the country where they are incorporated and the country where they operate, which in 
the case of FIFA is Switzerland.1289 Switzerland, however, have repeatedly taken a laissez-
faire approach regarding football’s decades of match-fixing, money laundering, looting, self-
dealing, and bribery.1290  The limited interest shown by Swiss authorities paved the way for 
FIFA’s years of unaccountability and led to claims that Switzerland are “implicitly 
complicit” in FIFA’s corruption.1291 The complicity is exacerbated by studies which show 
that Switzerland’s neutrality has been to enable the Swiss “perpetuate their power and in 
many cases enrich themselves individually at the organization's expense.”1292 Therefore, 
both FIFA and Swiss officials have been accused of being corrupt. 
Second, because it is an NPO, FIFA receives far less oversight1293 and can avoid practices 
that regular businesses must abide by. For example, FIFA is not required to disclose what it 
does with its money by publishing its financial accounts.1294 Therefore, many of FIFA’s 
fiscal decisions remain undisclosed. 1295 FIFA enjoys exemptions from domestic anti-
corruption laws, and FIFA is given substantial freedom to administer its own affairs.1296 
Alternatively, for-profit organisations (FPOs) are regulated largely through the market 
process, with stockholders having strong incentives to maintain close oversight and 
demanding transparency of transactions. 1297  FPOs are subject to “proportional sharing” 
requirements, whereby the board is expected to not discriminate when making 
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distributions.1298 With the sharing requirements in FPOs, shareholders are likely to vote for 
what is in the best interest of the organisation because that will also produce the greatest 
benefit for themselves.1299 Whereas, with NPOs and private institutions like FIFA, the best 
interest of the organisation may not always be the aim of the officials in charge, but rather, 
the aim tends to be promotion of wealth redistribution within the group.1300  
FIFA treats its MAs differently from one another because of its pyramidal structure,1301 and 
this furthers an uneven distribution of resources between the MAs.1302 The uneven treatment 
contributes to the self-aggrandisement and corruption culture seen at FIFA,1303 and it also 
influences voting decisions.1304 This is because the smaller and more corruptible MAs1305 
have personnel who are more likely to be cajoled for their support and votes,1306 owing to 
individual promises and the monetary benefits on offer, rather than by an assessment of what 
is best for the organisation as a whole.1307  
Third, with FIFA’s NPO status, the organisation enjoys favourable tax relief from 
Switzerland and its World Cup host countries. Meaning, the substantial revenues FIFA 
generates from the World Cup (such as the $5.3 billion from the 2018 competition in 
Russia1308) is mostly tax free. 1309 Through FIFA’s billions in untaxed profits, unparalleled 
bargaining power, and with its limited oversight, DiCenso argued that it is unsurprising that 
FIFA officials have been able to continuously push the boundaries of legality.1310 Seeing as 
FIFA is not ordinarily accountable to any higher authority (except the neutral Switzerland), 
FIFA officials have been able to take advantage of the temptations presented by football’s 
billions of dollars.1311 The underlying issue remains that these corruptible FIFA officials are 
often leading personnel at football associations, and therefore have a seat and a valuable vote 
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at the FIFA Congress. Rather than using FIFA resources to make social change in regions 
and countries renowned for being source areas for victims of football trafficking, for 
instance, the FIFA officials appear to be more interested in achieving private monetary gains 
at the expense of the organisation’s public image. 
One member, One vote 
FIFA implements a “one member, one vote” system in its Congress.1312 And though this is 
in theory a pure democracy, where each MA has an equal vote,1313 it is also inherently 
imbalanced in nature. The structure favours the smaller and more corruptible MAs by 
placing them in a disproportionately powerful position where they can be bribed1314 in 
exchange for their support and votes.1315 This structural weakness stems from football’s 
financial arrangements whereby several MAs beneath FIFA’s elite level have insufficient 
resources needed to sustain themselves.1316 This limitation has meant that even legitimate 
funding from FIFA to a small MA could potentially influence the association’s votes.1317 
For instance, when Havelange incorporated new MAs into FIFA’s pyramid and awarded 
them with financial assistance to support football in their respective countries, the 
associations showed gratitude to Havelange by supporting him with their votes in five of his 
re-election campaigns.1318  
The issue with the financial assistance is that though a relatively small amount of funding 
goes a long way in smaller nations, the money that is earmarked for development projects 
can also be easily misallocated into the private pockets of football officials. Yet, this problem 
of misappropriated funds appears to be one of limited concern to FIFA. When Blatter took 
the reins, between 1998 and 2014, $1.1 billion was disbursed by FIFA to the various MAs 
and confederations.1319 It has been suggested that the grants were designed to corrupt the 
MAs since they were used to satisfy campaign promises, and the payments were made 
irrespective of whether or not they would be diverted for personal use.1320 Although FIFA 
                                                 
1312 DiCenso, Matthew B. "A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and Its Repercussions for Football's Governing 
Body." BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 40 (2017): 115. p/131 
1313 Bean, Bruce W. "FIFA Is Corruption: What Is to be Done." Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 27 (2018): 197 p/211 
1314 DiCenso, Matthew B. "A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and Its Repercussions for Football's Governing 
Body." BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 40 (2017): 131-3 
1315 Tomlinson, Alan. "The supreme leader sails on: Leadership, ethics and governance in FIFA." Sport in Society 17, no. 
9 (2014): 1155-1169. p/1161 
1316 Andrews, Matthew, and Peter Harrington. "Off pitch: football's financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them." (2016) CID Working Paper No. 311. p/2 
1317 DiCenso, Matthew B. "A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and Its Repercussions for Football's Governing 
Body." BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 40 (2017): 132-3 
1318 Bean, Bruce W. "FIFA Is Corruption: What Is to be Done." Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 27 (2018): 197 p/211 
1319 Conn, David. The Fall of the House of FIFA. Random House, 2017. p/63. Cited in Bean, Bruce W. "FIFA Is Corruption: 
What Is to be Done." Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 27 (2018): 197 p/212 
1320 Bean, Bruce W. "FIFA Is Corruption: What Is to be Done." Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 27 (2018): 197 p/212 
181 
 
may not consider the diverted funds as a serious breach to its practices and operations, the 
funds perpetuate illicit practices within football, thereby leading to more significant 
problems of match-fixing, money laundering, and ultimately, human rights related problems 
like trafficking.1321 Ruggie stated that the lack of financial integrity at FIFA is itself a 
foundational source of human rights risks for those involved in the sport, as issues such as 
bribery and corruption enable the involved parties to evade their legal and contractual 
requirements to their participants, including the requirements related to the protection of 
their human rights.1322 
Conflicts of Interest 
FIFA’s billions of dollars in untaxed revenues attracts a wide range of interests1323 and its 
fair share of associated conflicts, as several FIFA officials prioritise their personal interests 
over the good of the organisation.1324 There are common trends of conflicting interests at 
FIFA that are reflected through key personnel chasing self-interests, high salaries, bonuses, 
and prolonged tenures as board members. 1325 Even though these trends underline the self-
serving environment at FIFA, they are also trends seen at other SGBs which have regulatory 
authority and simultaneously control their own commercial activities with relatively limited 
supervision.1326 FIFA officials have been involved in illicit actions in the projects associated 
with football,1327 and also in the decision-making processes leading to the selection of host 
venues and the selling of media rights for football competitions.1328  FIFA officials have been 
accused of rigging bids for the World Cup and accepting bribes in exchange for marketing 
and broadcast contracts.1329 
A key illustration of these conflicting interests is the case of Jack Warner. Warner was vice 
president of FIFA and president of CONCACAF and the Caribbean Football Union 
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(CFU). 1330  Warner was accused of receiving bribes and siphoning money on several 
occasions during his tenure to support national bids to host World Cups and to deliver votes 
for FIFA presidential candidates.1331  Prior to the 2010 World Cup, and to secure his votes 
(and that of his bloc of MAs under the CFU), Warner received and pocketed sums totalling 
$10 million from South African representatives. This money was reportedly meant for a 
“diaspora legacy programme to develop football in the Caribbean region.”1332 Warner also 
received a bribe from the former president of the Asian Football Confederation, Mohamed 
Bin Hammam, for his support in Hammam’s bid to become the next FIFA president.1333 The 
Warner example is symptomatic of FIFA as an organisation and its corruptible personnel in 
top positions of power and influence.1334 The pervasiveness of Warner’s actions run deep 
through FIFA,1335 and it showcases the general acceptance of the way FIFA operates as being 
"normal".1336  
FIFA MAs and related personnel are also culpable in the organisation’s corrupt practices. 
The MAs at times adopt adverse rent seeking behaviours to capitalise on the economic 
impact of hosting major sporting events. With the significant development consequences and 
investments associated with hosting a competition like the World Cup, 1337 MAs have been 
accused of promoting their own self-interest at the expense of football.1338 The scramble for 
profit making opportunities related to the World Cup (e.g., television rights and other 
economic investments) increases the incentive for corrupt persons and MAs to seek rents 
through hosting the competition, subsequently feeding other corrupt practices and 
procedures within FIFA.1339  For instance, in Brazil, a significant sum of the country’s 
infrastructural spending for the 2014 World Cup was diverted/captured by “illicit” activities 
like overpricing and accounting irregularities. 1340  In addition, the Qatari government 
promised to invest $10 billion locally ahead of the 2022 World Cup,1341 which are funds that 
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could have been used for more long-term improvements to the host country, but the rent-
seekers within the MAs have instead chosen to use football as an avenue to make profit.1342   
FIFA as an organisation, can also be accused of conflicting interests which contradict its 
purported social responsibility and ethical principles.1343 For example, on two occasions 
during the preparations for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, FIFA ignored the people’s 
interests for its own benefit. First, when many families were evacuated from their homes in 
favour of the World Cup constructions, the families were moved without compensation. 
Second, FIFA forced the Brazilian government to overturn its laws around the sale of alcohol 
within football stadiums, so that its alcohol partner Budweiser could sell beers during the 
tournament. 1344  
Conclusion 
The evaluation of the aspects of regulation revealed that the social and systemic factors are 
significant enough to undermine the efficacy of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies. The social 
factors showed that the push and pull dynamics result in the young African players having 
an innate desire to migrate to Europe to achieve socio-economic betterment through football. 
The absence of legal routes to migrate subsequently leads the aspiring footballers into the 
hands of unscrupulous persons looking to traffic and exploit them. The systemic factors 
affecting the performance of FIFA’s policies then revealed that data deficits are a general 
problem in forming pertinent anti-trafficking regulations. However, the efforts of the UN 
and its member states, and the practices introduced at international level to bridge the 
knowledge gap in relation to the occurrence of the problem, are in stark contrast to the 
practices being adopted by FIFA. In FIFA’s regulatory regime, there is no adequate data on 
the trafficking problem, even though the organisation has admitted the problem does exist. 
Therefore, FIFA’s ability to adequately regulate against football trafficking, considering the 
absence of data, is questionable. 
In evaluating FIFA as the assessed party, the structural factors showed that corruption at 
FIFA is a longstanding problem and is one that has resulted in several negative externalities 
for the general public. FIFA’s corrupted structure, its practices and benefits as an NPO, and 
its one member one vote policies, have combined to provide an environment in which 
problems like money laundering, match fixing, and human trafficking, are all allowed to 
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thrive. The conflicts of interest amongst senior personnel at the organisation results in the 
diversion of essential funds that would help local communities and reduce the risk factors 
and vulnerabilities of child players. Yet, FIFA remains largely unmoved by these reports. 
185 
 
Chapter 7 - EVALUATING FIFA’S REGULATIONS - DECENTRED REGIMES 
(LEGITIMACY & ACCOUNTABILITY) 
Baldwin and others posited that there is often a difficulty for evaluators when assessing the 
policy performance of decentred regimes1345 (where the regulators are autonomous from the 
state1346), because of the regulatory structure of these bodies. Black and Prosser1347 proffered 
that to counter such difficulties during an evaluation, the dominant actor in the decentred 
regime should be assessed by yardsticks which determine if the organisation’s practices are 
legitimate and accountable.1348 Black argued that all regulators, but particularly non-state 
regulators, need legitimacy to motivate behavioural responses amongst their regulatees.1349 
Unlike state-based regulators whose actions are supported by law, private regulators cannot 
rely on the authority of law to motivate their regulatees to change their behaviours, or to 
behave in a certain way.1350 Thus, the decentred bodies need to be seen as legitimate and 
accountable by its regulatees to ensure policy compliance. To translate these regulatory 
prerequisites to the analysis of FIFA, the organisation is required to be legitimate and 
accountable for its regulations and anti-trafficking policies to have the desired impact in the 
regime. Black reasoned that there are four challenges which should be addressed when 
assessing the legitimacy and accountability of a decentred body.1351 These are: 
1) Functional challenges: Relate to the problem of coordination, as organisations 
within a regulatory regime may have complex interdependencies and lack a central 
locus of authority. This means that in decentred regimes, there may not be a body 
whose role it is to coordinate the activities of the multiple participants.1352 
2) Systemic challenges: With a plethora of normative orders (i.e., both state and non-
state regulations being applicable) the challenge would be in identifying what 
regulatory norms should be considered as “law” and which should not.1353 
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3) Democratic challenges: These arise from issues of representation, such as when 
identifying who should be involved in the decision-making process, and to whom the 
regulatory body is accountable to, and how.1354 
4) Normative challenges: These stem from concerns as to the goals and operations of 
the regulatory regime. For example, in identifying the overriding “good” that is being 
pursued through the adopted regulatory policy.1355 
In FIFA’s regulatory regime, there is no uncertainty relating to complex interdependencies 
or a lacking central locus, as FIFA does not share authority with state actors and maintains 
a monopolistic control of all regulatory matters related to football. Equally, considering 
FIFA’s position as the dominant actor, norms from the organisation are deemed as “law” 
within football’s regulatory environment. Therefore, both the functional and systemic 
challenges mentioned by Black are of limited importance within the context of determining 
if FIFA is legitimate and accountable. Although significant questions could be posed about 
FIFA through the democratic challenge (who is represented in the decision-making, and who 
is the organisation accountable to?) and the normative challenge (is there an overarching 
good being pursued by FIFA’s policies?).  
Discussions relating to the democratic and normative challenges will help to ascertain if 
FIFA is a legitimate and accountable organisation able to bring about the necessary 
behaviour change amongst its regulatees. However, prior to discussing these challenges, 
Black asserts that the evaluator ought to have an appreciation of the organisation being 
assessed, and  a core understanding of what it means to be legitimate and accountable within 
a decentred regime.1356 To appreciate the nature of the organisation, Prosser explained that 
an inter-institutional mapping out of the ‘regulatory space’ would help achieve such an 
understanding of the body being assessed, as it will highlight the inter-relationships between 
the regulators and the regulated in the regime.1357 The previous discussion about football’s 
regulatory space and the role of FIFA subscribes to Prosser’s assertion of mapping out the 
inter-relationships within the space. The discussions revealed FIFA as a transnational private 
regulator with monopoly powers over the sport, and as the dominant actor in the space.1358  
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Thus, in line with Black’s assertion, the key question becomes, what does it mean to be 
legitimate and accountable in a decentred regime? 
7.1 WHAT IS LEGITIMACY? 
Wolf once asked, “what makes public authority exercised by private actors in the sphere 
beyond the state legitimate authority?”.1359 Legitimate regulatory authority in a decentred 
regime can be said to exist when there is “a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norm.”1360 Hence, for the actions of the controlling body in the decentred regime 
to be deemed as desirable and thereby legitimate, the actions of the body should be rooted 
in acceptance and “active support” from its regulatees, thereby enabling it to institute the 
necessary behaviour change.1361 It can be surmised that, particularly for non-state actors such 
as FIFA, for the organisation’s anti-trafficking policies to cause the requisite change amongst 
its regulatees, the regulatees (and others affected by FIFA’s regulatory actions) should accept 
the policies and show active support for its introduction. This would not only further FIFA’s 
claim to being legitimate, but it will also aid policy compliance between the FIFA members 
and non-members associated with the sport. 
Notwithstanding the presence or absence of the acceptance and active support elements of a 
claim to legitimacy, FIFA alleges it is a legitimate organisation on account of two main 
factors. Firstly, the implicit delegation1362 of powers caused by the state’s refusal to regulate 
sport.1363 FIFA, in filling the regulatory gap left by nation states and international law,1364 
assumed responsibility and gained recognition for the application of its special expertise as 
a ‘legitimate’ TPR within football’s regulatory space.1365 However, it has been argued that 
this alone is not enough to ascribe unfettered legitimacy to FIFA, because in general, TPRs 
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who control the space owing to the state’s failure to regulate are known to lack 
legitimacy.1366 Secondly, FIFA claims to be legitimate through its democratic representation 
where it purports to serve the shared interests of its members1367 by exercising its consent-
based power as a ‘voluntary association’.1368 Yet, there remain key questions about the 
voluntary/autonomous nature of the submission to FIFA’s authority.  
Furthermore, Schwab argued that SGBs typically do not have regulatory legitimacy, due to: 
(1) the acknowledged failures and conflicts of interest within the 
governance of SGBs  
(2) the lack of involvement of the people bound by the law in the making 
of it – the players 
(3) the ongoing violation of the rights of players – especially vulnerable 
players who are, naturally, the ones most in need of the protection 
of the law; and  
(4) the law’s lack of recognition and compliance with internationally 
recognised human rights.1369  
These four assertions by Schwab can be adapted to elements of both the democratic (points 
1 and 2) and normative (points 3 and 4) challenges which would justify why FIFA may lack 
legitimacy. (1) Though the conflicting interests displayed within FIFA’s governance may 
not be enough to deny FIFA’s legitimacy on its own,1370 the combination of the conflicting 
interests with other structural factors affecting FIFA’s policy performance could serve to 
undermine the democratic processes and claims to legitimacy sought by the organisation. (2) 
If FIFA’s democratic processes do not involve or accommodate for the perspective of the 
players who are bound by the laws, the organisation’s policies may not be accepted or 
supported by the regulatees, which could lead to non-compliance. Additionally, Schwab’s 
points about (3) the violation of the rights of players, and (4) the deficient recognition of 
international human rights standards, are both crucial elements which would weaken the 
argument of an “overriding good” within FIFA’s policy provisions and would grossly 
undermine the existence of legitimacy within the regime.  
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7.2 WHAT IS ACCOUNTABILITY? 
Accountability is defined as an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to 
account for one's actions.1371 It is a central feature of most global governance structures, 
including that of centred and decentred regulatory regimes. 1372  Accountability is often 
mentioned as a joint concern with legitimacy, because accountability is considered to be a 
critical element in the construction and contestation of legitimacy. 1373  The UK Better 
Regulation Task Force (BRTF) suggested that to be accountable “regulators must be able to 
justify decisions and be subject to public scrutiny”.1374 Black asserted that being accountable 
is agreeing to subject one’s self to relationships of external scrutiny which can have 
consequences.1375 Though the BRTF and Black agree that to be accountable there must be 
some form of external scrutiny, the ‘consequences’ element added by Black for unachieved 
regulatory outcomes is of specific importance here. Stiglitz concurred and explained that 
accountability requires that:  
 (1) people are given certain objectives; (2) there is a reliable way of assessing 
whether they have met those objectives; and (3) consequences exist for both the case 
in which they have done what they were supposed to do and the case in which they 
have not done so.1376 
Though sports law scholars like Foster have since argued that SGBs have limited 
accountability because of their set-up as private entities,1377 FIFA’s regulatory regime is 
going to be examined in line with Stiglitz’s assertion. Translating Stiglitz’s criteria within 
the context of FIFA: (1) FIFA’s objective is to regulate all matters relating to football, 
including the provision of efficient anti-trafficking policies to safeguard children within the 
sport; (2) various methods have been adopted in this thesis to assess whether FIFA’s policies 
have met their intended objective of curbing football trafficking; and (3) having established 
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that FIFA’s policies have not achieved its policy objective of providing the requisite 
protections, the key question is then are there any consequences for FIFA?  
It is noted that the consequences for unmet regulatory objectives are often imposed through 
accountability mechanisms which keep the controlling regulatory body in check. Pielke 
provided a list of such accountability mechanisms which could apply to an organisation such 
as FIFA. 1378  These included the hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market, peer, 
reputational,1379 and the democratic means of accountability.1380 Due to accountability being 
part of the democratic challenges facing FIFA as a decentred body,1381 the accountability 
mechanisms will be discussed in relation to their significance for FIFA’s claim to legitimacy. 
7.3 DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE 
The democratic challenge affects the legitimacy and accountability of decentred regimes 
because it purports that the regulatees may not be adequately represented during the 
decision-making process, thus making the regulatory body unaccountable. 1382  If strong 
democratic structures existed, the regulatees would be more willing to accept the regulatory 
actions of the controlling body, which would improve policy performance. However, Foster 
argued that many SGBs remain undemocratic because they exclude fans, players, and 
representatives of communities, from formal representation within their decision-making 
processes.1383 This was echoed by Schwab, who stated that players and the people bound by 
the laws of SGBs may not always be represented in the democratic structures of the 
associations,1384 thereby limiting the SGBs’ claim to legitimacy.  
7.3.1 Representation at FIFA 
The actions of a TPR could be legitimised through its representative democracy and 
organisational structure.1385 Though the principles of representative democracy are usually 
applied to nation states, in the case of FIFA, the organisation’s claim to legitimacy through 
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this means is furthered by its backing from Swiss legislation which recognises FIFA as a 
voluntary association that is structured democratically. 1386  It can be argued that a real 
representative democracy at FIFA would not only improve the quality of governance and 
reduce corruption and instances of conflicting interests1387 within the organisation,1388 but it 
could also limit the occurrence of the negative externalities which affect the wider public. 
For FIFA, the voluntary will of its members and participants to be a part of the organisation 
is the primary basis for its claim to representative democracy, and legitimacy by extension. 
However, the autonomous nature of the relationship between FIFA and its members has been 
called a “quaint legal fiction”.1389 In practice, the MAs are given little choice in exercising 
their autonomy. Without complying with FIFA’s stipulations, parties would be unable to 
engage with professional football in any capacity, considering FIFA’s exclusive control of 
market access to the sport.1390 Therefore, there is a general acceptance of FIFA’s regulatory 
actions by both its members and non-members affected by its policies.1391 Still, the players 
at the bottom of FIFA’s pyramidal structure, who are bound by the organisation in order to 
keep participating in the sport, 1392  are unable to make direct contributions to FIFA’s 
decision-making processes.1393  Though football has been dubbed as a “representational 
sport”,1394 it is evident that FIFA’s ability to democratically represent its regulatees is itself 
hindered by FIFA’s organisational structure. Freeburn underlined this issue, as he contended 
that: 
A system in which a participant votes for someone, who votes for someone else, and 
perhaps so on, through various other layers until someone is ultimately elected to a 
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body that makes the rules, cannot masquerade as an expression of the democratic 
will of the participant.1395 
Despite FIFA lacking legitimacy, the organisation is left to continually operate in this 
manner because it is the only “sheriff in town”,1396 for which all actors looking to engage in 
organised football must submit, regardless of whether or not they are adequately represented 
within FIFA’s processes. When FIFA’s regulatory powers are actioned without the requisite 
legitimacy, this increases the likelihood of wider negative externalities in the regime, leading 
to circumstances which endangers players and leaves them susceptible to issues which could 
include trafficking and exploitation.  
7.3.2 Accountability and FIFA 
Accountability is a vital element in the contestation of legitimacy1397 and is also a key part 
of the democratic challenge. As a TPR and major economic player with ties to nearly every 
part of the world, achieving accountability within FIFA, its leaders, and members, should be 
a critical aspect of the organisation’s aims.1398 When SGBs lack accountability it increases 
the possibility of abuse, and it could also damage the reputation of the organisation as public 
mistrust may be engendered. 1399 It has been argued that accountability remains a perennial 
problem for FIFA,1400 as the organisation has reportedly shown a “disdain for any attempt to 
bring accountability” 1401  to its ranks. Some have claimed that FIFA does not have a 
willingness to make its key personnel accountable,1402 as it has “manoeuvred itself into a 
position where none of its members can really be prosecuted for much of anything.”1403  
With these issues, Boudreaux and others summarised the work of Pielke, 1404  who had 
concluded that there were no clear institutional processes whereby FIFA’s president and its 
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MAs could be held accountable for their actions.1405 It was then contended that this lack of 
an obvious means to hold FIFA accountable stemmed from its organisational 
structure.1406FIFA’s structure makes it immune to various accountability mechanisms,1407 
thereby allowing FIFA to do as it wishes with little consequences.1408 According to Stiglitz’s 
earlier assertion, this lack of consequences itself alludes to a system with no 
accountability. 1409  Nevertheless, in his analysis, Pielke mentioned and applied several 
accountability mechanisms to examine the applicability of these within the context of FIFA, 
and to determine how and why FIFA could be termed as being unaccountable. 
The first mechanism is the hierarchical accountability, this is the power that superiors have 
over subordinates within an organisation, allowing them to impose accountability in such 
circumstances.1410 With FIFA’s pyramidal structure, it has historically lacked this type of 
accountability,1411 as the president and leaders who sit at the top have been accused of 
corruption1412 and accountability failings in the midst of various scandals.1413 The constant 
allegations of corruption suggests that FIFA may not have held itself to its own self-
professed standards1414 and its supposed commitment to transparency.1415 The transparency 
problems at FIFA have arguably been worsened by systems such as its one member one vote 
policy,1416 and also the general corruptibility of the MAs and top personnel.1417 Though 
issues of corruption often plague SGBs with an influx of money such as FIFA, consequently 
making them unaccountable,1418 FIFA’s governance scandals in particular have highlighted 
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a significant lack of transparency and accountability.1419 These circumstances contribute to 
the football environment where illicit dealings and opaque arrangements are common,1420 
which consequently puts several players involved in the sport at risk of exploitation due to 
bad governance.  
The absence of a sound democratic structure at FIFA has contributed to a deficient 
democratic accountability.1421 FIFA exercises its TPR regulatory powers without being 
democratically accountable to the wider public who are affected by its decisions, unlike 
public bodies at the domestic levels of governance.1422 Olsen noted that to be democratically 
accountable, the democratic structure of the organisation should be based on appointed 
officials being accountable to those who elected them.1423 And as Freeburn argued, with 
FIFA’s layered democratic system,1424 there is likely to be an absence of accountability 
between the elected and the electorate. 
With FIFA’s wide spectrum of involved actors1425 and its laws which affect both its members 
and non-members, the legal accountability mechanism would have ensured that FIFA is 
held accountable by virtue of its registration as a non-profit organisation (NPO) based in 
Switzerland.1426  Wrage had stated that “the only entity capable of insisting on transparency 
[and accountability] at FIFA is the Swiss government”,1427 and Bruce echoed this point as 
he asserted that “the most direct and effective means of imposing accountability upon FIFA 
would be through the Swiss government.”1428 However, the Swiss, despite their direct formal 
authority, have often chosen to be “notoriously laissez-faire” 1429  in their approach to 
overseeing FIFA.1430  The relaxed approach is consequential of the significant financial 
                                                 
1419 DiCenso, Matthew B. "A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and Its Repercussions for Football's Governing 
Body." BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 40 (2017): 115. p/115 
1420 Andrews, Matthew, and Peter Harrington. "Off pitch: football's financial integrity weaknesses, and how to strengthen 
them." (2016) CID Working Paper No. 311. p/82-3 
1421 Meier, Henk Erik, and Borja Garcia. "Protecting private transnational authority against public intervention: FIFA's 
power over national governments." Public Administration 93, no. 4 (2015): 890-906. p/890 
1422 Wolf, Klaus Dieter. "The non-existence of private self-regulation in the transnational sphere and its implications for 
the responsibility to procure legitimacy: The case of the lex sportiva." Global Constitutionalism 3, no. 3 (2014): 275-309. 
p/276 & 286-7 
1423 Olsen, Johan P. Democratic accountability, political order, and change: Exploring accountability processes in an era 
of European transformation. Oxford University Press, 2017. 
1424 Freeburn, Lloyd. "The fiction of democracy in FIFA’s governance of football and the case of Football Federation 
Australia." The International Sports Law Journal (2019): 1-21. p/10 
1425 Pieth, Mark. “Governing FIFA: Concept paper and report.” Geneva, Switzerland: Federation Internationale de Football 
Association (2011) Cited in Pielke Jr, Roger. "How can FIFA be held accountable?" Sport management review 16, no. 3 
(2013): 255-267. p/258 
1426 Jorge, Guillermo. "Fixing FIFA: The Experience of the Independent Governance Committee." Sw. J. Int'l L.21 (2014): 
165. p/165 
1427 Bean, Bruce W. "FIFA Is Corruption: What Is to be Done." Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 27 (2018): 197. p/251 
1428 Bean, Bruce W. "The Perfect Crime: FIFA and the Absence of Accountability in Switzerland." Md. J. Int'l L. 32 (2017): 
68. p/117 
1429 DiCenso, Matthew B. "A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and Its Repercussions for Football's Governing 
Body." BC Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 40 (2017): 115. p/131 
1430 Pielke Jr, Roger. "How can FIFA be held accountable?" Sport management review 16, no. 3 (2013): 255-267. p/262 
195 
 
contributions FIFA (and other SGBs registered in the country) make to the Swiss 
economy.1431 Additionally, FIFA’s registration as an NPO under Swiss law also forms the 
basis for the unaccountable practices and procedures of the organisation.1432 Unlike for-
profit organisations (FPOs) which claim accountability through their stakeholders, 1433 
democratic practices, and government regulations, NPOs with their diffuse and complex 
stakeholder relationships1434 are not subject to the same norms and practices that govern and 
ensure FPOs are accountable.1435 Due to there being less restrictions on NPOs, FIFA is not 
required under Swiss law to publish its financial accounts. 1436  This instrument of 
accountability is known as fiscal accountability. However, because many of FIFA’s fiscal 
decisions remain undisclosed,1437 the organisation continues to operate independent of state 
oversight. FIFA’s financial independence prevents the state from adopting a monetary 
incentive system, which is commonly used to hold other non-governmental bodies 
accountable.1438 Thus, FIFA’s fiscal independence makes this accountability mechanism 
unworkable.1439 
FIFA’s financial backers and commercial partners contribute billions to the organisation, 
thereby enabling FIFA to be financially independent. These contributions should ordinarily 
put the sponsors in a position where they are able to demand accountability from FIFA.1440 
This accountability mechanism is referred to as pressure from sponsors or market 
accountability. 1441  However, the practical impact of this accountability has also been 
ineffective. For example, in the aftermath of the selection of Russia and Qatar as World Cup 
host countries for 2018 and 2022 respectively, some major sponsors voiced their disdain for 
this decision, 1442 as Castrol, Continental, Johnson-Johnson, Sony, and Emirates announced 
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the end of their sponsorships with FIFA. 1443  Yet, the sponsorship gap meant that new 
companies which were not immediately recognisable in the west now had a big opportunity 
to come in and increase their branding via sponsoring FIFA. The sponsorship gap was soon 
filled by large state-controlled Russian company, Gazprom, and several other Chinese 
companies,1444 and in so doing limiting the potential effects of the market accountability 
mechanism. FIFA remained largely unaffected, whilst it continues to be affiliated with 
several other corporate giants such as Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Visa, and Adidas. These 
organisations all called for FIFA to address its internal issues in the wake of the previous 
corruption scandals,1445 but none of the sponsors were inclined to do more than issue public-
friendly statements of concern about FIFA’s practices.1446  
With football’s popularity across the globe, reputational accountability could also be used 
by the public to apply pressure on FIFA. The problem with this form of accountability is on 
the one hand, FIFA has often shown a lack of appreciation of its fiduciary duties to the wider 
consumers of football.1447 And on the other hand, the fans themselves are more concerned 
with “what happens on the pitch, and not in the smoky back rooms of football 
governance”.1448 Peer accountability implies that another SGB on FIFA’s level, such as the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), could be able to impose better accountability on 
FIFA. Then again, the IOC has itself been embroiled in corruption issues,1449 and suffers 
similar governance failings to FIFA. There is also no evidence to suggest that the IOC could 
apply this type of accountability to FIFA, or that FIFA has any degree of accountability to 
the IOC, in the first instance.1450  
Fundamentally, the core accountability that could be applied to FIFA is the supervisory 
accountability. 
Supervisory accountability 
This accountability can be interpreted on two levels.  
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The first level is when a nation state proposes to act in a direct supervisory role over its home 
FIFA Member Association,1451 i.e., the Spanish government seeking to control the affairs of 
the Spanish football federation. This accountability is frowned upon by FIFA, as its statutes 
discourage oversight and interference from nation states and allows FIFA to suspend 
governments who intervene in football matters.1452 There are several reasons why the states 
would rather comply with FIFA than go against the organisation’s statutes. For example, 
FIFA’s monopoly stranglehold over the sport; the socio-political, socio-cultural, and 
economic importance of football to various governments; the role football can (and 
continues to play) in identity politics; the global popularity of football and political leverage 
that comes with it;1453 the significance of a nation’s participation in international sporting 
competitions;1454 and, the important club goods FIFA provides to its MAs, of which the 
wider public/football consumers within the country could potentially benefit. 
Though these reasons provide a significant incentive for the state to comply with FIFA, there 
have been instances whereby nation states have stood up against the organisation. Such as, 
to address governance failures or to fight misconduct in their home MA1455 and impose more 
accountable and transparent practices.  Over the years, FIFA’s response to some of these 
challenges have included: First, in Greece, after FIFA’s intervention and meeting with 
representatives of the Greek government, the government watered down its initial proposals 
and left the Greek FA’s structure mostly unchanged. Satisfied with this opt-out, FIFA lifted 
the suspension of the Greek Football Association and national team.1456 Second, in Spain, 
after the Spanish government attempted to intervene in the matters of the Spanish FA (RFEF) 
through a court ruling, the RFEF threatened its own government with impending sanctions 
from FIFA. The RFEF underlined the supremacy of lex sportiva (sporting autonomy) over 
nation states, to show that Football associations themselves could escalate matters up to 
FIFA with confidence that FIFA would successfully exercise its powerful position and 
prevent state interference.1457 The Spanish government backed down to avoid conflict with 
FIFA, and this again highlighted FIFA’s ability to consistently defend its autonomy against 
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nation states 1458 by forcing governments to deviate from national paths of sports policy. 
These examples show that FIFA’s ability to threaten and/or suspend nation states continues 
to be an effective hindrance on the capacity of the supervisory accountability.  
The second level of the supervisory accountability is between FIFA and the absent 
supervision from nation states. Under general circumstances with private governing bodies 
which lack accountability, it often becomes the state’s responsibility to procure such 
legitimacy and accountability for the private body.1459 The state generally tries to resolve 
this by interfering and correcting the defaulting association through the imposition of 
constitutional norms on the private body.1460 This state interference is known as the public 
“shadow of hierarchy” (SoH).1461 However, contrary to other forms of private governance, 
the strength of the SoH is significantly diminished in the case of TPRs such as FIFA.1462 
This is as a result of FIFA’s financial independence, and the fact that the organisation 
provides a service for which there is no adequate substitute which the state authorities can 
provide.1463  
FIFA’s significant strength over nation states and its ability to limit effective state 
intervention1464 has meant that governments have very few, if any, tools at their disposal to 
hold FIFA accountable.1465 This lack of accountability but continued ‘victories’ against 
nation states (who often have legitimate grounds for intervention) could itself prove to be 
the undoing of FIFA and its private governance structure. 1466  Though supranational 
institutions such as the EU have previously been able to challenge the legitimacy and 
governance of football, 1467  it is clear that nation states and wider jurisdictions at the 
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international level will need to orchestrate their efforts if they want to put up a significant 
challenge to FIFA’s unaccountable practices. 1468  This is significant because FIFA’s 
governance failings have shown that it is incapable of mitigating global and large-scale 
problems affecting football,1469 such as football trafficking. Therefore, better collaboration 
and externally imposed accountability of FIFA could bring about greater legitimacy within 
football’s regulatory space,1470 which may lead to better performing FIFA policies in the 
long term. 
7.4 NORMATIVE CHALLENGE 
A normative element to regulatory actions is similarly important to the claim of 
legitimacy.1471 According to Black, normative legitimacy exists when the assessment of an 
organisation’s regulatory policies affirm that the policy actions are “the right thing to do” or 
that there is an overriding good to the regulations.1472 The normativity challenge stems from 
concerns as to the means of determining this overriding “good”. 1473  Incorporating the 
challenge within the context of analysing FIFA, the question then becomes “what is the 
overriding good that is sought by FIFA’s policy responses to football trafficking?”. To 
answer this, Schwab’s earlier assertion is important. He argued that SGBs lacked legitimacy 
(and by extension, normativity) because of the violations of the rights of players, especially 
vulnerable players, and the lack of recognition of wider human rights standards within 
sport.1474 This means that an organisation cannot claim to be pursuing an overriding good 
when its policy actions provide avenues for involved actors to suffer human rights abuses. 
7.4.1 Violation of rights of players 
For FIFA to be legitimate it must respect and fulfil the fundamental human rights of the 
people who are often the subject of its laws and reside at the bottom of its organisational 
structure, such as the child players and vulnerable participants who are most in need of these 
protections. However, as McGee argued, sport (including football) remains one of the few 
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domains that has been impermeable to the legal and moral obligations needed to regulate 
and safeguard the welfare of minors.1475 This inability to protect the child players underlines 
the argument that FIFA (and other SGBs) lack legitimacy, as they have systemically failed 
to embed and sufficiently reflect the rights of players within their governance framework.1476 
Consequently leading to the increased instances of human rights violations within sport.  
Though FIFA has established its anti-trafficking rules, 1477  there remains significant 
weaknesses within its regulatory system that has undermined its ability to protect child 
players from these human rights violations. FIFA’s regulations do not cover the 
unscrupulous intermediaries, unsanctioned football academies, and the known trafficking 
routes by which the traffickers and smugglers constantly use to transport the vulnerable 
players.1478 Such significant regulatory gaps have allowed unscrupulous intermediaries to 
continue facilitating the trafficking and transfer of players from the poor countries in West 
Africa to lower-tier European and Asian clubs.1479 The players’ rights are violated as they 
find themselves in conditions akin to slavery and servitude, being cajoled into signing 
exploitative professional contracts, which as Giulianotti notes, are “little more than 
indentured labour”.1480 
Despite these violations, there are limited options for players to seek respite through legal 
frameworks and systems of justice.1481 FIFA, like other SGBs, maintains the barriers which 
prevents athletes and participants from seeking external non-sport specific judicial remedies, 
even when the internal arbitral systems have failed to adequately protect them.1482 It has been 
argued that such a restriction on the rights of athletes to choose between a Judge from a court 
of law, and a sports arbitral tribunal, could itself constitute as being a violation of the players’ 
rights.1483 Such a violation could prove detrimental to players, as though the sports arbitral 
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bodies may be well equipped to resolve a great variety of sports-related disputes, the arbitral 
avenues lack the requisite expertise needed to handle the wider human rights problems that 
are faced by athletes, which also intertwine with sport.1484 
Fundamentally, the violations on the rights of players transpires in football because the 
environment fostered by FIFA is primarily concerned with the goals of profit maximisation, 
commercialisation of football, and the continued commodification of child athletes, rather 
than prioritising the safety of all child participants involved with the sport. Arguably, FIFA’s 
profit-oriented goals underline the absence of an overriding good that is being sought by the 
organisation’s policy responses to football trafficking thus far. 
7.4.2 Lack of recognition of wider human rights 
In 2017, FIFA released its first Human Rights Policy, which showed its commitment to 
“respecting human rights in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNGPs).”1485A relevant excerpt from the policy is: 
In the often short-lived career of a professional football player, the human 
rights of players may be at risk, particularly in connection with their 
employment and transfer[...] Moreover, the strong desire to become a 
professional footballer and the lure of financial benefits can create fertile 
ground for adverse human rights impacts, in particular with regard to 
trafficking and other issues relating to minors. FIFA is committed to helping 
protect the rights of football players and will continually evaluate existing 
regulations and processes and, if necessary, consider additional measures to 
address the respective risks.1486 
Considering FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations have been described as “demonstrably 
ineffective”, 1487  it can be said that the organisation has reneged on its claim to adopt 
additional measures that would address the football trafficking related risks faced by the 
vulnerable minors. The UNGPs on Business and Human Rights provided that, FIFA (like all 
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business enterprises) should respect human rights, avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others, and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.1488  
The UNGPs state that the responsibility of an entity such as FIFA would include (a) avoiding 
causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities, and to 
address such impacts when they occur; and (b) seeking to prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations.1489 Likewise, the UNESCO Charter 
imposes clear obligations on employers of players in sport, stating that “International labour 
conventions and basic human rights must be respected, in particular to avoid child labour 
and human trafficking.”1490  Seeing as this thesis has at different points established the 
contributory role FIFA has played towards the current football trafficking circumstances, it 
could therefore be argued that FIFA has not complied with the internationally recognised 
human rights standards.1491 In FIFA’s human rights policy, the organisation admits to the 
occurrence of football trafficking. Yet, contrary to the UNGPs on Human rights and the 
UNESCO Charter, FIFA has neither limited the causative circumstances in the sport which 
fosters the adverse human rights, child labour, and human trafficking of the foreign minors, 
and neither has FIFA introduced tailored policies which adequately prevent these adverse 
human rights problems from occurring within the sport. 
The adverse human rights risks faced by the child participants in sport are also felt by people 
involved in the delivery of major sporting events (MSEs) such as the World Cup.1492 FIFA 
claims it takes human rights into account in the selection of host countries for its MSEs,1493 
and that it expects compliance with international standards from all host countries for its 
events.1494 However, the organisation has so far omitted to take measures to ensure that Qatar 
was upholding its commitments on the health and safety involved in its preparations for the 
2022 World Cup.1495 During the Qatar preparations, there have been documented instances 
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of several workers dying,1496 workers being forced to work without contracts, workers being 
paid poorly, and workers being subjected to debt bondage.1497 When then FIFA president, 
Sepp Blatter, was confronted about these Qatar incidents, he replied that the Qatar 
government and companies are responsible for their workers’ rights, and “we can’t interfere 
in the workers unions”.1498 Though, FIFA were not averse to interfering in the operations of 
the Brazilian government when there was a commercial risk to the organisation.1499  
These instances reflect a contradiction to FIFA’s social responsibility and undermines the 
perceived values of integrity and transparency1500  the organisation claims to stand by.1501 In 
addition, the normativity/overriding good of FIFA’s regulatory actions remain questionable. 
This is considering the loopholes in the policies that were supposed to prevent aspiring child 
players from facing adverse human rights conditions and precarious circumstances, as well 
as the inadequate response to the detrimental situations faced by the workers taking part in 
the organisation of the FIFA World Cup. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the importance of legitimacy and accountability for decentred 
regimes, to ensure that the operations of non-state bodies are conducted in a manner which 
the regulatees in the regime accept and support, as this will aid policy compliance. It was 
argued that to achieve such acceptance and support, the regulatory body would need to have 
strong democratic and normative elements in its operations. This will ensure that policy 
provisions are representative of the intentions of the involved actors, and that the regulators 
seek to achieve an overriding good. 
FIFA’s claim to democratic legitimacy and accountability are hampered by its organisational 
structure which hinders it from adequately representing the intentions of all who are affected 
by its policy actions within its decision-making process. Also, due to its structure, its strength 
as a TPR, and with its monopoly over the sport, several accountability mechanisms are 
unworkable when applied specifically to FIFA. In addition, with the violations to players’ 
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rights and FIFA’s policy provisions failing to action its claim to adopt additional measures 
needed to safeguard vulnerable minors from football trafficking, these circumstances 
combine to undermine FIFA’s claim to normativity, and ultimately, legitimacy. Thus, with 
legitimacy and accountability both absent, FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies are consequently 
hindered by the non-compliant practices of its regulatees and their unchanged behaviours, 
which continuously puts the young African players at risk of trafficking and exploitation. 
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Chapter 8 - FIFA’S REGULATORY FAILURE? 
Identifying the success of regulation is said to be harder than failure,1502 but this does not 
mean that ascertaining regulatory failure is a straightforward task, as evaluators often 
disagree on what would constitute “failure” and what its causes could be.1503 On the one 
hand, failure could be based on the different understandings of the regulatory objectives and 
the view of the problem being regulated against. This would often involve a comparison 
between the desired outcomes of the policy and the real-life impact of the provisions.1504 On 
the other hand, failure could be determined by the effect a range of factors could have had 
on policy performance.1505 With one view arguing that failure would depend on the outcome 
of the policy and the second basing failure on the extent to which the policy is resistant to 
wider factors of influence, Baldwin and others asserted that when discussing regulatory 
failure the evaluator ought to know what they are comparing failure to.1506 They contended 
that to ascertain failure and possible comparisons, two broad approaches to explaining 
regulatory failure could be adopted, the rhetorical and the analytical approaches.1507 
8.1 RHETORICAL APPROACH 
The rhetorical approach draws on the work by the economist Albert Hirschman, and it looks 
at the common arguments used to dispute the effectiveness of regulation. Baldwin and others 
explained that this approach is divided into three: futility, jeopardy, and perversity. Of the 
three, the perversity argument (when the regulatory policy achieves the exact opposite of the 
intended outcomes1508) is of least importance within the context of this analysis and therefore 
will not be expanded upon. 
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8.1.1 Futility  
The futility argument provides that regulation fails when there is no change to the existing 
problem, nor is there a change in behaviours, despite the regulatory intervention.1509 The 
data deficits in human trafficking research would ordinarily prevent an assured answer to the 
question “has there been any change to the existing problem?”, however the range of 
evaluations conducted within this study suggests that the football trafficking problem may 
be largely unchanged. With the results from the assessment into FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policy objectives (its impact and outcomes), discussing aspects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
regulations, analysing FIFA as the assessed party, and examining the legitimacy and 
accountability practices used within the organisation, it is evident that FIFA’s members and 
non-members are still involved in football trafficking despite the organisation’s provisions 
restricting this. The analysis into FIFA revealed that its anti-trafficking policies contain 
loopholes which several teams and unscrupulous persons have been able to utilise to 
contravene FIFA’s regulations on ITMs. With the unchanged behaviours and the effect of 
the internal and external factors impacting on FIFA’s policy performance, it can be argued 
that FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have not resulted in any significant change to the current 
football trafficking problem. 
8.1.2 Jeopardy 
The jeopardy argument provides that regulatory failure occurs when the deployment of the 
regulatory tool leads to undesirable side-effects.1510 These side-effects could be detrimental 
to the regulatory system, the members within the regime,1511 and also non-members, due to 
the wide implications of regulatory actions which are able to affect a variety of persons both 
directly and indirectly.1512 In FIFA’s regime, the undesirable side-effects are caused by the 
organisation’s regulatory loopholes, structural problems, and the lack of legitimacy and 
accountability. These circumstances have inadvertently established the culture of self-
aggrandisement, unaccountability, and corruption seen at FIFA.1513 Whereas, FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policy provisions have been unable to limit the risk factors faced by the 
vulnerable minors, and in some cases, the policies have exacerbated the problem,1514 leading 
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the minors to face even more precarious circumstances as part of the football environment. 
It is argued that with the continued endangerment of child players as a side-effect of FIFA’s 
regulatory actions, the organisation’s anti-trafficking policies can also be said to have failed 
in accordance with the jeopardy argument of this rhetorical approach to regulatory failure. 
8.2 ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
The analytical approach explains regulatory failure through four accounts which show how 
regulation might fail or has failed in different contexts.1515 These include the public interest, 
interest group, ideas based, and institutional theories accounts of regulatory failure. 
8.2.1 Public Interest accounts 
The public interest account argues that regulatory failure occurs through two main elements. 
The first centres on the determination of the true public interest of the regulatory actions, 
and the second concerns the competing conceptions of public interest and how this could 
lead to regulatory failure.1516  
With the first element, based on the analysis of FIFA and its dominant position in the space, 
it is clear that as a TPR the organisation has a responsibility to produce policies which do 
not negatively affect the wider public, even though said policies may not have been created 
for the express benefit of the public. Foster noted that SGBs should be able to recognise a 
wider public interest in the way in which sport is run.1517 However, the absent democratic 
representation for the wider public who are affected by FIFA’s policies limits the 
organisation’s claim to recognising matters of wider public interest. Also, with prior 
discussions about the lack of recognition (and compliance) with internationally recognised 
human rights standards, 1518  it could be reasoned that FIFA’s deficient legitimacy and 
accountability practices also hinders the public interestedness of its regulatory actions. This 
then leads to deficiencies within FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies and ultimately, the 
occurrence of regulatory failure. 
Regarding the second element, because of football’s regulatory space and FIFA’s control, it 
is argued that there are no competing conceptions of what public interest policies would 
entail in the regime. FIFA solely determines the policy direction, and it is therefore 
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responsible for regulatory failures caused by its omission to account for wider public interest 
issues within its anti-trafficking and human rights related policies.  
8.2.2 Interest group theories 
Most of the literature on regulatory failure focuses on the extent to which regulatory actions 
are made based on the concerns of an interest group, rather than actions being taken in pursuit 
of an overarching good. 1519  This occurrence is known as regulatory capture and was 
proposed by Stigler. 1520  Capture theory presumes an understanding of the public 
interestedness of regulatory provisions, 1521  and considers that capture occurs when 
regulatory policies are directed away from the public’s interest in favour of specific vested 
interests1522 of regulatees in a regime.1523 Lodge and Wegrich argued that regulatory capture 
is in fact the most prominent explanation for regulatory failure.1524  
There are two main views of regulatory capture. The classic view purports that regulations 
are “captured” (or there is a “power grab”1525) either by those the regulators are supposed to 
regulate (such as industries, professions, businesses, or other interest groups) or by the 
bureaucrats or legislators who write and control the regulation (such as politicians1526 and 
other powerful parties1527).1528 The capturing party is subsequently able to influence the 
impartiality of regulations,1529 and can shape the regulatory processes to meet its specific 
needs.1530 The second view of regulatory capture is the non-materialist view or “cognitive” 
capture theory.1531 In this view, emphasis is placed on the interest-group’s capture of the 
administrative process through the “creeping colonisation of ideas”, as the regulators are 
influenced to think like the regulated industry.1532 This influence over regulators can result 
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in weaker enforcement1533 of regulatory standards,1534 and a biased supply of benefits to an 
interest group.1535  
The cognitive capture theory, in particular, can be linked to FIFA. An illustrative example 
is the unique relationship between the state regulator (Switzerland) and the regulated body 
(FIFA).1536 FIFA exerts its significant TPR authority over nation states, so much so that 
Switzerland chooses to adopt a laissez-faire approach to overseeing the organisation.1537 
This circumstance of limited oversight is in essence regulatory capture, as it evidences the 
conditions whereby the regulator (Switzerland) considers that it is not in its best interests to 
intervene and regulate a particular industry or body (FIFA)1538 because it fears it has more 
to lose than to gain if it actively supervises the body.1539 Regarding potential losses, FIFA 
has the capacity to penalise the Swiss national football team if Switzerland interferes in 
football matters. FIFA could also propose a “regulator switch”, 1540 as it could threaten to 
relocate to the United Arab Emirates as a means of influencing the Switzerland government 
to act in its favour.1541  If FIFA relocated, the organisation would no longer be subjected to 
the regulatory stipulations of Switzerland, and most importantly for the Swiss, the country 
would lose out on millions of investments in its economy. However, whilst FIFA remains 
under Swiss authority, the lacking accountability, limited regulatory legitimacy, and the 
absent consequences for FIFA’s policy failures, are all indicative of regulatory capture. With 
capture alone inferring a high probability of regulatory failure, FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
regime has arguably failed. 
8.2.3 Ideas based account 
This account explains that regulatory failure can occur when the ideas, beliefs, and 
worldviews that shape the regulatory approach and delivery are flawed.1542 For example: 
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Regulations can fail when the underlying cause–effect assumptions regarding the problem 
are defective.1543 This defective view could be as a result of inadequate data and lacking 
information regarding a problem, which some refer to as the “bounded rationality” that 
affects the decision-making of regulators.1544 The data deficits considered earlier underlines 
the fact that FIFA’s regulatory regime and its anti-trafficking policies are affected by this 
bounded rationality.1545 Though the issue with data deficits is a common theme with human 
trafficking regulatory responses, FIFA’s regime has been particularly ineffective in bridging 
the knowledge gap and providing appropriate insights into the cause-and-effect links 
associated with football trafficking. Consequently, FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have 
performed poorly in limiting the problem, thereby increasing the propensity of regulatory 
failure. 
It is also held that defective cause-and-effect assumptions could be as a result of an 
incomplete understanding of the regulatory environment,1546 as when regulators display an 
uncertainty and ambiguity of knowledge with their decisions, this inhibits them from 
choosing the most appropriate regulatory action that is tailored to tackling the problem.1547 
Within FIFA’s regime, it is argued that there is in fact a complete understanding of the 
regulatory environment, owing to FIFA’s dominant position within the space. Yet, FIFA has 
still shown an ambiguity with its anti-trafficking approach, e.g., through its initial 
deregulation on the rules for intermediaries which put several child players at an increased 
risk of exploitation.1548 Accordingly, it is contended that FIFA has been unable to adopt an 
appropriate regulatory approach to limiting football trafficking, considering the various 
loopholes in the regime and the inability of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies to achieve their 
intended outcome. 
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Regulatory failure could occur because of the chosen regulatory instrument. This is said to 
be the case when a regulatory choice is made based on limited knowledge of the problem,1549 
or an underestimation of the scope of the problem. 1550  FIFA’s current anti-trafficking 
responses suggest that though the organisation acknowledges the existence of football 
trafficking, its subsequent regulations allude to a lack of in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of the problem, such as through its defective cause and effect assumptions. 
Still, FIFA has displayed an over-confidence in its anti-trafficking regulatory strategy,1551 
believing that its provisions can curb football trafficking if applied strictly.1552 However, as 
the evaluation of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies revealed, the regulations have been 
ineffective in safeguarding child players from trafficking and exploitation. This is arguably 
due to FIFA’s choice of regulatory strategy recurrently underestimating the true scope of the 
problem. Therefore, without first attaining an in-depth understanding of football trafficking, 
FIFA’s over-confidence in its regulatory instruments has hindered the organisation from 
being able to effectively predict (and prevent) the adverse side-effects of its policies,1553 such 
as the subsequent prevalence of football trafficking. 
Compliance assumptions 
Regulatory failure could occur as a result of misguided assumptions about regulatory 
compliance.1554 Meaning, a gap between what regulators assume is taking place, and what 
the regulatees are doing in practice, could itself be described as regulatory failure. In the 
context of FIFA and football trafficking, FIFA believes that when trafficking and illicit 
transfers involving minors occur with its member parties, it has the mechanisms in place to 
intervene, prevent, and/or sanction defaulting teams, as seen with the Midtjylland and Cadiz 
cases. However, the analysis of FIFA’s members showed that, like other industries, its 
members are at times prone to creative compliance (side-stepping regulatory provisions 
without breaking them) and even non-compliance.1555 Nevertheless, FIFA assumes that its 
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policies are adept at dealing with football trafficking by its members, and that the key issue 
with non-compliance comes from the unscrupulous intermediaries and rogue agents on the 
periphery of the sport (non-members) who conduct the crime outside FIFA’s jurisdiction.1556 
Whilst, generally speaking, the non-members are often the parties most connected to football 
trafficking, FIFA’s compliance assumption here misses an essential link between its 
members and non-members who collectively benefit when a trafficked player becomes a 
football star. The prior evaluation of FIFA revealed that there is an apparent gap between 
the theoretical view and practical aspects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations. As FIFA’s 
overriding perspective on compliance is not representative of the profit maximisation 
practices of its own regulatees, who continually look for means to benefit from the enhanced 
commodification of child players within the sport.  
Confusion of approaches 
Regulatory failure may occur when there is a confusion of approaches to tackling a problem, 
as this could lead to frictions in communicative practices and uncertainties in the 
implementation of provisions.1557 Having discussed FIFA’s over-confidence with its anti-
trafficking regulations, FIFA cannot be simultaneously accused of adopting a confused 
approach. However, the communicative practices and uncertainties around the 
implementation of certain FIFA policies arguably aligns the regime with this account of 
regulatory failure. 
With the communicative practices, Black explained that controlling bodies at times use false 
communication to manipulate perceptions of their activities and the performance of their 
regulations, in order to serve their interests and enhance their claim to legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public.1558 In the past, FIFA has attempted to manipulate perceptions about its regime, 
such as in the aftermath of the corruption scandals.1559 At the time, FIFA used positive-
sounding press releases and well publicised moves about reform as a calculated step to 
assuage public outrage1560 and allay further fears of corruption,1561 whilst the organisation 
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remained “more or less unchanged.”1562 Similar to this, FIFA has also publicly claimed to 
be playing an active role in the protection of vulnerable child players from adverse human 
rights issues and child trafficking.1563 Yet, as the analysis in this thesis has shown, there are 
continued reports of human rights abuses and the violation of players’ rights, whilst FIFA’s 
regulations which were once described as “demonstrably ineffective”,1564 have not been 
updated to account for the increased vulnerabilities of the at-risk children involved with the 
sport. Moreover, this absence of amendments to its policy approach occurs despite FIFA’s 
initial commitment to adopting additional measures to prevent football trafficking in its 
human rights policy.1565 
Concerning uncertainties with implementation, this takes place mainly when there is 
resource inadequacy (insufficient resources provided for the effective enforcement of 
regulation1566), or a failure of oversight and monitoring over policy enforcement.1567 With 
the billions of dollars football is able to generate,1568 resource inadequacy is generally not an 
issue with the top echelons of the industry. However, it is the corruption and mismanagement 
of available resources, and the prevalence of conflicting interests, that arguably leads to the 
ineffective enforcement of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies, and the consequent assertion of 
regulatory failure. Additionally, the failure to monitor the practical enforcement of FIFA’s 
anti-trafficking policies is evidenced by the significant data deficits in the field. This means 
that FIFA is neither aware of the true extent of the problem, nor is the organisation cognisant 
of the specific impact of its anti-trafficking policies in limiting and/or furthering the 
occurrence of football trafficking.  
Changing challenges 
Regulatory failure can take place when policies are inflexible and unable to be adapted to 
new circumstances in the regime,1569 even when under-performing.1570  This is similarly 
referred to as an assessment and modification failing. Analysis in this thesis has shown that 
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FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies have underperformed in affording the at-risk minors with 
requisite protections from exploitation within the sport. However, the organisation is yet to 
modify its regulatory responses to reflect the ever-changing football environment in which 
trafficking occurs. It is argued that FIFA’s regulatory approach has been inflexible because 
the organisation has been unable to adequately self-assess the performance of its policies, in 
order to mitigate the regulatory loopholes which its members and non-members frequently 
adopt to conduct illicit ITMs. This inability to adjust and adapt to such changing challenges 
suggests that FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations have failed. 
8.2.4 Institutional theories 
This theory illustrates that institutional structures and arrangements which shape regulation 
could be the reason for regulatory failure.1571 To elucidate, the structure of a regulatory body, 
the type of organisation being assessed, and the complexity of the regulatory space where 
the organisation operates, and the inter- and intra-institutional pressures that exist in the 
space, are all aspects of an organisation’s institutional structure and arrangement which 
could lead and contribute to uncertain effects within the regulatory regime, and ultimately 
result in regulatory failure.1572  
Baldwin and others explained that a special feature of the institutional theories view of 
regulatory failure is the occurrence of “drift”, and they explained this as the tendency of a 
regulatory system to lose focus and direction.1573 This loss of focus can be linked to Baldwin 
and others’ supplemental point about regulatory failure potentially occurring due to the 
overlapping of different organisational understandings, and the frictions that this may 
cause.1574 It is subsequently argued that the institutional and organisational understanding 
overlaps, and the consequent loss of focus, are mostly seen in decentred regulatory regimes 
where there could be multiple actors involved within the regulatory space. Therefore, the 
complexity of the regulatory space in decentred regimes may lead to uncertain outcomes, 
diverse assumptions about a problem, the misallocation of resources owing to the number of 
different actors involved in the space,1575 and potentially, regulatory failure. 
Prior discussions in this thesis have evidenced that within football’s regulatory space, and 
unlike in other decentred regimes, there is no “complexity” in football’s space as FIFA 
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maintains a stranglehold over the sport as the monopoly power and dominant actor in 
football’s regulatory environment. 1576  Ordinarily, the absence of a complexity within 
football’s space may have negated the argument that FIFA’s regulatory regime has failed 
under this institutional theories account of failure. However, it is contended that it is this 
absence of complexity in the space that has contributed significantly to the lack of legitimacy 
and accountability seen across FIFA’s institutional structures and arrangements, and which 
has also affected the efficacy and performance of the organisation’s anti-trafficking policies. 
With the current institutional set-up in and around football, FIFA faces no substantive 
external scrutiny for the failure and ineffectiveness of its anti-trafficking policies. Thus, the 
institutional structures and arrangements of FIFA, the wider football environment, and the 
external SGBs, NGOs, and IGOs who are interested parties in the governance of the sport, 
have all contributed to the present situation whereby FIFA continues to produce regulations 
which are unable to adequately protect a select number of its child participants, without the 
organisation suffering any consequences for its ineffectual policy actions. As a result, it 
should be noted that these deficient policies could potentially have a longstanding 
detrimental effect on FIFA’s regulatory regime, as if unchanged, the organisation’s practices 
will continue to place African and other foreign football minors at an increased risk of 
trafficking and exploitation in and through the sport. 
Conclusion 
The discussions on the rhetorical and analytical approaches to determining regulatory failure 
suggest that core elements within FIFA’s regime and its anti-trafficking regulations could 
be said to have failed. The rhetorical approach considered that, firstly, FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies have arguably been futile in limiting the problem. And secondly, that the 
FIFA policies align with the jeopardy argument because of the negative externalities and 
precarious circumstances which young players continue to face as a consequence of FIFA’s 
rules.  
With the analytical approach, the analysis showed that the public interestedness of FIFA’s 
regulations is questionable, and that the occurrence of regulatory capture suggests that 
regulatory failure has taken place. Under the ideas-based account, it was established that 
FIFA’s cause-effect assumptions on football trafficking are defective; the choice of 
regulatory instruments have been ill-informed; its compliance assumptions are detrimental 
to optimal regulatory performance considering the real-time practices of FIFA’s regulatees; 
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the false communicative practices and uncertainties with policy implementation and 
enforcement suggests that there is a confused approach to tackling the problem; and the 
inadaptability of FIFA’s policies to the changing challenges in football’s regulatory 
environment implies that FIFA’s regulations have failed. The institutional approach then 
highlighted how FIFA’s private legal order as the dominant actor within football’s regulatory 
space has affected the performance of its anti-trafficking policies, and has contributed to the 
occurrence of regulatory failure in the regime. Ultimately, the circumstances discussed 
through the rhetorical and analytical approaches illustrate why FIFA’s policies have failed 
to protect vulnerable foreign minors involved in the sport from trafficking and subsequent 
exploitation. Thereby leading to the question, what are the possible remedies for FIFA’s 




Chapter 9 - REMEDYING FIFA’S REGULATORY FAILURE 
(ORGANISATIONAL AND GOVERNANCE REFORM) 
The regulatory literature is important for understanding and applying the remedies for 
regulatory failure to the specific context of FIFA and football’s regulatory environment. 
Regulatory theory provides that there are three means for countering regulatory failure: 
Coordination, hybrid solutions, and organisational reform. Of the three remedies, 
organisational reform is considered to be the most applicable remedy within the context of 
this study and for recommending solutions to FIFA.  
The organisational reform remedy aims to counter the bounded rationality (or data deficits) 
that leads regulators to produce policies based on limited information about a problem.1577 
Organisational reform proposes that regulatory bodies introduce a ‘challenge function’ into 
their operations to counteract the informational issues.1578 The role of the challenger is to 
improve the organisation’s legitimacy and accountability practices by holding it responsible 
for its regulatory actions from within. It is held that the challenger is the one that can “speak 
truth to power”, by posing tough questions and analysing proposed regulatory interventions 
to identify potential derailments that could hinder the achievement of the regulatory 
objectives.1579 The organisational reform remedy has the capacity to improve the quality and 
performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations, as the reforms could persuade FIFA’s 
regulatees to be more compliant with the organisation’s policy interventions.  
9.1 ORGANISATIONAL REFORM AT FIFA 
To offset the bounded rationality in FIFA’s anti-trafficking decision-making, its regulatory 
processes should be more open, rigorous, transparent, and able to encourage active 
participation (by members and non-members) so it can better assess a range of views and 
viable solutions for the problem.1580  It is contended that this can be achieved if FIFA 
undergoes significant structural reform. 
FIFA was established prior to the rapid growth, politicisation, and commercialisation of 
football, but the structure of the organisation is not yet tailored to handle the growing 
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political and administrative challenges that exists in the sport today.1581 Some have argued 
that FIFA’s structure still resembles an amateur association, as opposed to a socially 
responsible global sports body.1582 Over the years, FIFA has undergone several reforms due 
to pressures from the media, civil society organisations, and the public, especially in the 
aftermath of the corruption scandals.1583 However, many argue that FIFA’s reforms have 
exemplified the difference between “good governance” and “good-looking governance”.1584 
FIFA views reforms as an opportunity to restore confidence and win back corporate 
sponsors,1585 thus, it is often more interested in the good publicity that a reform effort might 
provide, rather than in attaining actual change through reform.1586 
FIFA’s reforms have been relatively ineffective because the recommendations provided 
through the reforms have either been rejected, partially ignored, or have fallen apart.1587  This 
has led to questions about FIFA’s capacity to adequately reform itself.1588 Significant reform 
(imposed through internal or external channels) is therefore needed to enable FIFA to 
improve the quality of its governance and its regulatory practices.1589 This will reduce the 
instances of corruption and conflicting interests within the SGB,1590 thereby allowing FIFA 
to become a more legitimate and accountable organisation.  
9.1.1 The Challenge Function and Transparency 
The challenger in organisational reform can either be a person or committee.1591 They are 
tasked with analysing proposed regulatory interventions to identify potential derailments,1592 
and to prevent the reoccurrence of regulatory failure. 
At FIFA, it is recommended that the challenger be a combination of independent personnel 
and committee members able to question its regulations. With FIFA’s dominance of 
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football’s regulatory space, the organisation has been notoriously insular in the way it 
operates.1593  Thus, commentators in and around football’s regulatory environment have 
called for FIFA to adopt the same measures used by corporate governance and international 
public bodies, such as introducing more oversight by independent directors.1594 Foster noted 
that the use of independent personnel is a common response to failures of governance by 
international sporting federations, as it is often an attempt to preserve their regime’s 
integrity.1595 In the past, FIFA have introduced independent chairs for its Ethics Committee 
and its Audit and Compliance Committee, and FIFA have also hired individuals to serve in 
executive positions who had not previously been involved in the sport. 1596  These 
independent persons were purportedly brought to remedy and reform FIFA’s governance 
failings. However, FIFA’s organisational structure limited the effect that the independent 
personnel/challengers could have. 
First, the independent personnel were selected by FIFA officials/insiders, are accountable to 
the insiders, and ultimately remain beholden to them.1597  In addition, FIFA’s president 
Gianni Infantino, arranged for the FIFA Executive Council to have the power to not only 
appoint but also to fire the “independent” members on the Ethics and Audit Committees.1598 
This meant that the independent members were “factually deprived of their independence” 
and could have, at any time, become auxiliary agents of those they were brought in to 
supervise.1599 Secondly, the possibility that the independent personnel could be co-opted into 
corruptible FIFA practices undermines the general workability of this challenge function. 
As Bank argued, even the above-the-table payments and exorbitant salaries of committee 
members are sometimes enough to entice independent reformers to abandon their reform 
aims and collude with FIFA.1600 
Accordingly, to reform FIFA and institute a workable challenge function, there should be 
truly independent personnel not beholden to FIFA, as well as an oversight group composed 
of independent stakeholders.1601 The aim of the oversight group would be to encourage better 
stakeholder participation, and improve representation from all involved in football, such as 
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the players, football federations, sponsors, referees, and the global football-watching public 
who also deserve a voice in the decision-making processes.1602 Such representation will 
increase FIFA’s claim to being a legitimate organisation and will enhance the number of 
personnel and committees able to hold FIFA accountable internally. From an external 
perspective, the introduction of the oversight committee should coincide with more 
transparency and cooperation between governments, the EU, and FIFA, in this attempt to 
solve what is a global trafficking problem.1603  
Improving transparency across FIFA will not only limit the instances of corruption,1604 but 
could potentially have a domino effect on the rest of the footballing community. Football 
teams could be encouraged to be more transparent with their recruitment strategies,1605 and 
this will be beneficial in combatting the instances of forced labour and child trafficking seen 
amidst football’s supply chains. With more independent personnel, an oversight group, and 
better transparency practices within FIFA, the effects of the bounded rationality which exists 
in this area will be limited. This is because the information relevant to football trafficking 
will be more accurate, understandable, and accessible to the regulators. Thereby allowing 
the challenge function to accomplish its intended purpose of identifying problems with 
FIFA’s proposed regulatory actions and preventing further instances of failure. 
9.1.2 Rebalancing and Redistribution 
The rebalancing of power and redistribution of football’s wealth should also be a key part of 
FIFA’s reform. Currently, smaller countries and MAs have not benefitted from their 
representation and voting rights at FIFA, with data showing that though these smaller and 
poorer MAs have gained more votes, they have lost out more on football revenue and 
participation.1606 Hence, there is a need for the power model within FIFA to be rebalanced 
in a manner that is more representative of the football landscape. For example, there could 
be an imposition of a population-based voting system which would ensure that smaller 
countries are no longer disproportionately favoured during FIFA’s elections.1607 This would 
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reduce the corruptibility of the smaller MAs and will enable more FIFA officials to vote 
based on merit rather than on self-interests. 
Another means of achieving this rebalance is for FIFA to bridge, rather than perpetuate, the 
gap between the rich and poor football nations.1608 To bridge the economic gap, there would 
need to be better redistribution of football’s resources. Such as, by offering better financial 
compensation to the poorer African nations who lose their most talented players to European 
teams for undervalued transfer sums.1609 Advocate-General Lenz equally argued for the 
better redistribution of football’s wealth in Bosman, emphasising that this is important to 
prevent the richest clubs from monopolising the best players. 1610  With better wealth 
redistribution, the African MAs and clubs would be able to invest in their local youth training 
academies, build larger facilities, and develop other talented players.1611 The better structure 
and facilities would improve the quality of African football and help “give back” to the 
communities where the talented players are regularly sourced. These improvements could 
also lead to reduced instances of football trafficking, as the migratory disposition of the 
African players could be diminished. 
9.2 LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
There is an increased need for FIFA to input and maintain better legitimacy and 
accountability practices. This will improve FIFA’s policy performance and will enable the 
organisation to achieve more compliant behaviour from its regulatees and others affected by 
its regime. As Ruggie argued, “organisations with a footprint as large as FIFA’s … must 
become more transparent and more accountable”.1612 Still, there are significant questions 
about how FIFA can be reformed into a more legitimate organisation,1613 considering FIFA’s 
“decades of unaccountability”,1614 and its dominant position in football’s regulatory space. 
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Thus, it is reasoned that a comprehensive strategy must include both internal and external 
mechanisms able to enhance legitimacy and institute better accountability at FIFA.  
9.2.1 Enhancing Legitimacy 
Often, when a private body assumes some public function through its regime, the State is 
still responsible to mitigate any problems of legitimation associated with the private 
organisation. Wolf called this occurrence an “external legitimation” by the State,1615 which 
is similar to the supervisory accountability/Shadow of Hierarchy argument considered 
earlier.1616 However, FIFA’s structure and its insularity has meant that the organisation is 
generally able to withstand external oversight and scrutiny of its regulations.1617 But with 
problems like football trafficking affecting the regime, there are underlying arguments that 
football has grown to the extent that it is impossible to manage the sport only through FIFA’s 
‘Laws of the Game’,1618 and that the State needs to intervene to stop the self-regulation of 
FIFA.1619 
Though Foster argues that legitimation must be internally produced by those directly 
involved in private self-regulation,1620 and even though State interference may ordinarily be 
averse to the autonomy of sport, it is argued that FIFA needs significant external legitimation 
to curtail this specific transnational problem of football trafficking. The intervention and 
supervision of FIFA should be a concerted approach which merges actions, oversight, and 
pressures from nation states, governmental institutions, and intergovernmental bodies, to 
impose an enhanced external legitimacy on FIFA. This will ensure that FIFA creates more 
effective policies, ones which recognise and comply with international human rights 
standards, and are able to target the elimination of forced labour within football.1621 
9.2.2 Instituting better Accountability 
FIFA sits free from several mechanisms of accountability that are employed to hold 
international organisations to account.1622 Thus, FIFA has operated without consequences 
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for the non-achievement of regulatory objectives, even where such objectives are the 
safeguarding of child players within the sport. Therefore, to remedy the failure of FIFA’s 
anti-trafficking regulations, it is contended that there ought to be a considerable challenge to 
FIFA’s lack of accountability.1623 Switzerland remains in the best position to pioneer the 
improvement of accountability at FIFA,1624 due to FIFA’s articles of incorporation and its 
registration as an NPO in the country.1625 Although, for this increased accountability to take 
place, the Swiss authorities must do away with their laissez-faire and ineffective approach 
to monitoring FIFA.1626 As it is often argued that Swiss action is necessary before other 
forms of accountability can be effectively imposed on FIFA.1627 
Swiss authorities have previously collaborated with the US’ department of justice (DOJ) to 
force FIFA into significant internal reform.1628 On its own, the DOJ would have been unable 
to directly impose accountability upon FIFA1629 because FIFA exists outside the scope of its 
courts.1630 The DOJ thereby needed to collaborate with the Swiss authorities to have the 
requisite impact on FIFA.1631 This instance showed that nation states are increasingly more 
willing to intervene in FIFA matters, especially when there is a need to correct the internal 
governance failings within the organisation.1632 Additionally, nation States may choose to 
combine to have an “intergovernmental effect” able to impose accountability on FIFA, as 
occurred with the IOC.1633 Through the coalition, the authorities would be empowered to 
impose requisite consequences on FIFA, which will lay the foundation for a more concerted, 
collaborative, and considered approach to tackling football trafficking. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed how organisational reform and increased legitimacy and 
accountability at FIFA are potentially key remedies for the failure of FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
regulations. Organisational reform considered that regulatory bodies should introduce a 
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challenge function to counter the information problems/bounded rationality which affects 
their decision-making processes. Thereafter, it was recommended that the challenge function 
at FIFA be actioned by both independent personnel and a committee of stakeholders 
involved with the sport. A secondary aspect of organisational reform proffered that there be 
a rebalancing of powers within football, as well as a better redistribution of football’s wealth. 
The rebalancing and redistribution will help the struggling African teams and leagues in 
being more sustainable, which could potentially limit instances of football trafficking. 
Furthermore, it was argued that improving, instituting, and maintaining better legitimacy 
and accountability practices around FIFA, are essential tenets that will allow for the better 





Chapter 10 - CREATING EFFECTIVE ANTI-TRAFFICKING REGULATION 
Gaining an understanding of the core principles of “effective regulation” is essential, 
especially when trying to implement the principles as part of the formation of successful 
anti-trafficking policies. Scholars in regulatory theory note that effective regulation is often 
the outcome of significant dialogue with the actors within a regime.1634 The aim of the 
dialogue is to facilitate the unbiased participation of all stakeholders, allowing them to better 
analyse the advantages and limitations of proposed regulatory strategies.1635 The regulations 
produced through such dialogue will be more legitimate, as it would be representative of the 
intentions of the actors. This thereby increases the likelihood of policy compliance and 
effectiveness in the long-term. Though, with FIFA and football’s regulatory environment, it 
should be noted that in order to create effective anti-trafficking policies, merely having more 
dialogue with regulatees will not be enough to produce the requisite policies able to curtail 
the trafficking problem. The International Labour Office highlighted that there are several 
obstacles which regulators should be aware of when creating anti-trafficking policies: 
1. Insufficient preparation because initiatives have been launched 
before reliable information has been thoroughly reviewed; 
2. Missing links between cause and effect (often because of poor 
understanding of why or how things happen) that lead to a mismatch 
between the desired outcome and the actions taken to reach it; and 
3. False “common wisdoms” that recur throughout the various elements 
of project design or policy planning and that invariably lead to 
ineffective (or even harmful) outcomes.1636 
Elements of these three obstacles have been discussed at prior points within this thesis. 
First, with insufficient preparation and information deficits, the previous chapter showed 
that the organisational reform of FIFA and the inclusion of a challenge function could be 
used to counter this issue.1637 The stakeholders involved in deliberations should be aware 
that through their increased unbiased critique of FIFA’s proposed anti-trafficking policies, 
and by recommending and instituting key measures to bridge the knowledge gap pertaining 
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to the trafficking problem, this information obstacle will be bypassed. Moreover, further 
means of providing additional information for the policy deliberations will be discussed. 
This will centre on the recommendation that FIFA should adopt a (human rights) regulatory 
impact assessment, and that its anti-trafficking policies should be modelled on the 
“DREAM” regulatory framework. Both measures will improve the efficiency and quality of 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations. 
Second, the missing links with cause and effect and how these relate to the occurrence of 
football trafficking (and the failure of FIFA’s regulations) were discussed in chapter 8.1638 
As part of the open dialogue, FIFA and its stakeholders should be cognisant of the fact that 
various structural, systemic, and social factors have undermined FIFA’s prior anti-
trafficking policies. These factors overtly and covertly combine to cause a disparity between 
FIFA’s desired outcomes, and the actual outcomes, where football trafficking is still 
prevalent due to the increased commodification of foreign child players. Therefore, it is 
suggested that policy deliberations on effective anti-trafficking regulations must reflect a 
significant understanding of why, and how, football trafficking occurs. As Gallagher and 
Holmes argued, trafficking is “not simply a special organised criminal behaviour, but rather 
the predictable outcome of certain global political and economic realities.” 1639  Thus, 
effective anti-trafficking policies must be reflective of these realities, considering its 
influence on the understanding of the cause-and-effect links related to football trafficking. 
For example, the lack of safeguards and policies compliant with international human rights 
standards, the absence of safe routes to play professionally abroad for the African footballers, 
and the gross inequalities within and between footballing countries and leagues,1640 are all 
realities and factors that increase the vulnerabilities and tendency towards trafficking for the 
young players.  
Furthermore, Gallagher and Holmes again noted that with the transnationality of human 
trafficking, national criminal justice agencies (and in the context of this study, FIFA) should 
“understand the limits of their own influence and not be tricked into believing that they alone 
have the power to curb or even substantially disrupt this trade.”1641 Therefore, FIFA, by itself 
and in collaboration with other SGBs, NGOs, and IGOs, must find ways to reduce the 
inequalities and realities that lead to the trafficking of the young African players. Such as, 
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by instituting a child-centred approach to anti-trafficking regulations and introducing a legal 
route towards professional football for the African minors.  
Third, the dialogue on anti-trafficking policies should consider how to limit the effect of the 
false “common wisdoms” that exist in the field. Prior discussions uncovered how the 
bounded rationality and data deficits affected FIFA’s understanding of the problem,1642 
which subsequently limited the efficacy of its anti-trafficking policies. As, despite the 
emphasis FIFA places on protecting minors through an uncompromising stance within 
football, there remains a significant mismatch with the effectiveness of the policies in 
practice.1643 This is exemplified most by FIFA’s limitations on ITMs. Therefore, to counter 
the further impact of the false common wisdoms, it is argued that the proposed organisational 
reform of FIFA should be conducted in conjuncture with the adoption of the DREAM 
regulatory framework, and a child-centred approach that would enable the creation of more 
effective anti-trafficking policies.  
10.1 REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 
A key practice which should be adopted during the preliminary stages of FIFA’s anti-
trafficking decision-making policy process is the use of an economic appraisal, in the form 
of a regulatory impact assessment (RIA). 1644  RIAs are used to appraise the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of proposed policy strategies.1645 RIAs consider the full range 
of costs and benefits of regulatory policies,1646 in order to achieve a situation whereby the 
total benefits of a policy exceed its total costs, and the marginal benefits are equal to the 
marginal costs of the chosen strategy.1647 The RIA contains a summary of the problem, the 
rationale and justification behind choosing a particular intervention,1648 what the policy 
objectives being sought are, and what the intended impact in the regime is likely to be.1649 
Therefore, RIAs are crucial in improving the quality of regulations because they make 
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deliberations more transparent, they facilitate essential discussions regarding the ideal choice 
of regulatory strategy, 1650  and RIAs have a comprehensive structure and economic 
relevance.1651 
It is recommended that FIFA adopts the use of RIAs in its policy design because of the 
intersection between the economic incentives in football trafficking (for the unscrupulous 
persons and victims), and the costs involved in creating effective anti-trafficking policies. 
Analysis on football trafficking has shown that the finances and underlying benefits feeding 
the problem are not being matched by the financial support which should be dedicated to 
stopping it from within the football community.1652 Consequently, in balancing the costs, 
benefits, and intended impact of effective anti-trafficking policies, an RIA would be 
essential. For the RIA to have the necessary impact, it is important that FIFA does not view 
its use as merely a “box-ticking exercise”.1653 When used correctly, RIAs have the potential 
of being an instrument to bring about meaningful change in the regime, which is essential 
considering the need to quell the financial speculation and increased commodification of 
young African players within football.1654 By using RIAs as an element within the formation 
of effective anti-trafficking policies, the football minors will be provided with requisite 
protections from adverse human rights risks. This can arguably be achieved through the 
specific adoption of a human rights impact assessment (HRIA). 
HRIAs are complex surveys requiring an important level of human rights expertise, whereby 
stakeholder involvement and consultation of human rights experts is considered to be 
imperative to draw a holistic picture of the human rights situation in a regime.1655 HRIAs are 
recommended here as part of the overall calls from intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), 
NGOs, and some UN bodies, which have asked regulators to adopt a “human rights” 
approach to trafficking that prioritises and emphasises the protection of the victim.1656 
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HRIAs can be used to ensure that FIFA and its stakeholders take all feasible measures to 
address and prevent adverse human rights risks from occurring within its regime.1657  
Some have argued that FIFA now understands it can no longer be a passive player in respect 
of human rights in football.1658 As FIFA possesses the legal mechanisms to contribute to the 
improvement of human rights at a global level, whilst it has also been noted that SGBs 
generally have the capacity to exercise their regulatory powers in a way which proactively 
addresses the fundamental rights of participants transnationally. 1659  Therefore, as Latty 
argued, FIFA may prove to be more efficient in instituting vital human rights practices than 
other public international organisations.1660 Having previously discussed the transnationality 
and strength of FIFA’s legal authority,1661 the organisation possesses the capacity to have a 
longstanding impact in the fight against child trafficking, in sport, and also on a broader 
global scale. It is contended that FIFA can achieve this by using HRIAs to implement a 
human rights and child-centred approach to its anti-trafficking policy responses. HRIAs will 
enable FIFA’s policy deliberations to consider the possible unintended consequences of the 
policy intervention, and the HRIAs will be beneficial in enabling the regulators to identify 
(and curtail) any adverse human rights risks that could be caused through the purported 
policy action.1662 
In consideration of the HRIAs, it is recommended that FIFA should: 
 Expand its understanding of human trafficking. FIFA (and its partners) should 
ensure that trafficking and smuggling are not seen as only problems of migration or 
organised crime, 1663  but that trafficking is perceived as a by-product of global 
inequalities.  
 Be willing to assess the myriad of contextual factors and underlying systems that 
combine to cause human trafficking.1664 
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 Centre a durable anti-trafficking approach on the rights and needs of the victims of 
trafficking.1665 
 Institute avenues for robust engagement with external stakeholders who have human 
rights expertise.1666  
 Collaborate frequently and transparently with external IGOs and NGOs to ensure a 
concerted regulatory approach is being adopted. 
 Utilise internal but independent human rights monitors who can report to FIFA 
regularly to provide more insight and data on the trafficking problem, as well as 
updates on the performance of the anti-trafficking policies. 
 Have a dispute resolution body with specific human rights expertise to address 
human rights claims and provide more effective remedies to victims,1667 which 
should also coincide with increased sanctions to the identified perpetrators. 
10.2 THE “DREAM” FRAMEWORK 
Baldwin and others devised the DREAM framework (Detection, Responding, Enforcing, 
Assessing, and Modifying) as a viable means of attaining effective regulatory 
enforcement 1668  and ensuring that policy interventions are more than “symbolic 
gestures”. 1669  These enhanced regulatory practices will enable FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policies to have a greater impact in the regime. 
10.2.1 Detection 
Detection allows for the adequate inspection of activities within the space and involves the 
regulators gaining information on the undesirable or non-compliant behaviours occurring in 
the regime. 1670  Detection is key to achieving effective regulation and optimal policy 
performance, as an inability to detect non-compliant behaviour could itself undermine 
regulatory efficiency. For example, imposing sanctions such as fines or bans on non-
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compliant regulatees will have a limited effect if the probability of detecting such non-
compliant behaviour is negligible in the first instance.1671 
FIFA, in introducing more effective anti-trafficking policies, must consider the importance 
of being able to detect and address errant behaviours in its regime. However, detection of 
trafficking related activities has often proven to be an arduous task, caused by the 
complexities and clandestine nature of its occurrence. Since recruiters use disguises to 
conduct dealings in legal, semi-legal, or even an illegal manner,1672 traffickers and other 
persons involved in perpetrating the crime are difficult to identify,1673 whilst the victims of 
trafficking are often confused for irregular migrants. Whereas in football, the teams who 
benefit from the trafficking of young African players are not easily detected. The issue with 
detecting instances of trafficking within football is significant, and this is due to the blurred 
understanding of what would constitute as being “the trafficking of foreign football minors”, 
and merely, the “non-compliance of football clubs with FIFA’s rules on ITMs.” This blurred 
understanding significantly hinders the detection of the perpetrators and the victims 
involved. 
FIFA’s decision makers and policy deliberators must clarify their stance via the attainment 
of a thorough understanding of the problem. The regulators must ask themselves key 
questions about their regulatory approach, in order to improve the efficacy of policy actions 
and institute better mechanisms able to detect and differentiate when football trafficking can 
be said to have taken place within the regime. The questions may include: 
 What is the difference between breaching FIFA’s rules on ITMs and conducting 
football trafficking? 
 Who are the perpetrators of football trafficking and can they be adequately 
sanctioned for this offence?  
 Should there be more checks and verifications to ensure players are not victims of 
trafficking before they are allowed to take part in football trials abroad?  
 Can football teams be held liable for receiving, signing, and benefiting from the use 
of trafficked football labour?  
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 Can football teams be identified as part of the wider criminal network that aims to 
locate, transport, and exploit young African players for profit in Europe?  
FIFA must have a clear conception of what compliance with its anti-trafficking policies 
would entail and how it aims to detect the instances of non-compliant behaviour. With the 
latter, it is recommended that through better collaboration, more insight into the ways in 
which victims of trafficking are identified and treated, and with improved data on the 
problem and the routes taken to exploit the young players, FIFA would be able to better 
detect the occurrence of football trafficking. 
Better Collaboration 
The failure of FIFA’s regime to adequately detect and respond to instances of football 
trafficking suggests that there is a need for more international collaboration to effectively 
tackle the problem.1674 Moreover, it can be argued that football trafficking (as with other 
generic forms of trafficking) is not a problem that can be detected and addressed effectively 
in any one national jurisdiction, nor can it be solved by any one entity.1675 The nature and 
transnationality of its occurrence restricts the way victims can be identified and the way 
punishments can be imposed upon traffickers. In football trafficking, specifically, many 
aspects related to the occurrence of the crime falls outside the scope of FIFA’s direct 
authority. 1676  Thus, because of FIFA’s status as a private regulator and the associated 
limitations, a collaborative multi-agency approach will be essential to better detect, combat, 
and prevent the continued trafficking of persons within the sport.1677  
To have the requisite effect, the multi-agency approach should consist of greater networking, 
collaboration, coordination,1678 and co-operation between FIFA and other external bodies 
involved in human trafficking, who are able to operate in both a domestic and cross-border 
capacity. 1679  This collaborative element improves the ways in which non-compliant 
behaviour (within FIFA’s regime and on the periphery of the sport) can be detected and 
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subsequently combatted. Thus, FIFA is encouraged to form more effective coalitions and 
networks consisting of other sports governing bodies, wider institutions in the form of law 
enforcement agencies (police and prosecutors), civil society groups (social workers and 
service providers), IGOs and NGOs, who are all able to collaborate and improve the 
detection and consequent eradication of trafficking.1680 
FIFA should note that an effective collaborative approach should extend beyond the 
destination countries1681 to involve personnel and organisations in known source regions for 
the trafficking victims. As Gallinetti and Kassan argued, “to address the phenomenon of 
child trafficking in Africa adequately, a single, comprehensive approach across countries on 
the continent and between regions is required to provide the African child with the maximum 
protection against this global scourge.”1682 It is therefore essential that for FIFA’s anti-
trafficking policies to adequately detect and tackle the problem, the collaborative element 
should extend to Africa through the introduction of tailored policy actions which are relevant 
to the region. Actions could include an aggressive monitoring of football academies in the 
known source countries, and better monitoring of player movements through identified 
‘trade’ routes. 1683  Such actions will increase the likelihood of detecting non-compliant 
behaviour, which could then serve to deter unscrupulous intermediaries/agents (and teams) 
from further engaging in football trafficking. 
Identification of victims 
Efficient anti-trafficking regulations should be able to differentiate between a victim of 
trafficking and an irregular migrant. Victim identification is classed as an important aspect 
of an effective response to the occurrence of the crime, as the identification will enable the 
victims to benefit from requisite assistance, support, and protection obligations in the 
destination country. 1684  With FIFA’s collaborations with the interested external bodies, 
FIFA should similarly input policies and practices that reflect an importance in identifying 
the victims of football trafficking as victims, rather than illegal migrants. Through this, 
identified persons will be afforded the requisite protections for their circumstances rather 
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than for them to be treated as criminals and smuggled persons who are likely to be returned 
upon discovery. 1685  Better identification of the victims will contribute to an increased 
transparency around the crime, which will allow FIFA and its partners to better investigate, 
track, and prosecute the involved perpetrators.  
Outside football trafficking, the science of locating and identifying trafficked persons is one 
that has been described as a “frustratingly complex and inexact” process, and this has led to 
universally low rates of victim identification. 1686  These low levels of detection and 
identification lend weight to a growing perception that if there is reason to believe someone 
has been trafficked, then that person should be identified and treated as a victim, unless and 
until another determination is made regarding the individual’s status.1687 It is argued that by 
using this perception to institute more lenient identification policies through FIFA and its 
collaborating parties, there will be no negative effects to the organisation’s intended outcome 
of curbing trafficking. In fact, such a lenient policy identification process will enable FIFA 
to curtail trafficking and the possibility of re-trafficking by offering key assistance to several 
of the purported victims.1688  
Improving Data Collection 
Improving detection is often hindered by circumstances in the regime where breaching the 
rules are cheap and easily carried out in a clandestine manner, 1689  or where there are 
significant loopholes in the regulatory system that allow for non-compliance or creative 
compliance amidst the regulatees. It can be argued that these hindrances are more 
pronounced in the case of trafficking, considering it is an “invisible crime”1690 with its own 
detection and data difficulties. With problems in acquiring data on both the trafficking 
victims and the numerous undetected victims, 1691  it is evident that there are specific 
vulnerabilities in relation to data collection on the crime. This problem is arguably more 
pronounced in football, as the lack of data contributed to the failure of FIFA’s current anti-
trafficking policy responses. Consequently, FIFA must consider more innovative ways to 
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detect and gain data on football trafficking. Collecting accurate and comprehensive data on 
the victims of trafficking, and even concrete estimations on the number of undetected 
victims, are important facets needed to propose adequate anti-trafficking policy responses. 
This data can also act as a means of measuring the performance of subsequent anti-
trafficking policies, to determine how or if the policies have contributed towards the 
eradication of trafficking in the long run.1692 
Enhanced data and detection practices can only come about where there is significant 
investment from FIFA in information gathering systems and campaigns, as this will provide 
the systematic information needed1693 to plot the nature of the crime.1694 It is recommended 
that FIFA should introduce mechanisms to ensure that all its MAs and their associated teams 
operate in a transparent manner, allowing FIFA to better monitor the actions of its regulatees, 
and to collect essential and comprehensive data on football academies and player movements 
and registrations, as they occur within the sport. The improved information will aid the 
process of learning relevant on-the-ground information about football trafficking,1695 which 
will then contribute to the formation of more effective anti-trafficking policies capable of 
preventing the crime and protecting the vulnerable players from the precarious 
circumstances related to it. 
10.2.2 Responding 
Regulators should be able to react efficiently to the non-compliant and errant behaviours 
detected in the regime.1696 These responses can be broadly divided into four categories: 
1) Amending the rules: The regulators could determine that the rule serves no obvious 
function and should be replaced by a regulatory mixture of general and specific rules 
to better address the issue of non-compliance.1697 
2) Persuasion: Regulators may choose to persuade and advice regulatees that 
compliance with its policies is in their best interests.1698  
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3) Deterrence: Regulators may punish defaulting regulatees to act as a deterring factor 
and make them averse to breaking the rules.1699  
4) Reform: Regulators can attempt to make it impossible for the regulatees to break the 
rules through technical and structural means.1700  
The persuasion and deterrence responses will be discussed in line with the enforcement 
benchmark within the DREAM framework. Whereas the reform response has already been 
considered in the previous analysis on organisational reform.1701  This section considers 
“amending the rules” as a valid response to correcting regulatory failure. 
Since human trafficking is fuelled by profit and demand,1702 it is argued that an effective 
response to this occurrence would be to amend the rules and undermine the basis in which 
the traffickers use to make continued profits from this illicit activity.1703 For example, there 
should be added scrutiny on the backgrounds of young players being introduced into the 
footballing environment, and there should also be more transparency around the signing of 
young foreign players, with an obligation to disclose the transfer terms and conditions to 
ensure that there are no irregularities with the transfer. These stricter provisions will limit 
the profitability of the underground market for the aspiring players. Therefore, it is essential 
that FIFA should prioritise constant cooperation and collaboration where possible to ensure 
that all appropriate measures to fight trafficking in the sport are being taken.1704 
FIFA should note that an efficient response to trafficking is one where the child victim is not 
criminalised for offences relating to their being trafficked,1705 and that the protection of 
trafficked persons is a goal which should be prioritised in itself.1706 Article 2(b) of the UN 
Trafficking Protocol proposed that victims of trafficking should be protected “with full 
respect for their human rights”, and Article 6(5) of the same Protocol urged States to 
“endeavour to provide for the physical safety of victims of trafficking in persons while they 
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are within its territory”,1707 including the right to stay in the destination country and other 
protections.1708 
This victim support response promotes the safety of the victim1709 and restricts them from 
being deported. Victim support is particularly important because repatriation of child victims 
of trafficking may open them up to several risks upon returning to their home countries.1710 
This may include dangers of re-trafficking; fear of retaliation by the members of the 
trafficking organisation (or the unscrupulous persons) who sent them abroad in the first 
instance; fear of being found by the trafficking organisation for the non-payment of monies 
owed through debt bondage; lack of social and/or medical assistance in the country of origin; 
rejection and stigmatisation by the local community and/or by the victim’s family.1711 Thus, 
with these prevalent factors in the lives of a significant number of returned victims of 
trafficking, it is necessary that there be a regulatory response which protects the victims 
rather than deports them.1712  
Considering FIFA possesses regulatory powers and monetary reserves that are comparable 
to many nation states, it can be argued that FIFA (in collaboration with other external 
institutions) has the wherewithal to offer a victim support response to the occurrence of 
football trafficking. FIFA can cater to the specific needs and protections of the identified 
victims, and through its global position and the strength of its TPR, FIFA has the capacity 
to create alternative opportunities for the victims in football, or FIFA could form other 
avenues related to the sport that would allow the child to continue their development. These 
opportunities will serve to insulate the trafficked victims from other adverse human rights 
risks, situations of re-trafficking, and the possible dangers they may face upon return. 
10.2.3 Enforcement 
For FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulations to be effective, the organisation must be able to 
adequately apply the rules on the ground.1713 Haynes argued that anti-trafficking regulations 
are only useful to trafficked persons and threatening to violators if it is 
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implemented/enforced properly, and that the traffickers know that the rules are fully in 
force.1714 Thus, proper enforcement of policies could be the difference between regulatory 
failure or success.1715 Enforcement entails compelling regulatees to comply with regulatory 
policies through persuasion and deterrence approaches,1716 as regulators can directly respond 
to the non-compliant regulatees by invoking more interventionist or punitive modes of 
enforcement until regulatory compliance is achieved.1717 
Persuasion based approach 
Persuasion is generally considered as the preferable first step1718 to achieve more compliant 
behaviour.1719 Through this approach, it is recommended that FIFA (the regulator) should 
initially have open conversations with its MAs and their associated teams (the regulatees) to 
understand the complexities of compliance in the context of its anti-trafficking policies. With 
the open conversations, FIFA will be informed of the hindrances in its regime which may be 
preventing its regulatees from voluntarily complying with its anti-trafficking rules and 
standards.1720 For instance, FIFA could be briefed about the extent of the financial benefits 
on offer to the teams who engage in these illicit transactions. The conversations could inform 
FIFA of the extent of these ambiguous transactions involving foreign minors, alluding to 
how several teams maintain an element of deniability and culpability for the on-the-ground 
effects of their aggressive recruitment strategies. With this information, FIFA would be 
better placed to advice and dissuade its regulatees from continuously engaging in these 
harmful practices, whilst proffering alternative means for the regulatees to achieve their 
profitability goals, in a manner that does not put foreign football minors at an increased risk 
of exploitation. 
FIFA should consider the introduction of mechanisms which reduce the commodification of 
children within the sport, as this is an underlying factor that drives the football trafficking 
problem. The reduced profitability ascribed to child players could act as a disincentive for 
the teams who continually search for means to bypass FIFA’s policies, and it could limit the 
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benefits for the unscrupulous persons who are regularly engaged in the trafficking of young 
players. With the open discussions brought about through this persuasive approach, FIFA 
could also ascertain the compliance reaction of its regulatees towards its proposed anti-
trafficking provisions. However, the issue with adopting only a persuasive approach to 
achieving optimal anti-trafficking regulatory compliance is that constant persuasion between 
the regulators and regulatees is known to create a “cosy regulatory arrangement”, which may 
itself discourage compliance in the long-term.1721 To achieve compliance through effective 
enforcement, the regulators must have punishments which not only adequately reflect the 
gravity of the breach, but are also able to deter regulatees from future non-compliant and 
errant behaviours.  
Deterrence based approach 
Deterrence approaches are adopted when persuasion fails,1722 and its aim is to produce 
compliant behaviour by introducing increasingly severe punishments for non-compliance. 
Deterrence approaches should be used after the attempts to persuade, as when they are used 
before, 1723  the deterrence measures could be counter-productive 1724  or could lead to 
undesirable side-effects in the regime.1725 With FIFA and the effectiveness of its future anti-
trafficking regulations, a deterrence approach is essential to cope with the instances of 
deliberate rule avoidance,1726 and the creative compliance which takes place amidst FIFA’s 
regulatees. It is recommended that FIFA’s anti-trafficking deterrence approach should 
specifically target the finances involved in football trafficking, and that there should also be 
an increase in the severity of the punishments/sanctions imposed upon defaulting parties. 
Regarding the finances, FIFA’s policies should be able to dismantle the current 
circumstances in football which render significant benefits for rule breaking, as opposed to 
the light-handed punishments for non-compliant behaviour with the organisation’s anti-
trafficking policies. In FIFA’s regime, the cost of non-compliance with its anti-trafficking 
regulations should be higher than the prospective benefits for the teams who break the rules 
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to conduct ITMs beneath FIFA’s radar. The severity of these practices by FIFA’s regulatees 
- which inadvertently contributes to the underground trade in foreign minors, should be 
reflected with significant financial and cost related punishments for the defaulting teams and 
football personnel. The financial penalties could include points deduction; bans from 
football for persons involved or bans from international competitions for teams, denying 
them the possibility of attaining the considerable cash rewards on offer for good 
performance; more significant and long-term limitations and bans to the teams’ ability to 
recruit and trade within the football transfer market; and other substantial economic fines, 
asset forfeiture, 1727  and confiscations. 1728  These financial penalties will reflect the 
significance of FIFA’s stance on restricting the occurrence of football trafficking, and it 
could serve to effectively deter the perpetrators from such errant behaviours which puts child 
players at risk of exploitation. 
Concerning increased punishments, FIFA should adopt a severe punitive and prosecution-
oriented approach to achieving compliant behaviour, to effectively deter the perpetrators of 
trafficking (both within football and on the periphery of the sport). FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policies should have avenues for increased enforcement and punishments in collaboration 
with wider NGOs, IGOs, and nation States. FIFA’s current ‘soft’ approach to punishing 
defaulting teams engaged in the crime has not contributed to ending the wider culture of 
impunity for perpetrators of trafficking and those that use trafficked labour.1729 It is generally 
held that trafficking  (and football trafficking as a subset of the larger problem) is a billion-
dollar business with a seemingly endless supply of trafficable persons and users.1730 Yet, due 
to this wider culture of impunity that has also seeped into football, anti-trafficking 
regulations have seldom led to arrests, investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of the 
traffickers or those that use and exploit trafficked labour.1731 
Accordingly, for FIFA’s regulations to effectively deter perpetrators from engaging in this 
crime with vast benefits and supposedly little risks, FIFA should harness its external 
collaborations to introduce a more prosecution-oriented approach which contains severe 
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penalties for errant behaviours of this kind.1732 In essence, FIFA’s policies should be able to 
criminalise both the traffickers and those who use the services of the victims within the 
sport.1733 The severity of this punishment alludes to what Ayres and Braithwaite referred to 
as the “benign big gun”,1734 which is often employed by regulators to signal the point at 
which greater punitive action becomes necessary for compliance.1735 Considering the non-
compliant behaviours of FIFA’s regulatees to its current anti-trafficking policies, if the 
organisation is unable to persuade its members to comply with its rules on ITMs, it is 
recommended that the benign big gun should be applied to enable FIFA effectively punish 
the perpetrators and their partners for engaging in football trafficking. The big gun, in this 
footballing context, could include lifetime bans from the sport and subsequent criminal 
prosecutions for the culpable individuals involved in perpetrating the crime. 
FIFA’s deterrence approach should also escalate the severity of punishments according to 
the defaulting parties and the nature of their contravening act. FIFA should be able to assess 
its regulatees and consider factors such as the deliberateness of their breach, the duration of 
the contravention, and the existence of prior contravening conduct of this kind.1736 These 
factors will enable the organisation to produce more tailored punishments reflective of the 
circumstances of the regulatees. Defaulting regulatees who are repeat offenders should be 
punished severely to illustrate that FIFA is willing to go beyond the mild reprimands 
currently being meted out for non-compliance with its anti-trafficking policies. Such a stance 
will signal FIFA’s intention to make football a less vulnerable sport for the minors,1737 as it 
shows an essential prioritisation of safeguarding child players from the precarious 
circumstances related to trafficking. 
As Baldwin and others noted, the aim of effective enforcement lies principally in the 
reduction of harmful behaviour. 1738  In this instance, for FIFA to reduce the harmful 
behaviours that have caused a precarious footballing environment for the aspiring young 
players, the organisation must be prepared to invest significantly in its enforcement practices 
to achieve the intended outcome of curbing football trafficking. The call for significant 
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financial backing stems from the understanding that enforcement activities are not cost-
free,1739 and insufficient financial resources and incapable staff are factors which could  
combine to hinder the effectiveness of FIFA’s policies,1740 and could lead to the occurrence 
of regulatory failure. 
10.2.4 Assessment 
Regulators must continuously self-assess the performance of their regulatory provisions to 
determine if the policies are successful or failing to institute the requisite behaviour change. 
The assessment shows how well the current system may be working and will highlight the 
undesirable behaviours escaping the adopted regulatory strategy.1741 FIFA should be aware 
that a comprehensive self-assessment is important in instituting effective anti-trafficking 
regulations, especially because it provides an avenue to identify and prevent any negative 
impacts which may impinge on the existing rights of the victims.1742 These assessments 
could take four main approaches: input; process; output; and outcome-based assessments. 
Of the approaches, the outcome-based method is recommended to FIFA as the best means 
of evaluating the performance of its anti-trafficking policies. The outcome-based assessment 
will provide the best means for FIFA to estimate the true impact of its anti-trafficking 
policies on those the policies are supposed to protect (the football minors). Moreover, the 
assessment will determine if the policies have been able to achieve the intended outcome of 
preventing non-compliant behaviours in the regime (such as, deterring teams from engaging 
in illicit ITMs).1743 
It is reasoned that FIFA can only achieve an effective self-assessment of its anti-trafficking 
policies when there is improved monitoring (and detection) regarding instances of trafficking 
within the sport. In line with earlier recommendations to improve its human trafficking data 
collection practices,1744 FIFA are also advised to introduce more independent personnel or 
groups with human rights expertise into the organisation. These expert groups would be 
called upon to assess the human rights issues and complaints around the sport,1745 as well as 
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to determine the true effects of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies in affording the football 
minors their requisite protections. Improved monitoring and data collection will allow FIFA 
to conduct a more comprehensive self-assessment on the efficacy and overall impact of its 
anti-trafficking policies.1746  Plus, with better data, FIFA will be able to highlight what 
modifications could be made to its policies to bring about increased behaviour change 
amongst its regulatees, thereby ensuring that the intended outcome of curbing football 
trafficking can be achieved and maintained. 
10.2.5 Modification 
Regulators must be able to adjust their regulatory strategies to improve compliance and 
address any undesirable behaviours detected during the assessment of the regime.1747 Having 
previously conducted an outcome-based assessment on FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies,1748 
the modifications being proposed in this section are based on the results of that assessment. 
The suggested modifications can be divided into three main aspects: modifications as a 
regulator, modifications for the regulatees, and modifications for the children involved with 
the sport.  
As a regulator 
For FIFA to modify its anti-trafficking approach to be more effective, FIFA must attain a 
better understanding of the factors that lead to football trafficking in different contexts.1749 
As the regulator and dominant actor within football’s regulatory space, FIFA must be aware 
of the factors that affect the populations which interact with and within its regime, and how 
these factors combine and lead to the occurrence of football trafficking. For example, there 
are differing circumstances that would lead to the trafficking or exploitation of a young 
European player, that would be different for that of an African or South American player. 
Therefore, for FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies to be modified in a manner that would make 
it more effective in tackling the problem, such a difference should be accounted for within 
its policy provisions, rather than a blanket approach which views football minors, their 
motivations (and that of the team looking to exploit them) through the same limited lens. By 
hindering most ITMs in a bid to protect the football minors, FIFA’s current approach 
signifies that FIFA (as the regulator) is not fully aware of the varying circumstances and 
complexities related to the football trafficking problem. Thus, modification of FIFA’s 
                                                 
1746 Bryant, Katharine, and Todd Landman. "Combatting human trafficking since Palermo: what do we know about what 
works?" Journal of human trafficking 6, no. 2 (2020): 119-140. p/132 
1747 Baldwin, Robert, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge. Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice. Oxford 
University Press on Demand, 2012.  p/227 
1748 Chapter 5 - Evaluating FIFA’s Regulations - Policy Objectives 
1749 Kiss, Ligia, and Cathy Zimmerman. "Human trafficking and labor exploitation: Toward identifying, implementing, and 
evaluating effective responses." (2019): e1002740. p/1 
244 
 
policies is essential to prevent further instances of non-compliance with its anti-trafficking 
provisions. The modified FIFA policies must accommodate for the variations in the 
vulnerabilities of the at-risk football minors, and the policies should be able to afford these 
young persons with the requisite protections which are reflective of their circumstances.  
For the regulatees (Raising Awareness) 
FIFA’s policies should be modified to account for the motivations of its regulatees and their 
non-compliant behaviours.1750 It is recommended that FIFA should adopt tailored awareness 
raising campaigns that inform its regulatees, the perpetrators on the periphery of the sport, 
and the foreign minors who are often the victims of this form of trafficking, about the 
dangers, downsides, and punitive repercussions of engaging in football trafficking. The 
recommended use of awareness raising campaigns as part of an effective anti-trafficking 
response is common, though their results are often varied. Prior anti-trafficking campaigns 
focused on educating the public on human trafficking,1751 and informing them of how to 
report cases and protect children from becoming the victims of traffickers. 1752  FIFA 
themselves have previously supported (and abandoned) the use of these awareness raising 
and education campaigns to address child trafficking and modern-day slavery.1753 
It is contended that awareness campaigns at times failed because they relied on a mistaken 
belief that traffickers prospered chiefly owing to the misconstrued aspirations of migrants 
and their hopes for a better life abroad. This perception led to awareness campaigns which 
focused heavily on the harsh realities that may befall an irregular migrant in a foreign 
country, and the risks involved for the persons who embarked on the clandestine and 
precarious migratory trips abroad. Najarian argued that targeted awareness raising 
campaigns for youth footballers in renowned source regions could be the most effective way 
to eliminate instances of football trafficking, as families would be more aware of the dangers 
of doing business with unlicensed intermediaries/agents and illegal football academies.1754 
Yet, previous football trafficking awareness campaigns have been ineffective, arguably due 
to the flawed premise in which they were based.  
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Unscrupulous persons and agents continue to deceive the young players in Africa because 
the awareness campaigns focused on the dangers associated with migration. Rather than 
publicising the availability of viable means which young players in the source regions could 
use to exercise their embedded agency and achieve a career in professional football. The 
previous awareness campaigns failed to comprehend how young people in Africa understand 
risk and how they view danger when making their migratory decisions.1755 Research in the 
field has since shown that the aspiring African players do not harbour the same negative 
connotations and perceptive dangers associated with precarious migratory routes that the 
trafficking awareness campaigns expected them to have.1756 Thus, attempts at eradicating 
football trafficking by discouraging irregular migration and engagement with unscrupulous 
agents/intermediaries is an approach which is not reflective of the socio-economic 
circumstances (and other push factors) that play a role in the young person’s decision to 
migrate regularly or irregularly. The aspiring players in the targeted source regions 
reportedly viewed the previous anti-trafficking awareness campaigns as being biased against 
them, because the youths felt that the images were aimed at preventing them from travelling 
abroad and ‘enjoying the West’1757 like the other successful football migrants before them. 
Therefore, for FIFA’s future anti-trafficking awareness campaigns to be effective, the focus 
should be on the reduction of avenues for exploitation and trafficking,1758 rather than on 
discouraging the at-risk youths and their families from engaging with potential traffickers, 
unscrupulous agents/intermediaries, or enrolling at illegal football academies. Effective 
awareness campaigns should involve local people residing in the respective African 
countries,1759 but should not be exclusively based around the African football minors who 
are the potential victims of football trafficking. Other groups, e.g., MAs, football teams, legal 
and illegal football academies, club owners, and the unscrupulous agents/intermediaries on 
the periphery of the sport perpetuating the crime, should all be targeted with clear and 
adaptable messages1760 that underline the severity of football trafficking and highlights the 
gravity of the punishments to be given to those caught engaging and facilitating in its 
continued occurrence. FIFA should equally employ a means of increasing public awareness 
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which could help external bodies, law enforcement, and the public, to better understand the 
extent of the trafficking problem,1761 and which would also enable FIFA to educate the 
public about the peculiarities of football trafficking, and inform the public about what is 
being done to curb the crime.  
By modifying its regulatory approach to adopt effective awareness raising campaigns to 
show this clear, public friendly stance on football trafficking, FIFA could decrease the 
avenues which the unscrupulous agents/intermediaries use to deceive and cheat young 
African boys and their families in the source countries.1762 More awareness will also aid in 
the identification of football trafficking victims and in providing them with the requisite 
support they deserve. Additionally, FIFA’s modified anti-trafficking policies would be able 
to better deter regulatees from further breaches to its regulations, as the organisation will 
equally raise awareness about the increased severity of the punishments for defaulting parties 
who are found to have engaged in football trafficking.  
Though awareness campaigns are beneficial, they tend to only have a positive impact on 
reducing problems like labour exploitation and human trafficking when used in combination 
with other interventions,1763 such as a child-centred regulatory approach. 
For the Children 
Regulatory theorists posit that effective regulatory modifications should consider broader 
issues which could be affecting regulatory performance.1764  Consequently, FIFA’s anti-
trafficking regulatory strategy should also be modified to accommodate for a broader issue 
which has affected and undermined the performances of its anti-trafficking policies thus far. 
This, it is argued, is the significant absence of a child-centred approach. 
10.3 A CHILD-CENTRED APPROACH 
Lewis and Taylor argued that Sport’s Governing Bodies (SGBs), in general, have a higher 
duty of care owed to children and the young people involved in their respective sports.1765 
Therefore, SGBs are expected to take appropriate steps to address and prevent any risks 
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associated with participating in their sport for young persons. Such as, the adverse human 
rights problems faced by the foreign football minors, which FIFA should have curtailed. 
Football trafficking was borne out of football’s regulatory environment that is dependent on 
child labour, and which engages many children, yet the sport has failed to establish adequate 
child-protection measures able to effectively combat this problem.1766 FIFA, as a TPR and 
global regulator of football, has the capacity to introduce policies which ameliorate some of 
the risks associated with pursuing a professional playing career. But FIFA’s regulatory 
responses have failed to reflect its moral duty to effectively safeguard the football minors 
from the potentially precarious situations that come about as a result of their pursuit. 
It is recommended that a child-centred approach to FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies will aid 
the production of more effective regulations. Through this approach, FIFA will be able to 
offer the requisite protections for the football minors, as the organisation’s regulatory 
decisions will revolve around measures that put the child as the primary ‘rights holder’,1767 
and the policies would be centred on the child’s best interests as a means of protecting them 
from the adverse human rights risks associated with the sport. For the child-centred approach 
to be effective it is essential that the regulations be based on the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) which provides a means for developing common standards 
which FIFA should adopt. 
10.3.1 UNCRC 
The UNCRC offers wide-ranging and globally accepted standards for children's rights. The 
provision recognises children as holders of human rights and renders several laws in 
advancement of these rights of the child, such as article 3(1) which requires that primary 
consideration must be given to the best interests of the child in all actions affecting them.1768 
The main issue with the football environment (and FIFA’s current anti-trafficking laws) is 
that the recruitment processes employed by teams,1769 and FIFA’s subsequent regulatory 
responses to these problems, have not always been operated in the best interests of the 
child.1770 This has undermined the performance of the policies in being able to offer the 
requisite protections to the football minors, as the commercial incentives created by the 
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popularity of football globally has created tensions between ensuring the rights of young 
players are protected, and harnessing a football environment that has a truly global and 
profitable transfer market.  
Football’s global transfer system aims to provide an increased availability of accessible 
talent for the football workforce but does so without offering the necessary protections from 
exploitative situations for the children involved with the sport, contrary to Article 32 
UNCRC. Such a gap in FIFA’s regulations leaves the football minors open to serious harm, 
as football teams use academies and schools in developing countries to recruit and exploit 
minors for economic gain in Europe. Through FIFA’s current anti-trafficking approach, the 
organisation (and by extension, the involved State parties) have failed to introduce the 
requisite national, bilateral, and multinational measures which would prevent the cross-
border networks that culminate in the abduction, sale, and trafficking of these children,1771 
contrary to Article 35 UNCRC.1772 Moreover, FIFA’s restrictions on ITMs have also been 
adopted in a way which contravenes Article 27 UNCRC, as it denies football minors 
legitimate opportunities to migrate and improve their standard of living which would have 
upheld their rights, protected them from exploitation, 1773  and furthered their physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral, and social development.1774 
Thus, an effective child-centred approach to FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies should consider 
the longstanding impact the policies could have on minors, and it should take into account 
how certain provisions could impinge on the rights of the child. The child-centred approach 
should be guided by the UNCRC throughout the planning, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation stages of the regulatory process. 1775  The policies should emphasise that the 
individuals are children first before they are sports persons, and the protections they are 
afforded should be able to prevent their exploitation without restricting the avenues for them 
to develop, in line with their best interests. 
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10.3.2 The voice of the child 
Article 12(1) UNCRC provides that children should be given a voice in all matters affecting 
them, including during regulatory processes. 1776  Within the context of anti-trafficking 
regulations, the ILO concurred with the UNCRC provision, stating that children should be 
involved at the planning stages of policies against child trafficking because the information 
they can provide is of great value to protecting children and preventing other instances of 
this form of trafficking.1777 Thus, effectively implementing Article 12 UNCRC is important, 
as it provides a means of realising other relevant UNCRC provisions for the child, and 
because enabling children to be involved in the decision-making will improve the quality of 
the decisions being made on their behalf.1778 Lundy proposed a generally accepted model to 
implement the Article 12 UNCRC provision.1779 The model has an explicit chronology, and 
requires consideration of the implications of the following four factors: 
 Space: children must be given the opportunity to express their views. 
 Voice: children must be facilitated to express their views. 
 Audience: the view must be listened to. 
 Influence: the view must be acted on, as appropriate. 1780 
Space 
Lundy explained that there is a need for a greater awareness of the fact that respecting 
children’s views on matters concerning them, and involving them in the decision-making 
processes, is not an option, but is a legally binding obligation.1781 Therefore, children should 
be given an opportunity for involvement in the decision-making processes, e.g., there should 
be a space in which children are encouraged to express their views.1782 To actualise this 
within FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy processes, FIFA must create an inclusive space during 
its deliberations whereby a diverse range of views from African minors (and other young 
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players) involved in football is sought. Seeing as participation within the deliberations 
should not only be afforded to articulate and literate persons,1783 FIFA should consult the 
victims of football trafficking, including the successful and unsuccessful players, as they are 
considered to be the “true anti-trafficking experts”.1784 The children consulted should be 
asked questions which elucidate whether firstly, they would like to participate in the 
decision-making process; secondly, how they would like to influence the outcome of the 
decisions; and thirdly, what aspects of football’s transfer system and the path to making it 
as professional players they consider to be of most importance or concern, based on their 
understanding. It is argued that the information provided by the child players will aid FIFA 
in designing and developing a more coordinated response to combatting the underlying 
causes of football trafficking in the source regions.1785  
Voice 
Article 12 UNCRC contains the restriction that the child’s right to express their view is to 
be afforded to a child “who is capable of forming his or her own views”.1786 However, Lundy 
explained that the provision should not be translated into questions about the capacity of the 
child or “the age and maturity of the child”.1787 She posited that the child’s right to express 
their view is not dependent upon their capacity to express a mature view, but rather, is 
dependent only on their ability to form their view, irrespective of maturity.1788 To form a 
view, children may need the help of others, and the child has a right to receive direction and 
guidance from adults in the course of this.1789 Within FIFA’s processes, the organisation is 
advised to directly obtain the views of former victims of football trafficking during its policy 
design processes,1790 as well as the successful football migrants, or those who would be 
impacted by FIFA’s anti-trafficking provisions. Alternatively, FIFA can solicit the 
assistance of football trafficking charities (such as Culture Foot Solidaire) who are informed 
                                                 
1783 Ibid. 
1784 Brennan, Denise, and Sine Plambech. "Moving forward—Life after trafficking." Anti-Trafficking Review 10 (2018). 
p/1 
1785 Guild, E., B. Andrees and M. Linden, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidance for Legislation 
and Law Enforcement (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2005). p/48 
1786 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1577, Article 12(1) 
1787 Lundy, Laura. "‘Voice’is not enough: conceptualising Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child." British educational research journal 33, no. 6 (2007): 927-942. p/935 
1788 Ibid. 
1789  Welty, Elizabeth, and Laura Lundy. "A children’s rights-based approach to involving children in decision 
making." Journal of science communication 12, no. 3 (2013): C02. p/3 
1790  IPEC, Combating trafficking in children for labour exploitation: A resource kit for policy-makers and 
practitioners (International Labour Office; ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Geneva 
2008). Book 4 page 9 
251 
 
about football trafficking and have the capacity to give football minors the direction that will 
enable them form views beneficial to FIFA’s anti-trafficking decision-making processes. 
Audience 
Article 12 requires children’s views to be given “due weight”. Lundy explained that implicit 
within the notion of due weight is that children have a right to have their views listened to 
(not just heard) i.e., a “right of audience”.1791 It is expected that the children’s views are 
listened to by an identifiable individual or body with the responsibility to listen, and an 
ability to make decisions which could give effect to the children’s views.1792 Thus, FIFA 
must find ways to increase its capacity and allow room for valuable contributions from 
children as part of its anti-trafficking policy deliberations process. Previously, football’s 
regulatory landscape (and sport more broadly) has not consulted children, or treated the 
results of such consultations with children seriously when enacting their policies.1793 For 
example, it can be argued that the child’s right to be heard in all decisions affecting them 
was not reflected in FIFA’s decision to ban the international transfer of minors in the first 
instance.1794 The ban failed to consider the perspectives and lived experiences of the young 
African players who are often the victims of trafficking,1795 but who continuously exercise 
a rational agency to undertake precarious migratory conditions as part of their calculated 
risks towards becoming professional players.1796 To produce effective policies, FIFA must 
be able to consult child players, and FIFA should be ready to consider their views seriously, 
by listening to the various verbal and non-verbal ways which they could use to express their 
perspectives on this issue of football trafficking.1797  
Influence 
The Committee on the UNCRC warned that “appearing to ‘listen’ to children is relatively 
unchallenging; [but] giving due weight to their views requires real change.” 1798  Lundy 
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posited that the due weight aspect of Article 12 is complex because of the difficulty in 
ascertaining what constitutes as being “due” in “due weight”, and the fact that the provision 
ties the due weight requirement to the “age and maturity” of the child.1799 This complexity 
often leads to debates about a tension between Article 12 and Article 3 (best interests) 
UNCRC. Since authorities and adults are to use discretion when acting in the best interests 
of children, it is not uncommon for this discretion to result in adults silencing a child or even 
side-lining their views, as opposed to fulfilling their Article 12 obligation.1800 Therefore, to 
navigate this obstacle, Lundy contended that the provision should be interpreted and applied 
in a generous and child-empowering context, rather than a negative and opportunity-
restricting manner. 1801  Seeing as authorities cannot ensure specific outcomes from the 
processes, nor can they guarantee that the child’s views will be given anything more than 
“due” weight, it is argued that there should be formal channels of communication in place 
where children are told how their views are to be taken into account, and what decisions are 
being made as a consequence of their views.1802 The communication channels will ensure 
that whilst children’s views are taken seriously, ultimately, the final responsibility remains 
with the adult/authorities,1803 who retain the capacity to decide to go against the child’s 
view.1804 
The rational agency that is often exercised by the African football minors necessitates the 
need for FIFA to give them an opportunity to participate, be listened to, and to have their 
views be given due weight and influence during FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy deliberations 
process. Academics have noted how policies designed to combat child trafficking without 
consulting the children tend to not meet the child’s needs,1805 and are at times reductive in 
nature.1806 By not accommodating the voice of the child, the policies could even have an 
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injurious impact on the child’s rights,1807 and could place them at further risk of abuse and 
exploitation.1808  Therefore, for FIFA to create effective anti-trafficking regulations, the 
organisation should welcome the input of football minors, which would ensure that the 
policies subsequently produced are tailored to their specific needs and are able to protect 
them from exploitation. As Esson and Drywood argued, there is a balancing exercise which 
regulatory bodies such as FIFA must be aware of, which is that regulations on children’s 
rights must be “sensitive both to the need to protect children from harmful situations, on the 
one hand, and the importance of acknowledging their rational, decision-making capacities, 
on the other.”1809 Hence, by giving the child players and victims of football trafficking a 
platform to share their experiences and to have a valid input in the formation of effective 
anti-trafficking policies,1810 the minors could provide the key information needed to fight 
this form of trafficking in the long-term.1811 
10.3.3 Specific Child Protection 
FIFA’s child-centred anti-trafficking regulatory approach must reflect special protections 
and status-related rights for the child victims,1812  in light of their particular vulnerabilities 
and needs.1813 The foreign football minors involved in the instances of football trafficking 
are the most at-risk and discriminated group in the football industry, 1814  and effective 
policies should be able to ensure that this group is afforded the requisite protections needed 
to limit their vulnerabilities. Once identified and rescued from situations of football 
trafficking and labour exploitation, all necessary steps should be taken to rehabilitate the 
child victim, such as giving the child access to education and training, where they wish to 
partake. Furthermore, reintegration into their home societies, local sports teams,1815 and/or 
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family groups, should be undertaken depending on the child’s wish,1816 or when it is in their 
best interests to do so.1817 
The far-reaching nature of these recommended practices requires that FIFA not only 
sponsors the process, but that FIFA also relies on international and national levels of 
cooperation to effectively enforce the policies and ensure the safety of the child players. As 
Lewis and Taylor equally note, there needs to be a full commitment and co-operation of all 
international and national sports federations (as well as external non-sport related 
institutions) for this child-centred approach to be successful.1818 The heightened need for 
cooperation is important considering the purported difficulties in regulating, and providing 
protections for the international movement and transfer of players which spans nation-states, 
continental regions, and multinational regulatory frameworks.1819 To afford the child the 
necessary protections, FIFA’s anti-trafficking laws must be comprehensive and reflective of 
the transnationality of the problem. 
10.4 THE LEGAL ROUTE INTO FOOTBALL 
As part of an effective anti-trafficking response, it is recommended that FIFA would need to 
introduce more legitimate avenues for migration through the sport, in addition to improving 
the conditions in the host countries and tackling the root causes of the problem. Creating a 
legal route will enable the aspiring child players realise their dreams of socio-economic 
betterment and personal and professional development through football, which would be in 
line with the provisions of the UNCRC. This proposed policy approach stems out of an 
overriding perspective on the trafficking problem that concurs with Gallagher’s assertion on 
human trafficking being the predictable outcome of global, political, and economic realities 
(and inequalities). 1820 This includes inequalities such as the restrictions on migration that 
limits an individual from securing legal access to their preferred destinations abroad. Since 
the absence of legal means to migrate and play professionally abroad has contributed to the 
trafficking of thousands of African football minors, it is contended that the creation of more 
                                                 
1816 Guild, E., B. Andrees and M. Linden, Human Trafficking and Forced Labour Exploitation: Guidance for Legislation 
and Law Enforcement (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2005). p/62 
1817 Lelliott, Joseph, 'Smuggled and Trafficked Unaccompanied Minors: Towards a Coherent, Protection-Based Approach 
in International Law' (2017) 29(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 238. p/251 
1818 Lewis, Adam, and Jonathan Taylor. Sport: law and practice. Bloomsbury Professional, 2014. p/731 
1819 Jarvie G, Thornton, James and Mackie, Hector, Sport, Culture and Society: An Introduction (Third edition., Routledge 
2018) p/146 
1820 Gallagher, Anne, and Paul Holmes. "Developing an effective criminal justice response to human trafficking: Lessons 
from the front line." International criminal justice review 18, no. 3 (2008): 318-343. p/321 
255 
 
legal routes could result in a reduction of the crime, as it could disincentivise the perpetrators 
behind the trafficking and reduce the vulnerabilities of the child players. 
10.4.1 An Absent Path 
One of the main factors leading to trafficking, in general, is the lack of legal migration 
options for the aspiring migrants. 1821  In football, FIFA’s laws like the ban on ITMs 
exemplifies the restrictive immigration policies within the sport which have limited the 
chances for aspiring African footballers to gain opportunities in more lucrative leagues 
abroad. The underlying problem, however, is that despite the ban, there remains an insatiable 
‘demand’ for cheap and profitable football labour, as seen with the several clubs across 
Europe.1822  Yet, these labour demands remain largely unmet, due to the limitations of 
available opportunities for the persons in the regions with significant ‘supply’ to be able to 
legally migrate to the EU teams which are in need of their services. Football clubs, their 
owners and stakeholders, parents of players, and the players themselves, are then put in a 
situation where they are all looking for opportunities (both legitimate and illegitimate) for 
the players to be transported abroad to play professionally.1823 Thus, the current limitations 
applied by FIFA’s ban have been unable to deter the young players from chasing their 
dreams, 1824  and it has also not dissuaded the EU teams from identifying and utilising 
regulatory loopholes to conduct illicit ITMs. 
The absence of legal pathways into professional football for the African players has denied 
some children access to the potential positive effects of migration.1825 With the absence of 
safe and regulated means of labour migration, the restrictions have pushed children and their 
families to depend on criminal networks to orchestrate clandestine trips abroad. For example, 
in 1989 (albeit prior to FIFA’s current rules on ITMs), the Ghanaian player Nii Odartey 
Lamptey, who was aged 15 at the time is said to have undergone a perilous and dangerous 
journey to Nigeria, without travel documentation, because that was the only way he could 
attain a transfer to the Belgian side RSC Anderlecht.1826 
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10.4.2 Labour Migration as a Remedy 
Since the African players are known to demonstrate their rational agency despite the dangers 
involved in irregular migration or being trafficked abroad, the creation of more legal routes 
into professional football for the aspiring players should be seen as a key remedy to tackling 
this trafficking problem. Mullally similarly argued that for trafficking to be taken seriously 
as a human rights violation, and if we admit the contributory role played by receiving 
countries (and in the context of this research, FIFA and its associated football teams) through 
their search for cheap labour, the provision of a secure/legal path to migration should be 
viewed as a human rights remedy to trafficking.1827 Thus, FIFA and its collaborators in the 
form of external sport and non-sport related bodies, should be able to consider means in 
which equality of opportunity and freedom of movement across borders can be granted to 
the aspiring football minors as part of: one, their fundamental rights;1828 two, doing what is 
in the best interests of the child in compliance with the UNCRC; and three, the organisation’s 
overall fight against football trafficking. 
Effective anti-trafficking regulations should provide for these legitimate options for 
migration. Such provisions will admittedly involve extensive work between FIFA, the State, 
and local NGOs,1829 to create these avenues for the aspiring football minors to migrate on 
fair and ethical grounds.1830 However, as the ILO contended, the creation of legal routes is 
an essential factor in preventing child trafficking, as it will promote safer, legal, migration 
for those of the appropriate working age.1831 Creation of the legal routes will also reflect the 
agency and subjectivities of the African football minors, and will provide a basis in which 
some of the problems and socio-economic reasons which makes them susceptible to being 
trafficked,1832 could be averted safely through sport.  
10.4.3 The Benefits 
The creation of legal routes will provide several benefits for the football minors, football 
teams, FIFA, and the nation States. 
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First, through the legal route, the talented players would be able to migrate to a foreign 
country, league, and team without fear of exploitation and with limited risks involved in their 
transfer from the continent. The transfers involving ITMs would be conducted more 
transparently without the need to bypass FIFA’s regulations, thereby protecting a wide range 
of young players involved in the sport. FIFA and the football environment would therefore 
be able to openly bridge the gap between the ‘insatiable’ demand for cheap football labour 
which exists in developed countries, and the ‘endless’ supply of talented players present in 
the developing African regions. By bridging this gap and offering more transparency within 
the football transfer market, FIFA will be promoting international and transnational values 
of more opportunities for human mobility as a means of remedying and curbing human 
trafficking.1833 And also, this will align FIFA’s practices with the UN SDG of reducing 
inequality by increasing labour migration.1834 
Second, because sport has often been viewed as an avenue to escape from poverty and an 
opportunity to achieve personal and collective development,1835 the legal route will provide 
the circumstances for the talented African football minors to achieve these aspirations. It 
will increase opportunities for children with limited options and will provide them with 
access to a range of benefits that would otherwise be unavailable to them in their home 
countries and region. For example, through legitimate labour migration, the African football 
minors would be able to escape settings of extreme poverty, or other general circumstances 
where they are not able to enjoy the basic rights as set out in the UNCRC.1836 With the legal 
route, the African football minors would be afforded protections from exploitation,1837 and 
would potentially be provided with improved standards of living adequate for their physical, 
mental, spiritual, moral, and social development.1838 The route will ultimately enable FIFA 
to strike the requisite balance between engaging minors in the sport and providing them with 
the benefits associated with sporting participation and migration, whilst simultaneously 
protecting them from any adverse human rights risks that may be related to their sporting 
involvement. 
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Third, the legal route will make football minors less likely to be enticed and tricked by 
traffickers looking to transport and exploit them in foreign countries through fake offers of 
professional playing contracts. Through the route, there will be better means of monitoring 
the international transfers and movements of footballers. This will give FIFA and its external 
collaborators more visible insight into the incoming and outgoing player transactions, whilst 
ensuring that players are protected from any exploitative conditions during the course of 
their transfer. In the past, some countries have trialled legal routes of migration to counter 
the well-known routes used by traffickers and smugglers. For example, Italy granted 5,000 
work visas annually to Albanians because Albania was its largest source country for 
trafficking and smuggling victims.1839 It is recommended that FIFA could use a similar 
model to tackle football trafficking, considering the existence of well-known colonial links, 
and with more data to be gathered on the common migratory/trafficking paths utilised by 
unscrupulous persons to exploit the African football minors. By granting visas and valid 
opportunities to migrate legally (even if for a limited number of people), the gesture will 
inform the African football minors that they do not need to rely on unscrupulous persons and 
precarious migratory conditions to achieve their professional footballing aspirations abroad. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has made recommendations to FIFA which would enable the organisation to 
create more effective anti-trafficking policies. The first subsection considered the 
importance of conducting a preliminary regulatory impact assessment for FIFA and its 
stakeholders to foresee the potential impact of the proposed policies in the regime. It was 
recommended that a human rights impact assessment would be important because it will 
ensure that the protections offered to the at-risk minors are of the requisite standard and 
would not result in adverse human rights risks for the young players. The second subsection 
considered the importance of the “DREAM” framework as an ideal means of ensuring the 
effective creation and subsequent enforcement of FIFA’s further anti-trafficking regulatory 
strategies. The third subsection considered the recommendation of the child-centred 
regulatory approach in more detail, by analysing how the strategy would be useful in 
effectively curbing football trafficking. The analysis showed that for the child-centred 
approach to be successful, it must be modelled on the UNCRC to ensure that regulatory 
decisions involving children are always conducted in the child’s best interests. The fourth 
subsection considered that as part of an effective anti-trafficking regulatory response, FIFA 
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would need to create more legal routes for the football minors to migrate and play 
professionally abroad. Thus, increased opportunities for labour migration should be viewed 
as a viable human rights remedy to tackling human trafficking. The legal route will afford 
the African football minors with opportunities to enjoy several rights, as stated in the 
UNCRC, which they may not otherwise enjoy outside the environment which football can 
provide for them. 
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Chapter 11 - ALTERNATE REGULATORY MODEL 
The recommendations provided to FIFA thus far give leeway for the formation of a more 
nuanced solution to the football trafficking problem, such as through an alternate regulatory 
model. This alternate model is being proposed as a more imaginative,1840 targeted, and 
effective way of remedying football trafficking. Generally, anti-trafficking regulations have 
often focused on addressing the trafficking problem by targeting the demand for cheap 
labour,1841 or instituting preventative regulations that limit migration and the open supply of 
labour. However, the alternate model suggests a different approach to anti-trafficking 
regulations, mainly by attempting to counter the effects of the push-pull factors of migration, 
as relevant to the occurrence of football trafficking. FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies do not 
account for these push-pull factors, and this evidently contributed to the meagre performance 
of the enacted regulatory responses. Thus, the alternate model proposes a means for FIFA to 
consider the effects of these push-pull factors within its anti-trafficking policy approach, 
such as, through the introduction of practices which can tackle some of the root causes of 
football trafficking.  
Despite the creation of more legal routes to migrate and play football professionally abroad, 
the overriding situation in football remains that the demand for cheap labour from the 
developed countries does not have the capacity to match with the extensive supply of the 
willing African football minors looking to migrate from the developing regions.1842 Hence, 
the large majority of players who aspire to migrate legally but cannot do so are left in a 
situation that could reignite their purported reliance on unscrupulous persons to facilitate 
clandestine trips abroad. The alternate model considers a way to engage the talented players 
who are unable to migrate legally but still harbour intentions of being successful professional 
players. The model stems out of the notion that the insufficient number of opportunities to 
play professionally and earn adequate sums in Africa (due to the limited economic pull), is 
consequently pushing aspiring football minors into precarious trafficking situations. It is 
therefore recommended that FIFA and its external collaborators should focus on tackling 
football trafficking through the development of Africa and African football, as this is one of 
the root causes of the problem. This alternate model provides a long-term and more 
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sustainable means of reducing the key vulnerabilities that puts the African football minors 
at an increased risk of trafficking and exploitation. 
11.1 DEVELOPING AFRICAN FOOTBALL 
Former FIFA President, Joseph Blatter, once said "Our world is one that is rich in natural 
beauty and cultural diversity, but also one where many are still deprived of their basic rights 
or have to deal with the daily realities of conflict. FIFA now has an even greater 
responsibility to reach out and touch the world, using football as a symbol of hope and 
integration”.1843 It is contended that in using football as a symbol of hope and integration, 
FIFA should consider the development of African football as a significant step in the right 
direction. 
The underdevelopment of African football is a key push factor for the African players. This 
is underlined by the instances of Ghanaian players travelling to countries such as India, 
Thailand, or Vietnam, in search of playing contracts, and despite these countries not being 
renowned for their footballing prowess.1844 The players put themselves at risk of exploitation 
due to the absence of opportunities being made available to them in Africa for financial 
rewards.1845 Therefore, it is argued that the development of African football should be an 
important part of FIFA’s long-term anti-trafficking policy response. This is because steps to 
provide opportunities for football migrants and to enhance anti-trafficking policy 
compliance are likely to be undermined and limited if the global inequalities that push the 
football minors into the precarious trafficking circumstances remain unaddressed.1846 These 
global inequalities can only be resolved through significant financial investment and 
capacity building in the source countries, to improve the circumstances of those who are 
most at-risk and vulnerable in the regions. The investments should target structural 
vulnerabilities in African football,1847 which would help to diminish the risk factors such as 
poverty and the poor infrastructure that leads to instances of football trafficking. The 
investments should elevate the African game to a level that will allow it to be more self-
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sufficient and able to give players increased financial rewards and opportunities for 
professional and personal development, even whilst they remain on the African continent. 
FIFA possesses the invaluable resources that will enable the organisation to undergo such a 
significant investment and development of African football. In 2019, FIFA’s president 
Gianni Infantino, said that FIFA would mobilise companies and entrepreneurs to raise 
around $1bn to improve the infrastructure and build world class stadiums across Africa.1848 
However, the problem with such a declaration is that merely investing in African football 
without a concrete framework on how specific development goals can be met through the 
investments would make the investments ineffective. The large sums generated without an 
appropriate framework will also open the door for the sums to be misappropriated by corrupt 
personnel within the African FIFA Member Associations, as there could be situations where 
the sums are diverted for private gain, especially considering the recurrent themes of 
conflicting interests taking place within FIFA’s operations. Therefore, significant 
investments able to develop African football should not be implemented using a scattergun 
approach, but the investments should be tailored towards the specific conditions of the teams 
and leagues on the continent. The development of African football should enable the teams 
to not only offer better opportunities for the African players,1849 but also, it should empower 
the African sides to be self-sufficient and no longer dependent on foreign aid to survive. The 
investments should be made in an attempt to support the African clubs to improve their 
economic standing and to generate their own sustainable revenues, thereby creating more 
opportunities and better jobs for the poor and at-risk minors in the rural areas. These 
suggestions can be best explained through the “Sport for Development and Peace” 
initiatives. 
11.2 SPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE (SDP) 
Sport has a popularity which transcends national, cultural, socioeconomic, and political 
boundaries, and can reach the world’s poorest people in a way that other mainstream 
development policies are unable to.1850 For this reason, Sport for development and peace 
(SDP) initiatives provide a means to achieve a holistic development of Africa and African 
football. SDP is the “intentional use of sport and physical activity as a tool to contribute to 
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development and peace goals”,1851 and it provides a means of pursuing wider, non-sporting, 
social 1852  and educational goals. 1853  SDP has, over the past two decades, 1854  gained 
popularity because of significant statements about the power of sport, such as that of former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan in 2002, who claimed: 
Sport can play a role in improving the lives of individuals, not only individuals, I 
might add but whole communities. I am convinced that the time is right to build on 
that understanding, to encourage governments, development agencies and 
communities to think about how sport can be included more systematically in the 
plans to help children, particularly those living in the midst of poverty, disease and 
conflict.1855  
More recently, the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also featured an 
endorsement of sport’s role and its ability to promote global development,1856 stating in 
Article 37 that:  
Sport is also an important enabler of sustainable development. We recognize the 
growing contribution of sport to the realization of development and peace […] and 
the contributions it makes to the empowerment of [...] young people, individuals and 
communities as well as to health, education and social inclusion objectives.1857 
Both statements are indicative of the widespread developmental goals FIFA and its external 
collaborators could pursue through sport, but the achievement of their development 
objectives depends largely on their chosen conception of “development”.1858 As, SDP could 
either be “sport development” or “sport for development”.1859 
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On the one hand, sport development (also known as sport-plus 1860 ) are programmes 
involving efforts by SGBs and their partners to develop the institution of sport in certain 
regions, by improving sport practices, and raising sport participation and sport performance 
levels.1861 Sport development involves programmes designed to assist those already engaged 
in organised sport (such as athletes, coaches, officials, administrators) to strengthen the 
infrastructure of facilities and institutions within which organised sport takes place.1862 As 
beneficial as these initiatives may be, the issue with sport development is that simply 
recognising or improving sports participation will do little to support persons or develop 
communities in the long-run.1863 Moreover, without a long-term developmental impact, the 
sport development initiatives are unlikely to cause the requisite social change amidst the 
target communities.1864 
On the other hand, sport for development (also known as plus-sport1865) is more central to 
the concept of SDP.1866 Sport for development is deemed as a vehicle for multiple forms of 
development and is used to attract youth1867 and seek out those not already involved in 
sport. 1868  The initiatives target populations that are more impoverished and 
disempowered,1869 and are unconcerned about whether participants ever become involved in 
organised sports training and competition.1870 The goal of these plus-sport programmes is 
often to achieve non-sport related development goals 1871  such as education 1872  and the 
eradication of poverty. Sport for development, therefore, provides a direct means for FIFA 
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to tackle the core vulnerabilities of the at-risk football minors, and it will give FIFA the 
opportunity to achieve actual social change within the target communities. 
Coalter reasoned that there is often a continuum occurring between sport-plus and plus-sport 
programmes, and that the differences may not always be clear. 1873 Thus, it is within this 
moving continuum that the recommended approach for the development of African football 
lies. FIFA and its collaborators should adopt both sport development and sport for 
development initiatives to grow African football. Through sport development, better 
infrastructure and sporting facilities would improve sport practices, sport participation, and 
sport performance for African football and its players, which will subsequently enable the 
leagues and teams on the continent to be more commercially viable, and ultimately, more 
self-sufficient. FIFA should also introduce programmes to train and aid the improvement of 
the players and coaches in the region. 
With sport for development, FIFA and its collaborators should institute programmes that 
have non-sport related development benefits, to address some of the core vulnerabilities of 
the at-risk African football minors. These programmes should advance economic 
development to tackle problems such as poverty,1874 and the initiatives should give the 
youths more opportunities to lift themselves and their communities out of otherwise 
challenging and marginalised conditions. 1875  For example, by creating avenues for the 
minors in the target regions to gain basic education. Through such programmes, FIFA would 
be able to limit the possibilities of the African minors falling prey to traffickers and 
unscrupulous persons looking to exploit them, whilst FIFA would concurrently be 
contributing to the achievement of several UN SDGs and UNCRC provisions. 
11.3 ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL SDP 
For SDP to have the desired impact, the following aspects must be abided by to bring about 
the requisite development across the African communities. 
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11.3.1 Clear targets 
Sport, it is said, cannot be the “panacea for all development challenges”,1876 and sport is  no 
guarantee of peace and development, nor is it a blueprint for solving major social 
problems.1877 Yet, sport has the capacity to be utilised as a tool to achieve these broader 
developmental goals.1878  For FIFA’s approach to harness this power of sport to bring about 
real social change able to limit football trafficking, the use of SDP initiatives should be 
guided by comprehensive planning, management, and a clear direction for the use of the 
programmes. FIFA must not have a “simplistic view” about the prosocial outcomes and 
effects of SDP in the target communities. Rather, FIFA should set clear targets for the 
intended development outcomes being sought. The programmes should be able to meet and 
reflect the local demands within the communities,1879 and should respond to any new needs 
or changing dynamics that arise.1880 For example, sports related development goals could 
include targets such as the improvement of  infrastructure, building stadia, and providing 
access to sports equipment for various African teams. 1881  Whereas, the non-sport 
development goals could be cultural, educational, health-related, and economic for the target 
communities.1882 
11.3.2 Collaborations and Monitoring 
FIFA are advised that collaborations between the organisation and the organisers of the SDP 
initiatives are essential for the programmes to have the desired effect.1883 The collaborations 
are part of the concerted approach to achieving development, as the increased 
communication and transparency in the actioning of the programmes will help to mitigate 
several challenges associated with the operation of SDPs,1884 such as in bringing about better 
accountability. Furthermore, due to the nature of SDPs, there may not be clear insight into 
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how sport is playing a positive role in achieving the purported wider development goals.1885 
Therefore, the increased monitoring of SDP initiatives will help FIFA and the involved 
actors to examine the broader, long-term benefits, and the real impact of the programmes, in 
the development of persons and communities in the target regions.1886 Such information will 
allow FIFA to comprehensively show what the practical benefits or positive outcomes1887 of 
the programmes have been, or what the benefits are likely to be in the future. 1888 The 
monitoring will enable FIFA to highlight the possible challenges which may hinder the 
achievement of the development goals going forward,1889 but will simultaneously put the 
organisation in a position where it is able to adequately respond and rectify such challenges 
in advance. 
11.3.3 Local involvement 
SDP initiatives have been criticised for being ineffective because of their top-down approach 
to development. The top-down approach allows for idealistic stakeholders and donors 
(without on-the-ground representation) to attempt to solve complex social problems in 
developing countries without first attaining an understanding of the local context or 
relevance of the proposed programmes. 1890 This approach often results in a wasteful 
investment,1891 as the SDP initiatives impose values based on the perceptions of the (top) 
high-income and first-world countries, upon problems which exists in the (bottom) 
disadvantaged low to mid-income countries,1892 which may ultimately not be applicable or 
relevant to the latter. For SDP to be successful, FIFA and its collaborators must be aware 
that a bottom-up community approach would be the most likely to achieve the desired 
development outcomes.1893 
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The bottom-up approach will allow development actions to be tailored to the needs of the 
target country and community, 1894  as the programmes would be informed by a deep 
understanding of local contexts and culture. 1895  To attain this understanding of local 
contexts, there must be in-depth community involvement and consultations1896 that will 
further the lines of communication between those at the bottom (who the SDP programmes 
are supposed to benefit) with those at the top (the stakeholders, donors, and FIFA who are 
heading the programmes). The local involvement will give the target communities the 
opportunity to participate and inform initiatives based on the community’s needs.1897 The 
local participants should be allowed to voice their opinions in all stages of the community 
development process. This will ensure that the programmes (both sport and non-sport 
related) are continuously shaped according to local preferences.1898 In addition, FIFA should 
ensure that the communities are trained and empowered so that they have the capacity to 
guide and lead their own projects eventually.1899 In so doing, FIFA would be enabling the 
local communities to be self-sustainable and less dependent on the donors and agencies 
abroad for resources, such as financial and human capital.1900 
11.4 THE ADVANTAGES OF SDP 
When modelled according to the needs of a community, SDP can have a significant impact 
on the reduction of the risk factors that make the African football minors vulnerable to 
trafficking. Therefore, a key advantage of instituting these SDP programmes as an alternate 
anti-trafficking regulatory response, is that FIFA would be able to tackle several root causes 
of the problem through the development of Africa and African football. The programmes 
are able to target high-risk families, communities, or workplaces, which are susceptible to 
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exploitation, 1901  and through SDP, FIFA could enhance the education, health, 1902  and 
general well-being of the relevant persons in these areas, thereby reducing their 
vulnerabilities. 
By adopting the use of SDPs, FIFA will be able to achieve several wide scale development 
and social outcomes.1903 For example, SDP programmes which have an educational benefit 
will align FIFA with Article 28 UNCRC, which recognises children’s rights to education 
and the importance of this in the child’s development.1904 SDP educational programmes 
which African football minors can benefit from will prevent situations such as that of Nii 
Odartey Lamptey from reoccurring. Lamptey was a talented Ghanaian football minor who 
was trafficked and exploited by his football representatives upon his arrival in the EU, due 
to his lack of formal basic education, as he was unable to read or write.1905 Educated African 
football minors will be better informed about trafficking and the related aspects of 
exploitation. The minors would be notified about the availability of avenues for them to 
legally migrate and play professionally abroad if they wished to do so. The education 
provided to them will also enable the football minors to better resist the ploys of 
unscrupulous persons, whilst providing them with a viable plan B if they were unsuccessful 
in becoming professional players. 
SDP initiatives could also lead to significant benefits for African football leagues. The 
development could foster economic growth at individual, community, and institutional 
levels,1906 in a manner that influences the running of the sport on the continent and makes 
the leagues more commercially viable. Such advancements would allow the teams on the 
continent to be more self-sufficient, giving them the capacity to offer adequate financial 
incentives able to persuade the African players to stay and play on the continent,1907 even if 
this is only for their formative years as professional players.1908 Thereby, SDP would be 
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limiting the effect of the muscle drain on Africa’s football labour, and would be restricting 
the avenues which the unscrupulous persons use to deceive and exploit the aspiring football 
minors. 
With the longstanding sporting and non-sporting benefits SDP programmes could provide, 
it is pivotal that initiatives of this nature should be centralised, mainstreamed, and supported 
by FIFA, other SGBs, and government bodies (IGOs and NGOs), so that a comprehensive 
and concerted approach is adopted to tackling this global trafficking problem. Through the 
development of Africa and African football, there will be substantial and significant impact 
and improvements on the lives of many across the continent, reducing their vulnerabilities, 
and making them less susceptible to trafficking situations. Therefore, even if sport was only 
able to make a small contribution to solving the global trafficking problem, this small 
contribution should not pre-empt the involved actors from introducing SDP programmes and 
policies which can effectively tackle the root issues that lead to football trafficking. As Jarvie 
and others rightly contended, “small contributions can sometimes make a big difference.”1909 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered an alternate regulatory model which can be used to tackle 
football trafficking, which is through the development of African football. The development 
would enable FIFA to tackle some of the core vulnerabilities of the African football minors 
which pushes them into situations of trafficking. The proposed development should be 
conducted through SDP initiatives, which provides a framework in which sport is used to 
achieve various sustainable development goals and benefits for target communities. For 
FIFA’s SDP to have the desired impact in tackling football trafficking, the organisation 
would need to adopt aspects of both sport development and sports for development in its 
attempt to improve Africa and African football. FIFA are advised to take a bottom-up 
approach to development, as this will allow for the participation and input of the local 
communities in the planning and actioning of the SDP programmes in their communities. 
This local involvement also improves the likelihood of the development programmes being 
successful, as the initiatives would be tailored to the specific needs of the target 
communities. Through a successful SDP, FIFA would be able to play a key role in achieving 
wide scale development and significant social outcomes which could limit the occurrences 
of trafficking. Furthermore, the development of African teams and leagues would provide 
the African sides with the commercial viability and financial incentives needed to retain 
                                                 




certain players, and in so doing, protect the players from a variety of precarious trafficking 
and exploitation-like conditions. Ultimately, SDP will enable FIFA to have a significant and 
positive impact on Africa and African football, whilst simultaneously, providing an 
increased level of direct and indirect protection from trafficking situations for the at-risk 
African football minors. 
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Chapter 12 - CONCLUSION 
This thesis has provided a holistic view of the football trafficking problem. The view has 
been attained by examining and exploring the full extent of football trafficking, and the 
factors that have contributed to its prevalence within the sport. The analysis in the project 
entailed an evaluation of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies, highlighting the core factors which 
have undermined its policy performance, and which ultimately resulted in FIFA’s regulatory 
failure. The thesis then proposed a range of recommendations to FIFA that could better curb 
football trafficking. The recommendations included requests for FIFA to reform its 
organisational structure and regulatory practices, which would enable it to create more 
effective anti-trafficking policies. The thesis argues that the aim of these policies should be 
to prevent the occurrence of football trafficking, whilst simultaneously protecting the 
African football minors from the adverse human rights conditions related to the running of 
the sport. 
12.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
At the start of this project, the thesis set out to answer the following three research questions: 
1. What are the key factors leading to the trafficking and exploitation of African 
minors? 
2. Are current regulatory responses to the problem adequate? 
3. How could an alternate regulatory framework succeed in limiting football 
trafficking? 
12.1.1 Question One  
Chapter 2 uncovered that there were several key factors that contributed to the trafficking of 
African football minors. Such as: The Bosman ruling and the aftermath of the ruling. After 
Bosman, EU football teams were more inclined to use the non-EU football transfer markets 
as a means of sourcing a wider range of cheap players to make profits. Similarly, after 
Bosman, the football environment saw an increase in the commodification of children, and 
this was fuelled by certain FIFA policies and practices like the home-grown player rule and 
training compensation. The FIFA rules, thereby, gave unscrupulous persons and football 
teams a reason to capitalise on the increased commodification of children in the sport. Such 
as, by enabling them to utilise the availability of the cheaper but equally profitable football 
talent from outside the EU.  
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Thereafter, several football teams in developed countries and regions entered into transfer 
agreements with the teams and academies in developing regions in Africa. These agreements 
enabled the richer EU teams to essentially “farm” Africa and African talent, discovering the 
most talented players and grooming them for exportation. Upon arrival in Europe, and 
provided the player performs well, the player could be kept because he is improving the 
team’s performances and allowing them to achieve their sporting and commercial targets, or 
the player could be sold to a bigger team for significant profits. Thus, the football 
environment considers the players to be assets rather than children, and the younger they are, 
the easier it is for the teams to train and develop their playing ability to fit a European mould, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of the teams receiving greater profits from any subsequent 
sale of the player. 
As the EU teams cherry-picked the best African players, the other aspiring players on the 
continent began viewing migrating to Europe for professional football as a prerequisite for 
achieving success through the sport. This contributed to the enhanced migratory disposition 
of the African football minors, which makes them increasingly susceptible to trafficking and 
exploitation when a professional playing opportunity is offered (irrespective of the validity 
of such an offer). The history of colonisation and previous colonial links between European 
teams and African source countries also supplements the players’ migratory disposition. 
Furthermore, several EU teams continue to harness their prior colonial links by conducting 
neo-colonial recruitment practises to attain the African players. By using their superior 
financial capabilities to obtain the best players from the smaller and financially inferior 
African sides. 
Chapter 3 considered that the African football minors have been engaged in trafficking and 
exploitation-like situations due to the unique intersection between the push-pull factors of 
human migration, and the personal and professional development opportunities potentially 
on offer to them through football. The factors pushing the players to leave the African 
continent (poverty, youth unemployment, poor footballing infrastructure), and the football 
opportunities pulling them towards Europe (increased financial incentives) provides a 
dynamic in the sport where unscrupulous persons are able to deceive and exploit the boys 
through false promises of footballing stardom. The players are either defrauded and left in 
Africa, transported abroad and abandoned, or trafficked abroad and exploited upon arrival. 
Yet, despite these instances and stories of football trafficking and exploitation, more African 
players continue to take the “calculated risk” involved in going abroad through illicit means, 
owing to the absence of legal avenues for them to migrate. 
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This absence of migration opportunities for the African players can be attributed to FIFA’s 
ban on ITMs. Discussions in the thesis identified how the ban has been counterintuitive for 
the players. As, rather than protecting them from exploitation, the ban pushes the players to 
depend on unscrupulous persons to make the clandestine trip abroad a possibility, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of them being trafficked and subsequently exploited. FIFA’s anti-
trafficking laws have not only been ineffective in affording the requisite protections for the 
African football minors, but the laws have arguably been contributory towards the 
establishment of the football environment where trafficking is rife. The lack of protection 
for non-EU minors in its laws, and the plethora of regulatory loopholes within its anti-
trafficking policies, are factors which suggests that FIFA’s regulatory responses have not 
been tailored to the problem. Instead, the rules have given leeway for unscrupulous persons 
and football teams to find means of creatively/not complying with FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policies, as they continue to export and exploit young African players, both within and 
beneath FIFA’s radar.  
12.1.2 Question Two 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, involved a comprehensive evaluation of FIFA’s anti-trafficking 
policies to determine the adequacy of its regulations. The assessment revealed that FIFA’s 
policies did not have the desired impact in changing the behaviours of its regulatees. And 
without changed behaviours, FIFA’s policies were not able to achieve the specific regulatory 
objective of curbing football trafficking, making the policies inadequate. However, the 
analysis revealed that the performance of FIFA’s anti-trafficking policies was not completely 
dissimilar to the performance of the wider international law anti-trafficking instruments. The 
assessment uncovered that this similar performance was primarily due to the relevant 
policies all viewing the trafficking problem, and the possible solutions for preventing it, from 
prisms of criminality and migration, rather than from a perspective which provides a 
workable solution towards addressing some of the root causes of child trafficking. 
Moreover, the evaluation of FIFA’s policies showed that there were several key social, 
systemic, and structural factors, that hindered the organisation’s anti-trafficking policies 
from being adequate. The social (i.e., recruitment strategies of teams pulling players to 
Europe through financial incentives, and the conditions in Africa which pushes the Africans 
to pursue professional playing contracts abroad), systemic (i.e., data deficits in football 
trafficking), and the structural factors (i.e., corruption and conflicting interests amidst FIFA 
officials), all allude to deficiencies in FIFA’s policy deliberations and regulatory practices. 
These factors not only exacerbated the rate of the football trafficking problem in the regime, 
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but they also underlined the inadequacy of FIFA’s regulatory responses to curbing football 
trafficking. Further analysis into FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy performance showed that 
FIFA’s deficient practices were augmented by the organisation’s composition as a self-
regulatory association. FIFA’s status as an SRA, and a TPR with extensive regulatory 
powers, meant that FIFA’s malfunctioning policies are often a by-product of the broader 
issue of its lacking legitimacy and accountability. 
The absence of regulatory legitimacy meant that FIFA’s regulations are at times not 
representative of the wishes of its regulatees (and other parties affected by its regime), 
thereby increasing the likelihood of noncompliance with FIFA’s policies. Whereas, due to 
the absent accountability at FIFA, there is no external or overarching body or nation state 
able to impose essential consequences upon FIFA for the non-achievement of regulatory 
objectives. With no accountability, there is a limited incentive for FIFA to amend its 
regulations and prevent the further detrimental failings of its anti-trafficking policy actions. 
FIFA is therefore able to continue operating as normal, without any consequences, despite 
the violations to players’ rights and the adverse human rights risks faced by the African 
football minors operating both within and on the periphery of the sport. The examination of 
FIFA’s anti-trafficking regulatory responses concluded that the policies have been 
inadequate in curbing the football trafficking problem. This is because the policies were 
determined to be deficient in line with both the rhetorical and analytical approaches generally 
used to ascertain the existence of regulatory failure. 
12.1.3 Question Three 
In chapters 9, 10, and 11, recommendations were made to FIFA to undergo key 
organisational reforms as a means of remedying the identified regulatory failures. The 
reforms would rebalance FIFA’s structure, and redistribute football’s resources to limit the 
impact of the structural factors which undermined FIFA’s anti-trafficking policy 
performance. Also, regarding the problems related to its status as a decentred body, it was 
recommended that FIFA should introduce better legitimacy and accountability practices for 
its regulatory operations. Such as, by adopting the use of a challenge function, and 
appointing truly independent personnel and groups able to hold FIFA to account from within. 
The aim of such practices is to improve the efficacy of FIFA’s further anti-trafficking 
policies, in order to ensure that there are no adverse human rights risks or side-effects caused 
to the African football minors as a consequence of FIFA’s policy actions. 
It was proposed that FIFA should adopt essential processes during the preliminary policy 
deliberations stage, the decision-making stage, and the enforcement stages of actioning the 
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effective anti-trafficking policies, to counter the systemic factors undermining its prior 
policy performance. The preliminary stage should consist of the use of regulatory impact 
assessments, involving human rights experts, and including the views and lived experiences 
of the trafficked African football minors. During the decision-making stage, FIFA should 
welcome input from external IGOs, NGOs, and nation states, so that a concerted approach 
is adopted to tackling this transnational problem. For effective enforcement, it was suggested 
that FIFA should adopt an important practice from the regulatory literature, i.e., the 
“DREAM” framework. The framework provides a better means of detecting instances of 
football trafficking; offering a more tailored response to the problem; using both persuasive 
and deterrent methods to enforcing FIFA’s policies and achieving regulatory compliance; 
undergoing a continuous assessment of the policy performance; and modifying aspects of the 
provisions to react to the circumstances within the regime that may be resulting in non-
compliant behaviour. 
Furthermore, as an underlying response to the social factors which undermined FIFA’s anti-
trafficking regulatory responses, there were three recommendations: the child-centred 
approach, the creation of more legal routes into football for the African minors, and the 
alternate regulatory model. 
The child-centred approach will enable FIFA’s policies to be cognisant of the social factors 
that put the aspiring child footballers at an increased risk of trafficking and exploitation. The 
recommended child-centred approach should be guided by the UNCRC, putting the best 
interests of the child, and the child’s rights, as paramount factors in the regulations relevant 
to offering the children requisite protections from situations of trafficking and exploitation. 
To achieve the best interests of the child within the context of football trafficking, it is 
essential that children (specifically trafficked African football minors who have both been 
successful and unsuccessful in playing professional football abroad), are given a voice to 
contribute to vital policy actions. Through their essential input, the children will be able to 
give insight into how best to prevent the crime, and what key protections they would have 
benefitted from, based on their first-hand experiences.  
FIFA, in creating more legal routes into football for the African minors, would also be able 
to counter some of the social factors which have hindered the performance of its anti-
trafficking policies. The absence of legal routes previously propelled the minors into the 
hands of unscrupulous agents/intermediaries looking to traffic and exploit them, as the lack 
of options gave the aspiring players limited choices for regular migration through football. 
Hence, the aspiring footballers generally had to engage with unlicensed agents and football 
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academies in order to gain opportunities to go abroad, which was mostly to the players’ 
detriment. Therefore, the creation of more legitimate routes into football should be viewed 
as a human rights remedy to countering football trafficking. Through these legal routes, it is 
believed that the African football minors would no longer be dependent on unscrupulous 
agents and illicit football academies to have a chance at playing professional football outside 
Africa. And due to the increased options made available to the players, the African minors 
and their parents would be less likely to fall for the deceptive ploys of mala fide persons 
looking to take advantage of them. 
In countering the undermining social factors (and in line with answering the third research 
question) chapter 11 considered the use of a more nuanced alternate regulatory model to 
curbing football trafficking. The analysis entailed discussions on how developing Africa and 
African football would be a means of tackling the core vulnerabilities of the African football 
minors. Noting how sports development and sports for development programmes should be 
equally adopted to have the desired impact in the region. Core elements of successful SDP 
programmes were also explained, such as: FIFA and its collaborators must have clear targets 
about what the programmes intend to achieve; Collaborations and monitoring are essential 
to know the true impact the provisions are having in the target regions; and local involvement 
is essential for the initiatives to be successful. The local involvement emphasises the 
necessity of a bottom-up approach to instituting tailored programmes which are able to cater 
to the needs of the countries and communities in which the initiatives are being conducted. 
The SDP initiatives will empower the community, the football teams, and the personnel in 
the regions, to be more self-sustainable and less dependent on foreign aid and assistance. 
These significant development investments in Africa and African football could potentially 
have longstanding benefits for the region. Still, as widely significant as these programmes 
may be, the primary goal is that they limit the social vulnerabilities of the at-risk children, 
and that they lessen the avenues and opportunities for unscrupulous agents and 
intermediaries to engage, traffic, and exploit the African football minors. 
12.2 THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis is significant because it uncovers key flaws in the regulatory approaches to 
curbing football trafficking. The research identifies that the prevalence of football trafficking 
has stemmed, in part, from the misconceived policies introduced to tackle the problem. The 
study does not attain its significance by contradicting any previous research on the subject 
matter, but rather, acquires its significance through the extensive recommendations provided 
to counter FIFA’s previously misconceived anti-trafficking regulatory responses. 
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The thesis underlines that banning or limiting the international transfer of minors, or 
providing additional immigration requirements and restrictions on labour migration, are 
policy responses that adopt a surface level stance to curbing a deep-rooted problem such as 
trafficking. Therefore, an adequate policy response must be able to target the root causes of 
the problem to have a longstanding and beneficial impact for the persons it is supposed to 
protect. Effective anti-trafficking policies able to curb football trafficking must be: 1) 
inclusive in its formation, attaining all necessary input and expertise possible to arrive at an 
enhanced policy response; 2) extensive in its reach, owing to the transnationality of the crime 
and the involved actors, the policy response must be able to limit all avenues for breach and 
provide extended protections for trafficked persons no matter the destination countries; and 
3) fundamental in its long-term applicability and sustainability, able to improve and tackle 
the root causes of the problem, and limit the vulnerabilities of the  common victims, who in 
this case are the African football minors. 
The study provides key implications for various parties involved in football trafficking. At 
a general level, the study should be the basis for FIFA (as a regulator, and its regulatees in 
the form of football clubs and personnel), other sports governing bodies, IGOs, NGOs, 
nation states, and law enforcement personnel, to undergo a thorough re-orientation about all 
facets related to the occurrence of football trafficking. This will enable the involved parties 
to treat the football minors more appropriately upon discovery, which will then aid further 
efforts towards countering its occurrence. At a sporting level, the thesis has implications for 
FIFA and other SGBs affected by sports trafficking, as they would be able to use the 
recommendations as a basis to improve their regulatory practises and also their anti-
trafficking policy responses. At an international policy level, practitioners and policymakers 
should consider this project as a call to action for more oversight, involvement, and 
collaboration with FIFA pertaining to the organisation’s handling of this football trafficking 
problem. The increased collaboration would ensure that there is a concerted, transparent, and 
accountable approach towards tackling this transnational issue. At an academic level, the 
analysis lays the foundation for more data and empirical research to be conducted in 
furtherance of the thorough recommendations provided herein, to affirm how the improved 
policies would directly lead to curbing football trafficking. 
Through the unique insight provided by this research, it is certain that effective regulation 
holds the key to countering the football trafficking problem in the long term. But to be 
impactful, the regulatory approach must be comprehensive and able to constantly react to 
the changing dynamics within the football environment. Adapting to the environment, whilst 
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maintaining the underlying protections the policies are supposed to provide for the at-risk 
children, is a key challenge for FIFA. Yet, it is a balance that FIFA must achieve in order to 
curb football trafficking and prevent the continued instances of child exploitation taking 
place within the sport. 
12.3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD 
This research provided a two-fold contribution to the literature on football trafficking. First, 
the theoretical perspective used (in combination with the socio-legal methodology) allowed 
the project to offer a unique insight into the causes of the football trafficking problem. The 
diagnostic and subsequent remedial application of the regulatory theory lens, then provided 
the platform for pertinent recommendations to be made to FIFA to improve its anti-
trafficking policies. The thesis has made significant contributions that will enable FIFA to 
amend its regulatory processes and procedures, and to introduce more effective anti-
trafficking laws that are tailored to the circumstances of football trafficking. The subsequent 
laws formed, if based on the recommendations of this research, would be better positioned 
to protect the African football minors. This is because the relevant anti-trafficking policies 
would be reflective of (and resistant to) the social, systemic, and structural factors that 
previously undermined and hindered FIFA’s policy responses.  
Second, this thesis has contributed to the growing legal commentary on football trafficking 
and has proposed a nuanced solution to curbing the problem in the long-term. By using the 
alternate regulatory model, FIFA would be able to effectively tackle some of the root 
vulnerabilities of the African football minors, which had previously led them into the 
precarious situations of trafficking and exploitation. 
12.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There were some limitations to the research that hindered the provision of more concrete 
recommendations. These limitations may have subsequently reduced the validity of some of 
the proposals to tackling football trafficking, owing to the embedded generalisations within 
the research. The research was hindered by methodological limitations with the recruitment 
of participants who had experience of football trafficking. Without consulting the African 
football minors, the research was unable to evidence that the proposals would truly afford 
the requisite protections to the minors, nor did the research show how the recommendations 
could, in practice, prevent the occurrence of football trafficking. Instead, the 
recommendations were based on the desk-based research method, and the writer’s own 
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intuition, rather than on the lived experiences and responses from the African minors with 
first-hand knowledge of football trafficking. 
This lack of insight from the minors arguably limits the validity of some of the arguments 
entailed within the study. For example, even though the discussions on the workability of 
the alternate regulatory model to countering football trafficking are informative, it is noted 
that the discussions in chapter 11 only provides a partial answer to the third research question 
of: “how could an alternate regulatory framework succeed in limiting football trafficking?”. 
The analysis showed the necessary steps that should be taken to successfully action the 
alternate regulatory model, but the link between the model and any possible reduction or 
limitation in the instances of football trafficking are clearly hindered by the absence of 
empirical data within the study.  
Part of the limitations in the recruitment of the participants came from the fact that the 
research has been self-funded. In this project, there were no budgetary provisions for 
undertaking significant empirical research in target regions, to interact and gain insight from 
the minors directly, in the same way as the scholars in sociology were able to achieve. Had 
the research been funded, the study would have benefited from similarly engaging 
conversations with the African minors, this time, through a socio-legal approach. The minors 
would have been able to provide key insight on: their thought processes when choosing to 
bypass relevant laws to undertake the clandestine trips abroad; their perception of FIFA’s 
anti-trafficking policies, and how the policies may be putting them in precarious situations; 
if the recommendations to FIFA provided in this study would have had any effect in limiting 
their migratory disposition or their core vulnerabilities; and, whether the proposed policies 
would have been able to protect them from trafficking and other exploitative situations. 
Admittedly, despite the contributions to the field, the research’s limitations suggest that there 
are several avenues for growth, and that increased empirical data is essential going forward.  
12.5 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are key areas for further research to extend on the recommendations in this study. 
These can be described through the following questions for academics and policy advisers 
in the field: 
1. Should generic recommendations for more effective anti-trafficking policies be put 
through a rigorous evaluations process? Perhaps, one that is tailored to the specific 
regime to ensure its workability and capacity to achieve the desired outcomes? 
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2. How can more empirical research be conducted in the field to uncover the direct 
effects of the anti-trafficking policy recommendations? 
3. What tests would enable the regulators and policy makers to know when there is a 
reduction in football trafficking cases brought about by one recommendation and not 
another? For example, how would we know if there is a reduction in football 
trafficking due to the creation of more legal routes for labour migration as opposed 
to the development of African football? 
4. What basis is there to determine if the vulnerabilities of a people or community has 
been reduced through the development programmes? And how can this be 
subsequently, and explicitly, linked to any diminished instances of football 
trafficking? 
5. Using a wider range of international regulatory provisions for limiting human 
trafficking, how have these other instruments performed in their respective regimes, 
and what are the factors affecting (or leading to) optimal policy performance?  
6. What other instances has regulatory theory been proposed as a viable lens to improve 
the regulatory practices of a self-regulatory organisation or an SGB? What was the 
result of the recommendations and how were the proposals actioned? Were the 
recommendations able to have the desired impact and bring about the requisite 
behaviour change in the regime? 
7. What has been the response to sports trafficking amongst other SGBs, and what 
practices have they introduced to limit its occurrence? 
8. Are the practices of the other SGBs regarding trafficking more comprehensive and 
successful when compared to that of FIFA’s? Or are their regulatory responses more 
adequate because there are generally less instances of wider sports trafficking?  
9. At what point can African football be said to have developed to an appropriate level 
able to restrict the occurrence of football trafficking? 
These questions are pertinent for further analysis into football trafficking, they are essential 
in creating a structured plan towards preventing the crime and protecting the African football 
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